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1.1. General Introduction 
One of the fundamental issues in management accounting is understanding cost 
behavior. In general, cost behavior refers to the change in resource consumption and 
supply levels when activities change (Cooper & Kaplan, 1992). Thus, cost behavior 
analysis investigates how costs react to changes in activity levels, the causes of these 
reactions, and the consequences of these cost changes (Banker, Byzalov, Fang, & Liang, 
2018).   
The traditional cost behavior analysis assumes that costs should change 
proportionally to changes in activity level (Anderson, Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003). 
However, since  Anderson et al. (2003), numerous studies have demonstrated that costs 
do not necessarily react proportionally to changes in activity level. More specifically, 
these studies have shown that oftentimes the increase in costs when the level of firm 
activity increases is greater than the decrease in costs in response to an activity decrease 
(e.g., Calleja, Steliaros, & Thomas, 2006;  Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012;  Dierynck, 
Landsman, & Renders, 2012). This “cost stickiness” or “sticky cost behavior” is the result 
of managers’ preference for making asymmetric resource adjustment decisions ( Banker 
& Byzalov, 2014;  Banker et al., 2018). Specifically, managers add resources when 







however, they may decide to keep idle resources if they perceive that it is more costly to 
reduce resources than to retain them ( Anderson et al., 2003). 
Managers make asymmetric resource adjustment decisions due to various reasons 
that can be grouped into four major determinants of cost stickiness. Firstly, firms have to 
incur adjustment costs (costs to reduce these resources and to reacquire them when the 
activity level returns to the previous level) when deciding to remove unused resources 
(Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018). Therefore, it is likely that greater 
adjustment costs increase the magnitude of cost stickiness because managers are less 
willing to reduce unused resources with greater adjustment costs (Banker, Byzalov, & 
Chen, 2013) 
 Secondly, when managers are optimistic (pessimistic) about future sales prospects, 
they are less (more) likely to reduce idle resources when sales decline because they expect 
the decline to be temporary (permanent) ( Banker & Byzalov, 2014;  Banker et al., 2018). 
Most studies use economics-based variables as proxies of managerial expectation of 
future sales, such as successive sales decreases and GDP growth (Anderson et al., 2003), 
sales conditions in two most recent periods (Banker, Byzalov, Ciftci, & Mashruwala, 
2014), and recession (Banker, Fang, & Mehta, 2012). However, another research stream 
predicts that specific managerial characteristics such as CEO overconfidence lead firms 
to exhibit a more optimistic managerial expectation of future sales and eventually greater 
cost stickiness (e.g., Qin, Mohan, & Kuang, 2015). 
Thirdly, managerial incentives influence cost stickiness. Managers arguably 
consider their own interests when making resource adjustment decisions (Banker & 
Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018). Regarding this issue, governance factors 







make certain decisions (Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012). In this respect, 
ownership type is an important component of corporate governance that likely affect cost 
stickiness (Banker et al., 2018). Ownership type is likely to affect firms’ cost behavior 
because it affects whether and how owners will receive the benefits of firms’ cost-
controlling activities (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998). 
Consequently, different owners have different incentives to control costs and firms with 
different ownership types are likely to exhibit different cost behavior (Banker et al., 
2018). For example, firms are likely to exhibit greater cost stickiness when their owners 
consider maintaining unutilized resources when sales decline to be beneficial for their 
interests. 
Among various ownership types, state and family ownership are pervasive 
worldwide (La Porta, Shleifer, & Lopez-de-silanes, 1999; Shleifer, 1998;  Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). Despite massive privatization waves for decades, state ownership in profit-
seeking firms remains a norm in many countries, even in developed ones (Megginson, 
2005). For example, in 2011, firms with significant state ownership in 27 OECD countries 
employed more than 4.3 million people and had a market value of more than US$ 1.3 
trillion. Thus, these firms contributed to about 15% of the countries’ total GDP 
(Christiansen, 2011). Meanwhile, family firms dominate the global economy. It is even 
estimated that family firms contribute to between 70%-90% of global GDP (Family Firms 
Institute, 2015). 
These two firm types arguably exhibit a distinctive characteristic in the sense that 
they pursue both nonfinancial and financial objectives. For example, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) greatly emphasize socio-political goals to serve their governments’ 







socio-political objectives often contradicts firms’ financial objectives and makes it more 
difficult to measure overall firm performance (Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). In a similar 
vein, families generate emotional wealth from owning their firms, such as family 
reputation, the continuation of the family dynasty, and the preservation of family culture. 
Consequently, owning families tend to prioritize their emotional wealth from their 
ownership over their financial objectives (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & de Castro, 2011). 
The pursuit of both nonfinancial and financial objectives of SOEs and family firms 
arguably affects their cost stickiness. When sales decline, these SOEs and family firms 
are likely to maintain unused resources because they consider reducing costs as 
detrimental to their nonfinancial objectives. Such a decision increases the degree of cost 
stickiness because the degree of cost increase when sales increase is higher than the 
degree of cost decrease when sales decline (Anderson et al., 2003).  
Finally, recent accounting and finance literature has also demonstrated that CEOs’ 
personal characteristics matter in explaining various firm outcomes and behaviors (e.g., 
Olsen, Dworkis, & Young, 2017; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015; 
Bernile, Bhagwat, & Rau, 2017). CEOs make important decisions for their firm ( Bertrand 
& Schoar, 2003), including resource adjustment ones. It is then likely that their 
characteristics shape their decisions by affecting their perception of their environment 
and the way they respond to the environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 
2007). 
An important CEO personal characteristic that likely affects firm performance is 
managerial ability. Managerial ability itself refers to managers’ superior skills to utilize 







Lev, & McVay, 2012). Previous studies have demonstrated that better able managers 
improve firm performance because of their ability to increase sales (Chen, Podolski, & 
Veeraraghavan, 2015; Bonsall IV, Holzman, & Miller, 2017; Demerjian et al., 2012; 
Koester, Shevlin, & Wangerin, 2017). However, increasing future sales does not 
necessarily imply higher profitability because sales increases often require additional 
resources. Firms can capitalize their sales increases into better performance only when 
they add resources at a lower pace than their sales growth (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; 
Davidsson, Steffens, & Fitzsimmons, 2009). In this respect, firms that manage to acquire 
resources with lower adjustment costs are more likely to increase future profitability 
because the costs of adding resources are less than future sales increase (Banker & 
Byzalov, 2014;  Banker et al., 2018). 
Since cost-efficient firms tend to have resources with lower adjustment costs sales 
(Anderson, Banker, Huang, & Janakiraman, 2007; Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, & 
Homburg, 2010), the performance effect of managerial ability may well be more 
pronounced for these firms. In such a context, better able managers are therefore more 
likely to translate their future sales increases into higher future performance.  
1.2. Research Question and Use of Theories 
The main research questions of this thesis are: (1) to what extent and under which 
circumstances does ownership type (state and family ownership) affect the degree of cost 
stickiness, and (2) what are the performance consequences of managerial ability and does 
a firm’s cost efficiency influence these consequences? To answer the research questions, 
this thesis uses several theories from economics (agency theory), family business 
(socioemotional wealth theory), and management (upper echelon theory) that are briefly 








1.2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory is an often used theory in economics, finance, and accounting 
literature. It argues that the delegation of control from owners as the principals to 
managers as the agents runs the risk of conflict between two parties because they have 
their self-interests that are different or even in conflict with each other. Because managers 
directly control firms, they have greater opportunities to maximize their self-interests at 
the expense of the owners’. Thus, owners have to expend greater resources to control 
managers’ behavior and to motivate their managers to maximize their interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). An extension of this theory predicts the potential conflicts between 
different owners who have different interests. In this respect, the horizontal agency or 
principal-principal agency problems exist when controlling shareholders due to their 
controlling share ownership, pursue their interests that potentially harm non-controlling 
shareholders’ interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This theory has also been applied in 
other settings that exhibit agency relationships between principals (persons or entities 
who delegate their power) and agents (persons or entities who receive the delegation of 
power to act on behalf of principals) (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), such as in political 
setting in which citizens delegate their power to politicians to run governments on behalf 
of their interests. Because politicians have better access to public resources than their 
citizens, they have greater opportunities to exploit this advantage for their interests 
(Besley & Coate, 2003)  even at the expense of their citizens’. For example, when 
politicians wish to be reelected in subsequent elections, they have greater incentives to 








Chapter 2 of this thesis relies heavily on this theory. Specifically, the chapter argues 
that politicians are likely to instruct SOEs to serve their socio-political interests at the 
expense of these firms’ financial performance (Bai et al., 2000; Megginson, 2005). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of socio-political objectives in SOEs makes it more difficult 
for governments (as principals) to monitor SOE managers’ behavior (Bai et al., 2000; 
Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Consequently, SOE managers have greater opportunities 
to maximize their self-interests when making decisions, including resource-adjustment 
ones. 
We also implicitly use this theory in chapter 3 that investigates cost stickiness of 
family firms relative to non-family firms. In hypothesis 2a, we predict that cost stickiness 
of family firms is concentrated among family firms with high family ownership. The 
underlying notion of this hypothesis is that higher family ownership enables owning 
families to pursue their interests, in this respect the protection of their socioemotional 
wealth, that will potentially differ from or even contradict non-family shareholders’ 
interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  Thus, our arguments in this chapter are basically in 
line with the horizontal agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders 
in which large share ownerships enable controlling shareholders to pursue their interests 
at the expense of minority shareholders’ (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
1.2.2. Socioemotional Wealth Theory 
Socioemotional wealth refers to “the nonfinancial aspects of the firm that meet the 
family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The socioemotional 
wealth perspective suggests that family firms use their socioemotional wealth as the 







socioemotional wealth over their financial objectives in the sense that they prefer options 
that preserve their socioemotional wealth although these options may jeopardize their 
financial wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, & Imperatore, 2014). 
This perspective theoretically underlies chapter 3 of this thesis. In this chapter, we 
use the socioemotional wealth perspective to predict that family firms exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms. Further, we analyze the consequences of family firms’ 
cost stickiness for one-year-ahead performance change using this perspective. 
1.2.3. Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper echelon theory suggests that top managers’ personal characteristics 
significantly affect their operational and strategic decisions and firm outcomes (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). The main premise of the upper echelon theory is that 
top managers process information, analyze problems, find alternative solutions to solve 
the problems and finally select solutions that they consider the most appropriate 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Such strategic decision-making processes often expose 
managers to complex situations that are difficult for them to understand and analyze fully. 
Consequently, they tend to develop selective interpretations of their environments to 
simplify their decision-making process (Hambrick, 2007). In this respect, upper echelon 
theory argues that top managers’ personal characteristics affect the way top managers 
interpret their environments and make decisions based on their interpretation. Because of 
the importance of their decisions to their firms, managers’ personal characteristics will 
eventually affect their firms’ behavior and outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2007).  
The upper echelon perspective is the theoretical basis of chapter 4 of this 







ability as a CEO characteristic on future firm performance. More importantly, the chapter 
also highlights the importance of firm characteristics in moderating the impact of 
managerial characteristics on firm performance.  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation also relies on this theory when we predict that the cost 
stickiness of family firms is concentrated in family firms led by family CEOs. Family 
CEOs are more emotionally attached to their firms and more protected from managerial 
job market mechanisms (Strike, Berrone, Sapp, & Congiu, 2015). These characteristics 
arguably lead their firms to exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms because 
these CEOs are better able to preserve socioemotional wealth. 
1.3. Outline of the Remainder of the Thesis 
This dissertation includes three studies that can be found in chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
Chapter 2 demonstrates the effect of state ownership on labor cost stickiness and reveals 
how several socio-political factors exhibit different effects on labor cost stickiness of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. Further, chapter 3 shows the impact of 
family ownership on cost stickiness. This chapter also demonstrates the consequence of 
family firms’ changes in cost ratio for one-year-ahead earnings change. Lastly, chapter 4 
analyzes the effect of managerial ability on firm performance and the role of cost 
efficiency in moderating this relationship. Table 1.1 below shows the characteristics of 












Table 1.1  Characteristics of the Chapters in This Dissertation 
Characteristic Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Cost behavior-related 
variable  
 Cost stickiness  Cost stickiness 
 Cost ratio 
 Cost efficiency 




and variable of interest 
 State ownership 
increases cost 
stickiness. 
 The effect of 
strategic industries, 
election years and 
left-wing 
governments on cost 
stickiness is greater 
in SOEs than in 
private firms. 
 SOEs exhibit less 
cost stickiness before 
privatization years. 
 Family ownership 
increases cost 
stickiness. 
 The effect of family 
ownership on cost 
stickiness is 
concentrated in family 
firms with a higher 
percentage of family 
ownership, family 
CEO, and family 
directors. 
 Family firms’ change 
in cost ratio negatively 
affects future earnings 
change. 




ability on future 
performance  
 
The studies use different research settings for the analysis. The sample of Chapter 
2 consists of more than 40,000 firm-year observations representing nonfinancial firms 
listed in 22 European countries as covered by the Datastream for the years 1993-2012. 
Chapter 3 uses the family ownership data of  Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) and 
Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) for 2000 US largest firms from 2001-2010.  
Meanwhile, chapter 4 relies on more than 130 thousand US firm-year observations of 
firms included in the Compustat database from 1980 to 2016 as the research sample. The 
following sections briefly explain the characteristics and findings of each chapter.  
 
1.3.1. Chapter 2: State Ownership, Socio-Political Factors, and Labor Cost 
Stickiness  
This chapter investigates the effect of state ownership on labor cost stickiness. 
Governments often require state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pursue both financial and 







2005; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  The presence of socio-political 
objectives is arguably detrimental to SOEs financial performance (Micco, Panizza, & 
Yanez, 2007; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Further, socio-political objectives 
are often in conflict with the financial goals of SOEs, thus making it more difficult to 
determine the relative importance of each objective of SOEs (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 
2004; Tirole, 1994). Eventually, it is difficult for states to measure the overall 
performance of SOEs and SOE managers have greater discretion in making decisions. 
Consequently, we predict that SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than 
private firms for the following reasons. Firstly, politicians or governments are likely to 
instruct their SOEs not to reduce labor costs when sales decline to support their socio-
political objectives, such as avoiding labor strikes or maintaining employment level 
(Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Secondly, 
it is also likely that SOE managers do not reduce labor costs when sales decline to avoid 
making difficult decisions (Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012) and that they use the 
socio-political objectives of their firms as an excuse. Further, governments as the 
shareholders will find it difficult to monitor and discipline SOE managers’ behavior 
because of the complexity in determining the relative importance of socio-political 
objectives of SOE performance measurement (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 
1994). Alternatively, SOE managers may decide to reduce fewer labor costs when sales 
decline due to the political intervention of ruling politicians (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Our empirical results support the hypothesis.  
Further, we predict that the effects of various socio-political variables on labor cost 
stickiness are stronger in SOEs than in private firms. More specifically, SOEs are more 







and under left-wing governments than private firms. Also, governments arguably have 
greater incentives to improve SOEs’ performance in the year before privatization takes 
place. SOEs are then willing to reduce costs when sales decline to enhance their 
performance in the pre-privatization years. Thus, we predict that SOEs exhibit lesser labor 
cost stickiness in the year prior to the privatization. Our empirical analysis of strategic 
industries does not support the hypothesis. However, the effects of election years and the 
political orientation of the ruling governments (left-wing vs. non-left-wing) are 
significantly stronger in SOEs than in private firms. Further, in the year prior to the 
privatization, privatized firms even exhibit an anti-sticky behavior. Thus, these latter 
findings support our hypothesis.  
 
1.3.2. Chapter 3: Cost Stickiness of Family Firms: A Socioemotional Wealth 
Perspective 
  Family firms use their socioemotional wealth as the reference point when making 
decisions, including resource adjustment decisions in response to sales changes.  When 
sales decline,  family firms are less likely to reduce costs because they perceive cutting 
resources as a threat to their socioemotional wealth (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2012; Block, 2010; Stavrou, Kassinis, & Filotheu, 2007). Thus, we then predict that 
family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms.  
Previous socioemotional wealth literature emphasizes that family firms differ in 
their ability and intention to preserve their socioemotional wealth due to various 
governance factors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Chapter 3 empirically demonstrates that 
the effect of family ownership on the degree of cost stickiness is concentrated among 







firms with such governance characteristics are arguably better able to preserve their 
socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) because owning 
families can exercise more direct control over their firms.  
The cost stickiness literature implies that firms’ decisions to retain unutilized 
resources when sales decline likely drive an increase in the cost ratio (a ratio between cost 
and sales).  Thus, this increase reflects managerial optimism about future sales and also 
positive earnings expectations (Anderson et al., 2007). 
We offer an additional explanation of the increase by using the socioemotional 
wealth perspective. We predict that family firms are likely to exhibit greater cost 
stickiness to preserve their socioemotional wealth. This decision will arguably increase 
their cost ratio because the change in costs is greater than the change in sales. However, 
family firms’ unutilized resources are less likely to be the productive ones because they 
use their socioemotional wealth, and not the productive capacity of the resources, as the 
basis for retaining resources. Thus, the increase in cost ratio is less likely to have a 
positive effect on earnings. Based on these arguments, we predict that for family firms’ 
cost ratio changes are more negatively associated with future earnings change and that 
this not the case for non-family firms. Our empirical results support this hypothesis. 
Specifically, the findings demonstrate that family firms’ cost ratio change is negatively 
associated with future earning change while for non-family firms the association is 
insignificant.  
 
1.3.3. Chapter 4: Managerial Ability, Cost Efficiency, and Firm Performance  
While the cost stickiness literature is mainly interested in cost changes that are not 







proportionally react to changes in activity level in the sense that the cost change that is 
greater than the change in firm activity level indicates firm inefficiency (Anderson et al., 
2007). Several studies (e.g., Brush & Bromiley, 2000; Hoitash, Hoitash, & Kurt, 2016; 
Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella Jr, 2013) rely on this “cost efficiency” view in their 
analysis. Specifically, these studies investigate the effects of various governance 
mechanisms (e.g., free cash flow and CFOs’ accounting background) on various firm 
performance indicators, including cost efficiency (e.g., Brush & Bromiley, 2000; Hoitash 
et al., 2016). Another study analyzes the effect of external presidents and non-president 
directors on firm performance when cost efficiency declines (Krause et al., 2013). 
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of cost efficiency in moderating the effect of managerial 
ability on future performance. Previous studies indicate that better able managers are 
more likely to increase firm performance, especially by their superior ability to increase 
sales (Demerjian et al., 2012; Bonsall IV et al., 2017). However, increasing future sales 
likely requires additional resources because current resources may be insufficient to meet 
increasing sales. Only when the increase in resources is less than the increase in sales, 
firms can translate higher sales into higher profitability (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; 
Davidsson et al., 2009). Thus, cost efficiency is as important as the ability to increase 
sales in generating higher future profitability because cost-efficient firms are more likely 
to add a lower level of resources in anticipation of increased future sales (Anderson et al., 
2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, we predict that firms’ cost efficiency enhances the performance effect 
of managerial ability. As suggested by the cost stickiness literature, when future sales 
increase, cost-efficient firms will generate a higher future performance only if they 







decline and to reacquire these resources when future sales increase) (Anderson et al., 
2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). Because cost efficiency tends to persist, it is likely that 
cost-efficient firms manage to acquire resources with lower adjustment costs when their 
future sales increase (Anderson et al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010).  
Based on these arguments, this study predicts that current cost efficiency moderates 
the effect of managerial ability on future performance. When better able managers 
manage cost-efficient firms, they will be able to add resources to meet increasing future 
sales with lower additional costs. Eventually, their firms will generate higher future 
profitability because the degree of sales increase is greater than the degree of cost 
increase. In general, our empirical results support the hypotheses. Thus, our study 
demonstrates that it is important to consider firm characteristics in explaining the effect 
of managerial ability on firm performance.  
 
1.3.4. Chapter 5: Conclusions 
As the last chapter, chapter 5 highlights the contributions of this dissertation. 
Firstly, chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation demonstrate the importance of ownership type 
in explaining cost stickiness. Secondly, chapter 4 shows the importance of cost efficiency 
as a firm characteristic in explaining the performance effect of managerial ability. Chapter 
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This article examines the effect of state ownership on the labor cost stickiness of firms in 
22 European countries. States are more likely to interfere in the decision-making 
processes of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and demand firm activities that are desirable 
from a socio-political perspective. For example, to win political support, politicians may 
instruct SOEs to avoid layoffs to minimize unemployment rates. The varied objectives of 
state-owned enterprises also make it more difficult to control managers’ behavior, leaving 
more room for managerial discretion and the pursuit of self-interests through empire-
building behavior. Both state intervention and managerial self-interest restrain managers 
from laying off employees or reducing employee wages when sales decrease, which may 
lead to greater labor cost stickiness. Data from 1993–2012 reveal that SOEs exhibit 
greater labor cost stickiness than private firms, and their labor cost stickiness also varies 
predictably with socio-political variables such as election years and left-wing 
governments.  
 





This study focuses on differences in labor cost stickiness between state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which are fully or partially owned by a government (Gupta, 2005; 
Megginson, 2005; Wang & Yung, 2011), and private firms. Increased pressures to pursue 
                                                          
1 This chapter draws substantially on Prabowo, R., Hooghiemstra, R.B.H, and Van Veen-Dirks, P. (2018).  









socio-political objectives and the difficulties involved in controlling managers, due to the 
wider range of objectives they confront, cause SOEs to operate less efficiently. 
Consequently, we predict and find, that SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than 
private firms. Moreover, we predict that membership in strategic industries, election 
years, and left-wing governments increase SOEs’ labor cost stickiness. Finally, firms are 
predicted to show less labor cost stickiness in the year prior to privatization. Using a data 
set that spans 22 European countries and 40,418 observations for 1993–2012, we 
document that except for membership in strategic industries these socio-political factors 
affect the degree of cost stickiness.  
Cost stickiness exists if costs increase more when the level of activity rises than 
they decrease when this activity level falls (e.g.,  Anderson et al., 2003; Banker, Byzalov 
& Chen, 2013; Chen et al., 2012). It arises from managers’ resource adjustment decisions. 
When activity levels increase, managers add resources to meet growing demand; when 
activity levels fall, they retain their underutilized resources, because they perceive the 
costs of reducing the resources as higher than the costs of holding them ( Anderson et al., 
2003).  
Notwithstanding widespread privatization in recent decades, states still own shares 
in many firms, and SOEs remain an important component of European countries’ 
economies (e.g., Christiansen, 2011; Megginson, 2005). In our sample, for example, 
SOEs account for about 12.62% and 17.60% of total employees and total revenues, 
respectively. Many SOEs also dominate strategic industries (e.g., utilities, electricity, 
mining, defense), which enhances their importance for countries’ economies. The 
importance of SOEs, in turn, has generated a considerable stream of literature about the 
effects of state ownership on firm performance and firm behavior (e.g., Ben-Nasr, 
 
 




Boubakri, & Cosset, 2012; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; 
Gupta, 2005). However, a research area that remains unexplored is the effect of state 
ownership on cost behavior, even though financial performance is strongly influenced by 
cost behavior.  
In this sense, a key feature of SOEs is that the state can interfere in their decision-
making processes and operations. This direct influence enables governments or 
politicians to leverage SOEs to realize their broader goals, such as social objectives, or to 
secure their own political interests (Megginson, 2005; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1994). It follows that profit maximization is not SOEs’ sole objective; rather, they have 
multiple objectives and must weigh different interests. It is thus unclear how SOEs’ 
overall performance should be measured, which in turn makes monitoring SOE managers 
very complex, such that these managers may have an easier time pursuing their own self-
interests (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994) and building empires (Chen et 
al., 2012). Accordingly, SOEs are likely to operate less efficiently than private firms 
(Boardman & Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). For example, SOEs are less 
inclined to lay off employees or reduce employee wages when sales decrease, which leads 
to greater cost stickiness. We focus on differences in labor cost stickiness because prior 
literature indicates that decision makers in SOEs concentrate particularly on labor-related 
issues, such as employment and wage levels (e.g., Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  
In so doing, we offer several contributions to prior literature. First, we contribute to 
cost stickiness literature by examining SOEs’ cost behavior in 22 European countries. 







cost stickiness, their study is limited to China, with its unique institutional features.2 Our 
cross-country data enable us to incorporate the effects of country-level variables, which 
is relevant because SOE behavior relates closely to country-level socio-political and 
institutional characteristics. Governments have incentives to exploit their ownership of 
SOE shares for socio-political interests, and these incentives vary with factors such as 
election years and government political orientation. By including these socio-political 
variables to explain the cost stickiness of SOEs, we provide new insight into SOEs’ cost 
management practices. Second, we contribute to emerging literature on the impact of state 
interference on firm behaviors and outcomes, such as the firm’s performance (e.g., 
Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; Gupta, 2005; Megginson, Nash, 
& van Randenborgh, 1994), the cost of capital (e.g., Ben-Nasr et al., 2012) or risk-taking 
behavior (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2013). By studying the impact of state ownership 
on cost stickiness, we contribute to a clearer understanding of how state interference 
affects firms’ cost behavior. Our findings suggest that performance differences between 
SOEs and private firms (e.g., Boardman & Vining; 1989;  Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) 
can be attributed, at least partly, to differences in resource adjustment decisions. 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Determinants of Cost Stickiness 
Cost stickiness has been documented in various countries and for various cost 
categories (Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Banker, Byzalov, & Threinen, 2013; Calleja 
et al., 2006; Dierynck et al., 2012). Explanations for this phenomenon usually rely on 
resource adjustment costs: A firm incurs costs when it disposes of resources and then has 
to reacquire those resources after activities return to their previous levels ( Anderson et 
                                                          
2 We develop our hypotheses independently from Bu et al. (2015). 
 
 




al., 2003;  Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013; Banker, Byzalov & Threinen, 2013). For 
example, firms provide severance payments to lay off employees when sales decline, then 
must spend time and costs to recruit and train new employees when sales increase again. 
When sales decline, removing unutilized resources with high adjustment costs might be 
more costly than retaining them, so resources with high adjustment costs justify greater 
cost stickiness ( Anderson et al., 2003). It is also likely that cost stickiness is influenced 
by managerial self-interest. For example, managers refuse to lay off  because doing so 
would be in direct conflict with their desire to build an empire (Chen et al., 2012), because 
they fear losing status, or because they are unwilling to deal with the challenge of 
negotiating with angry employees ( Anderson et al., 2003). The firm’s governance 
structure also influences cost stickiness; it incentivizes managers to make certain 
decisions that affect cost behavior. For example, better corporate governance reduces cost 
stickiness by restraining managers’ empire building behavior (Chen et al., 2012). 
Similarly, firms in countries that better protect shareholders tend to exhibit less cost 
stickiness (Banker, Byzalov & Threinen, 2013; Calleja et al., 2006). 
2.2.2. State Ownership and Cost Stickiness 
Different ownership types provide different incentives for owners to invest in cost 
controlling activities because ownership type dictates how the benefits of those activities 
accrue to owners (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998), 
resulting in different cost behavior of firms with different owners (Hall, 2016; 
Holzhacker, Krishnan, & Mahlendorf, 2015). Unlike other owners, states have socio-
political interests. It is thus likely that SOEs pursue broader social objectives than private 
firms do, such as employing a large number of people to reduce unemployment rates            







intervene in SOEs’ activities, which may, for example, lead to a transfer of wealth to 
voters at the expense of the firm. Through their political control over SOEs, politicians 
can instruct these firms to incur more labor costs (e.g., excess wages, maintaining 
employment levels) in an effort to win political support (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). Such socio-political objectives could conflict with other 
interests, such as those of shareholders, if they undermine the firm’s financial 
performance or shareholder value maximization. Prior studies accordingly document 
detrimental effects of political intervention on SOEs’ financial performance (e.g., Micco 
et al., 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998).  
The inclusion of socio-political objectives also makes the goals of SOEs more 
diverse than those of private firms. Measuring progress against business objectives is 
generally a challenging task; it is especially difficult in relation to socio-political 
objectives (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Further complicating the 
performance measurement efforts in SOEs is the inherent difficulty of determining the 
relative importance of various objectives. For example, what is more important, hiring 
employees or financial performance? Because overall SOE performance is so difficult to 
measure, the shareholders’ task of monitoring SOE managers’ behavior effectively 
becomes particularly complex, and the space for managerial discretion expands (Bai et 
al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Therefore, SOE managers can more easily 
pursue their own self-interests and use SOE socio-political objectives as an excuse for 
their own underperformance. 
We thus predict that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms. First, 
politicians may use the state’s ownership to instruct SOE managers not to reduce labor 
resources (e.g., employee layoffs, wage reduction) even if sales decrease, which would 
 
 




maintain the current employment levels and, subsequently, help the politicians win votes 
(Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). Private firms have no 
need to take such socio-political considerations into account in their labor resource 
adjustment decisions, so their decisions should be less asymmetric. Second, SOE 
managers are less likely to reduce their labor resources during a sales decline, in support 
of their own interests or to avoid having to make difficult layoff decisions  (Anderson et 
al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012), because they can use SOE socio-political objectives as 
decision rationales. In this context, the state, as a shareholder, would have a hard time 
disciplining this behavior, because of the difficulty of measuring overall SOE 
performance (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). Measuring performance is 
more straightforward in private firms because their primary objective is profit 
maximization. The focus on financial performance measures makes it easier for 
shareholders of private firms to discipline firm managers that fail to meet profit 
maximization goals. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is:  
H1: SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms. 
 
2.2.3. Labor Cost Stickiness in SOEs and Socio-Political Variables 
Next, we turn to the question of why such cost behavior typically is associated with 
SOEs. A key assumption of SOE/privatization literature is that SOEs’ behaviors and 
outcomes depend on various governance and socio-political factors (e.g., Ben-Nasr et al., 
2012; Boubakri et al., 2013). Governments exert influence on societies in general, so 
socio-political variables likely affect private firms’ behaviors too. Yet compared with 
SOEs, private firms should be less subject to government interventions, in that the costs 







(Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987). Accordingly, we argue that the effect of socio-political 
variables on cost stickiness is stronger for SOEs than for private firms.  
Our first variable of interest refers to the industry in which the SOE operates. Firms 
in strategic industries such as utilities, electricity, mining, and defense likely have greater 
labor cost stickiness, because they typically are more technology-intensive than are non-
strategic industries (Soete, 1991). Consequently, firms in strategic industries tend to rely 
more on skilled employees that incur higher adjustment costs, which eventually leads to 
greater cost stickiness (Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013). However, the effect of strategic 
industries on labor cost stickiness is likely to be stronger for SOEs. As suggested by 
Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami (2009), belonging to strategic industries puts SOEs under 
more public scrutiny and more intense government intervention. This greater socio-
political pressure likely increases the labor cost stickiness of SOEs, because SOE 
managers are more reluctant to adjust labor costs downward when sales decline. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2a: The effect of strategic industries on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than 
in private firms 
Election years affect the behavior of ruling governments (e.g., Besley & Burgess, 
2002). Mechtel and Potrafke (2013) show that ruling governments promote labor-friendly 
policies to win electoral support. Such labor policies likely increase labor cost stickiness 
for both SOEs and private firms, because they make it more difficult for both types of firms 
to reduce their labor force or compensation when sales decline.  
The effect of election years on labor cost stickiness is likely stronger in SOEs 
because private firms are better able to resist labor-friendly policies (Kleiner, 2001) 
whereas SOEs have fewer options to do so. This argument is in line with research into the 
 
 




political role of SOEs during election years. For example, election years significantly 
increase state-owned banks’ lending in emerging countries, apparently to improve the 
electoral results for the ruling politicians (Dinc, 2005). This approach increases state-
owned banks’ underperformance problem (Micco et al., 2007). In an attempt to avoid 
popular discontent during election years, politicians likely instruct SOE managers not to 
lay off employees or cut their wages when sales decline. Therefore, we predict that election 
years amplify the labor cost stickiness of SOEs and hypothesize: 
H2b:  The effect of election years on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs than in 
private firms. 
In addition, left-wing governments tend to pursue more labor-friendly policies, 
whereas right-wing ones are more market-oriented (Hibbs, 1977). Left-wing governments 
are thus associated with lower unemployment rates (Hibbs, 1977) and higher minimum 
wages (Saint-Paul, Bean, & Bertola, 1996), which implies greater cost stickiness for all 
firms due to the labor-friendly policies. Nevertheless, the effect of left-wing governments 
on labor cost stickiness should be more evident in SOEs, because these governments tend 
to use their SOEs as a tool to achieve broader political goals (Avsar, Karayalcin, & 
Ulubasoglu, 2013), such that SOEs are subject to more intense intervention. For example, 
to support their political agenda, left-wing governments likely instruct SOEs not to fire 
employees or reduce their compensation even when sales decline. In this situation, SOEs 
will be slower to scale down their labor costs. Private firms are more capable of resisting 
labor-friendly policies (Kleiner, 2001), so we predict that the effect of left-wing 
governments on labor cost stickiness is more pronounced for SOEs than for private firms. 







H2c:  The effect of left-wing governments on labor cost stickiness is stronger in SOEs 
than in private firms.  
 
The last variable of interest is the privatization year. Prior to privatization, states 
tend to cut costs aggressively to improve SOEs’ performance and thereby maximize the 
proceeds from selling their shares (Megginson, 2005). This aggressive cost-cutting likely 
causes a decrease in cost stickiness in the year prior to privatization. Using this argument, 
we posit: 
H2d: In the year prior to the privatization, privatized firms exhibit less labor cost 
stickiness than in other pre-privatization years. 
 
During and after privatization, performance generally improves, because the level 
of private ownership increases and firms experience increased performance pressure (e.g., 
Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; Gupta, 2005; Megginson et al., 
1994). These pressures arguably reduce labor cost stickiness further. However, as 
indicated by Banker and Fang (2013) in a loan financing setting, it can also be argued that 
during and after privatization, the incentives to improve performance through aggressive 
cost-cutting may decrease, because the government has accomplished its objective. In a 
similar vein, labor costs may be stickier than they were before because privatized firms 
need to restructure their labor forces to meet new private owners’ demands or to address 
the aftermath of unsustainable pre-privatization cost-cutting decisions (Chong, Guillen, 









2.3.1. Sample Selection 
We use annual data from Datastream on European nonfinancial listed firms for the 
years 1993–2012. We start our sample period in 1993 when the Maastricht Treaty went 
into effect. The Treaty requires member states to keep their budget deficit below 3% of 
total gross domestic product (GDP) and their sovereign debt at no more than 60% of total 
GDP. These budget requirements created an impetus for member countries to privatize 
their SOEs.  
To obtain privatization data, we identify all nonfinancial firms covered by the 
Privatization Barometer and check whether they appear in Datastream. The Privatization 
Barometer database contains information about privatizations in European countries 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2013); it informs prior research into privatizations in the 
European Union (e.g., Borisova, Brockman, Salas & Zagorchev, 2012; Boubakri et al., 
2009). The Privatization Barometer also provides data about state ownership and 
privatization years. Similar to Borisova et al. (2012), we define direct state ownership to 
include ownership by non-central government entities (e.g., provincial or municipal 
governments) and entities established specifically to manage the central government’s 
funds.3 To ensure the accuracy and validity of our data, we gather information about the 
firms’ state shareholders from annual reports and websites. The verification procedure 
spans all available annual reports of all firms. If there is no information about firm 
shareholders, we rely on the Privatization Barometer data.  
                                                          
3 Some countries establish special entities to perform activities on behalf of the state, such as those that 
invest state funds in other firms to generate returns for the states (e.g., Solidium in Finland, Parpublica in 
Portugal). Other entities serve non-economic purposes, such as the CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie 







Following Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013) we delete 
firm-year data that contain missing, zero, or negative values for revenues, labor costs in 
the current year or the two prior years, or current total assets. We also discard firm-year 
data if LaborCostst > Salest or LaborCostst-1 > Salest -1, where LaborCosts refers to a 
firm’s total labor costs. Observations in which the sales increase is greater than 50% or 
the decrease is more than 33% are excluded too because such large changes likely indicate 
mergers and divestitures (Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013). Furthermore, we screen for 
missing data about state ownership and require that firms use the same reporting 
currencies for the current year and two prior years. Finally, we delete the 1% outliers for 
each tail of labor cost change and revenue change. Thus the final sample includes 40,418 
firm-year observations of 5,931 unique firms, including 1,208 observations (148 unique 
firms) involving state ownership.4  
2.3.2. Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
 To operationalize labor costs we use the Salaries and Benefit Expenses item in 
Datastream, which represents all wages and other benefits assigned to employees and 
officers. Following Anderson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2012), we employ the 
following model to test hypothesis 1: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3  ∙  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽5  ∙  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6  ∙  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽7  ∙  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8  ∙  𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ∙   𝛾 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡       +
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .............................................................................................................................................  (1) 
  
                                                          
4 Because we obtain the SOE sample from the Privatization Barometer and Datastream, our sample 
generally excludes SOEs that are wholly owned by the state. 
 
 




where LaborCost and Sales are deflated total labor costs and net sales, respectively, and 
the subscripts i and t refer to firm i and year t, respectively. In addition, Dec is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if sales decrease in the current year and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable SOE equals 1 if the government owns some percentage of the firm’s shares and 
0 otherwise. γ∙StandaloneVariables is written in vector form and refers to the main 
variable SOE and to the control variables included in the interaction terms in equation (1) 
(AsInt, SucDec, EPL, etc.). To facilitate our interpretation of the results, we mean-center 
all the continuous variables in the interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991). Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Dierynck et al., 2012), costs are sticky 
when β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. To confirm H1, which predicts that SOEs exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than private firms, we would require β3 < 0.  
Following prior studies (e.g.  Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012), we include 
two firm-level control variables in our analysis. First, we include asset intensity (AsInt), 
which is the total assets divided by net sales. Second, we control for successive decrease 
(SucDec), which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Salesi,t < Salesi,t-1 < Salesi,t-2, and 0 
otherwise (Dierynck et al., 2012).5  
As country-level control variables, we include the Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) strictness index (EPL), legal origin (CommonLaw), and GDP growth 
(Growth). The EPL strictness index from the OECD measures the strictness of labor 
regulations with regard to employee dismissals; a higher value indicates stricter labor 
laws, which should be associated with higher firing costs and thus greater cost stickiness 
(Banker, Byzalov, & Chen, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                          
5 Following Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013) and Banker, Byzalov, and Threinen (2013), we do not 
include employee intensity. This variable, measured by dividing total employees (a non-financial data) 
by total sales (a financial data) will potentially lead to distorted results in a cross-country research due to 







Development, 2013).6 The dummy variable CommonLaw equals 1 for common law 
countries and 0 otherwise (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The 
effects of legal origin on cost stickiness are unclear: common law countries are more 
shareholder-oriented (Calleja et al., 2006), but they also facilitate long-term resource 
commitment (Banker, Byzalov & Threinen, 2013). Finally, GDP growth (Growth), 
obtained from the World Bank (The World Bank, 2013), represents macroeconomic 
conditions in individual countries that may affect managerial optimism about the 
prospects of future sales ( Anderson et al., 2003). 
To test H2a–c, we split our observations into SOE and private firm subsamples 
and modify Equation (1) by omitting the SOE and SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales variables while 
adding the socio-political variables (and their interactions with Dec∙∆lnSales), to produce 
the following equation: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙  𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽5  ∙  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
  𝛽6  ∙  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7  ∙  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽8  ∙




where SocPolVar refers to the socio-political variables of interest (i.e., StratInd, 
ElecYear, or LeftWing, as we discuss subsequently). γ∙StandaloneVariables is written in 
vector form and refers to the main variables StratInd, ElecYear, and Leftwing, and to the 
control variables included in the interaction terms in equation (2) (AsInt, SucDec, EPL, 
etc.). 
                                                          
6 We use the unweighted average strictness of employment protections for regular and temporary workers. 
We have to exclude Cypriot, Lithuanian, and Maltese firms, because these countries do not appear in the 
OECD EPL Strictness database. 
 
 




In H2a, we predict that the coefficient on StratInd∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β9)  is more negative 
in the SOE subsample than in the private firm subsample.7 We follow Boubakri et al. 
(2009) and include mining, steel, transportation, utilities, defense, telecommunications, 
and oil as strategic industries. The dummy variable StratInd equals 1 if the firm operates 
in a strategic industry and 0 otherwise.  
To test hypothesis H2b, similar to Dinc (2005), we obtain election year data from the 
Europa World Year Book (2006). For post-2006 data, we use the  International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems' (2014) Election Guide website. The dummy variable 
ElecYear equals 1 if the year considered is an election year and 0 otherwise. To test H2c, 
similar to Ben-Nasr et al. (2012), we use annual data provided by the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 2014; Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 
2001) to obtain information about the political orientation of the ruling party. We 
construct a dummy variable (LeftWing) that equals 1 if the ruling government is left-wing 
and 0 otherwise. Similar to H2a, H2-H2c predict that the coefficients on 
ElecYear∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β10) and LeftWing∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β11) are more negative in the 
SOE subsample than in the private firm subsample.  
Our last socio-political variable is privatization. To test H2d, we construct several 
dummy variables. That is, PrePriv1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the year prior 
to the privatization year and 0 otherwise. To compare PrePriv1 with earlier pre-
privatization years, we control for the effects of the privatization and post-privatization 
years by developing three dummy variables: PrivYear, PostPriv. PrivYear equals 1 for 
years in which the government sold shares of a particular SOE and 0 otherwise; PostPriv 
                                                          
7 Cost stickiness corresponds to a negative number, so a more negative interaction coefficient  represents 







equals 1 if the observation takes place after a privatization year and 0 otherwise.8 We 
estimate this model only for the SOE subsample while using the earlier pre-privatization 
years as the baseline group. Support for H2d would require the coefficient β12 of 
PrePriv1∙Dec∙∆lnSales to be positive. Specifically, we use Equation (3) to test H2d: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12  ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13  ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14  ∙  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙  𝑆𝑢𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽6 ∙  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7 ∙  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8 ∙
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ∙  𝛾 ∙  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    .......................  (3) 
  
where γ∙StandaloneVariables is written in vector form and refers to the main variable 
PrePriv1 and to the control variables included in the interaction terms in equation (3) 
(PrivYear, PostPriv, AsInt, SucDec, EPL, etc.). In all models, we also include industry 
dummy variables, using the Fama and French (2016) 49 industries classification, to 
control for industry effects on firms’ cost behavior. Finally, we add fiscal-year dummy 
variables to control for possible year effects. The appendix contains the variable 
definitions. 
 
2.4. Empirical Results  
2.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In the overall sample, labor costs constitute 26.55% of total sales. In 37.34% of 
our observations, we find a sales decline in the current year, while 18.31% experience 
successive sales decreases. Panel A of Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics for each 
country. 
                                                          
8 Alternatively, we develop two dummy variables that equal one if the observation takes place 1-5 (6 or 
more) years after a privatization year and 0 otherwise in order to control for a privatization year’s short 
term and long term effects separately. This alternative analysis generate qualitatively similar results.  
 
 




Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 





















Austria 776 0.254 1.455 0.361  0.161 5128 2.019 2.205 126 (0.162) 
Belgium 905 0.225  14.479 0.399 0.180 7241 1.749 2.709  21 (0.023) 
Czech Republic 317 0.118 1.568 0.492 0.284 3954 2.756 2.354  46 (0.145) 
Denmark 1439 0.276 1.593 0.347 0.161 5223 1.484 2.042 24 (0.017) 
Estonia 25 0.161  1.354 0.280 0.120 2435 0.812 2.231  1 (0.040) 
Finland 1217 0.276 0.950 0.339 0.149 5514 2.396 2.021 128 (0.105) 
France 6676 0.290 1.213 0.364  0.187 13142 1.402 3.291 180 (0.027) 
Germany 5834 0.281 1.028 0.388 0.201 13666 1.374 2.260 134 (0.023) 
Greece 826 0.191 1.857 0.496 0.298 1723 -1.157 2.911  49 (0.059) 
Hungary 267 0.157  1.112 0.494 0.281 3537 2.290 2.099  39 (0.146) 
Ireland 438 0.212 1.696 0.342  0.169 3241 4.338 1.402 10 (0.023) 
Italy 2206 0.220 1.785 0.398 0.204 6974 0.573 2.870 172 (0.078) 
Luxembourg 130 0.194  2.077 0.415 0.177 8808 2.772 3.284 0 (0) 
Latvia 12 0.191 1.700 1.000 0.417 406 4.35 2.240 0 (0) 
Netherlands 1372 0.271  0.843 0.382 0.188 17645 2.146 2.030 29 (0.021) 
Poland 878 0.175 1.146 0.319 0.117 3353 4.449 2.362 78 (0.089) 
Portugal 604 0.195 1.920 0.425 0.238 5144 1.435 2.850 47 (0.078) 
Slovenia 128 0.204 1.750 0.414  0.180 3041 -0.214 2.593 7 (0.055) 
Slovakia  69 0.172 1.181 0.478 0.246 2433 5.259 2.391 11 (0.159) 
Spain 1249 0.213 1.851 0.352 0.172 10552 2.067 3.005 68 (0.054) 
Sweden 2191 0.322 1.014 0.361 0.156 7348 2.477 1.655 24 (0.011) 
UK     12859  0.274 1.222 0.363 0.172 8059 2.364 1.078 14 (0.001) 








Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables, SOEs vs. Private Firms 
 







PrivYear StratInd ElecYear LeftWing 
SOE 1,208 1.822 0.324 0.143  39,390   0.211  227.76 0.131 0.729 0.268 0.416 
Private 39,210 1.550 0.375 0.184    8,449 0.267  112.54 n.a 0.121 0.245 0.432 
Difference test 
(p- value)  0.785 0.000 0.000   0.000    0.000  0.000 n.a 0.000 0.067 0.246 
Total 40,418 1.558 0.373 0.183  9,379  0.266  116.01  0.150 0.246 0.432 
 Notes: For panel B, all statistics are proportion values except for AsInt, Employees, Labor Costs/ Sales, and Labor Costs/ Employees (mean values). Numbers in 








In Panel B of Table 2.1, we divide the sample into SOEs and private firms. The 
SOEs experienced relatively fewer sales declines (Dec and SucDec); they also have more 
employees than private firms on average. At a 5% significance level, SOEs and private 
firms differ significantly only for one socio-political variable (StratInd). Most of the SOE 
observations do not relate to privatization years. Untabulated data indicate that the 
average percentage of government ownership in SOEs is relatively high (43.08%). Our 
data contain 206 firm-year observations with privatizations (48 that completely eliminate 
government ownership). On average, privatization reduces government ownership by 
24.47%.  
Table 2.2 contains the results of the Pearson and Spearman correlation tests of the 
























Sales SOE AsInt Dec SucDec 
Employe
es EPL CommonLaw Growth 
LaborCosts/Sales  -0.057*** 0.109***  0.061***  0.063*** -0.122*** -0.061*** 0.039*** -0.056*** 
SOE -0.061***  0.139*** -0.018*** -0.018***  0.186*** 0.091*** -0.115*** -0.004 
AsInt  0.002  0.001   0.035***  0.020***  0.007 0.159*** -0.091*** -0.097*** 
Dec  0.056*** -0.018***  0.000  0.613*** -0.061*** 0.015*** -0.016*** -0.152*** 
SucDec  0.056*** -0.018*** -0.004  0.613***  -0.050*** 0.027*** -0.20*** -0.087*** 
Employees -0.039***  0.160*** -0.003 -0.021*** -0.018***  0.034*** -0.042***  0.012** 
EPL -0.046***  0.096***  0.009  0.015***  0.026***  0.038***  -0.831*** -0.271*** 
CommonLaw  0.029*** -0.115*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.843***   0.219*** 
Growth -0.052*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.175*** -0.095*** -0.024*** -0.197*** 0.161***  
  
Note: The numbers below the diagonal represent the Pearson correlation coefficients; the numbers above the diagonal are the Spearman correlations 
coefficients.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
 
 




2.4.2. Main Results  
Table 2.3 shows the results of the regressions for H1.9 The first column in Table 2.3 
only includes firm-level variables and affirms that our sample firms exhibit sticky cost 
behavior, with a significantly positive value of β1 (0.673, t = 69.84) and a significantly 
negative coefficient for Dec∙∆lnSales (β2 = -0.277, t = -16.90). On average, labor costs 
rise by 0.673% for each 1% increase in net sales, but they diminish by only 0.396% 
(0.673% – 0.277%) for each 1% decrease in net sales. The positive value of 
SucDec∙Dec∙∆lnSales and the negative value of the AsInt∙Dec∙∆lnSales are in line with 















                                                          
9 Consistent with Chen et al. (2012) and  Dierynck et al. (2012) we use firm-level clustered standard errors 







Table 2.3  Results of Regression Analyses: Hypothesis 1 
 
  Dependent Variable: ΔlnLaborCost 
Independent Variables Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) 
ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.673 0.672 0.667 
  [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.277 -0.270 -0.271 
  [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.020]*** 
SOE∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β3) -  -0.194 -0.174 
   [0.056]*** [0.057]*** 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]* 
Suc∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β5) + 0.138 0.135 0.139 
  [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.021]*** 
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales(β6) -   -0.035 
    [0.020]* 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙ΔlnSales 
(β7) 
?   0.020 
    [0.036] 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) -   0.008 
    [0.003]** 
SOE   -0.021 -0.019 
   [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
AsInt  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SucDec  -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
EPL    0.001 
    [0.001] 
CommonLaw    0.007 
    [0.003]*** 
Growth    0.003 
    [0.000]*** 
Industry Dummies Included 
Year Dummies Included 
R2  0.43 0.43 0.43 
N  40,418 40,418 40,418 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses to investigate the degree of cost 
stickiness of SOEs. The dependent variable is ΔlnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value 
of labor costs). Column 1 does not include SOE variable and its interaction term. Column 2 includes 
SOE variable and its interaction term. Column 3 includes country-level control variables. Figures in 
brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold 
figures. See the appendix for variable definitions. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
For the test of H1, in column 2 of Table 2.3, we introduce the SOE dummy 
variable to the regression equation.10 The empirical results support H1, in that we find a 
                                                          
10 Including two-way interaction terms in the regression specifications leads to severe multicollinearity 
problems for ΔlnSalesi,t and Deci,t.ΔlnSalesi,t when we include country-level variables. Therefore, 
 
 




significantly negative coefficient for SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β3 = -0.194, t = -3.44). On 
average, SOEs exhibit a higher level of labor cost stickiness than private firms.  
Next, we include country-level controls in the regression model. As column 3 in 
Table 2.3 shows, the coefficient of SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales remains significantly negative (β3 
= -0.174, t = -3.07), confirming the greater cost stickiness of SOEs compared with private 
firms. Consistent with Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013), the labor costs of firms from 
countries with higher EPL scores are stickier (i.e., significantly negative β6). For 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β7), we find insignificant results. The coefficient of 
Growth∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β8) is significantly positive, such that firms from countries with 
higher GDP growth have less sticky costs. Taken together, these results indicate that, even 
after controlling for country-level factors, SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than 
private firms.  
Turning to H2a, columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 reveal that the coefficient β9 on 
StratInd∙Dec∙∆lnSales is more negative in the SOE subsample than in the private firm 
subsample (β9, SOE = -0.201; β9, Private firms = -0.166). The Chow test indicates that the 
coefficient on StratInd∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β9) in the SOE subsample is not significantly 
stronger than the coefficient in the private firm subsample (F=0.65, p = 0.421). These 
findings do not support H2a and imply that operating in strategic industries does not 
increase labor cost stickiness to a significantly greater extent in SOEs than in private 
firms.  
Columns 3 (SOE) and 4 (private firms) of Table 2.4 further show that election years 
have significantly positive effects on labor cost stickiness only in the SOE subsample, as 
signaled by the negative coefficient of ElecYear∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β10 = -0.301, t = -2.24). 
                                                          
consistent with prior studies of cost stickiness e.g.,  (Anderson et al., 2003, Chen et al. (2012), we do not 







This effect is not significant in the private firm subsample. The Chow test indicates that 
the effect of ElecYear on cost stickiness in the SOE subsample is significantly stronger 
than in the private firm subsample (F = 11.23, p = 0.00). These results are consistent with 
H2b and suggest that states increase their interference with SOEs’ labor cost adjustment 
decisions in election years.  
According to column 5 in Table 2.4, left-wing governments have a significantly 
positive effect on SOEs’ cost stickiness (β11 = -0.349, t = -2.68), while column 6 does not 
indicate a significant effect for private firms. A Chow test shows that the coefficient of 
LeftWing∙Dec∙∆lnSales in the SOE subsample is significantly more negative than in the 
private firm subsample (F = 15.95, p = 0.00). These results support H2c; left-wing 
governments’ labor-friendly policies cause SOEs to reduce their labor costs less when 
sales decline. 
Finally, column 7 of Table 2.4 presents a significantly positive coefficient for 
PrePriv1∙Dec∙∆lnSales (β12= 0.340, t = 1.71). Relative to earlier pre-privatization years, 
labor cost stickiness is significantly lower in the year prior to the privatization year. 
Column 7 also reveals that starting with the privatization year, privatized firms exhibit 
labor cost behavior that is similar to earlier pre-privatization years. These results provide 
support for H2d and suggest that states tend to restructure their labor force and cut costs 


















Table 2.4  Results of Regression Analyses: Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d 
 
  Dependent Variable: ΔlnLaborCost 
 Predicted 
Sign 














ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.504 0.672 0.507 0.671 0.504 0.671 0.507 
  [0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]*** [0.010]*** [0.053]*** 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.083 -0.257 -0.151 -0.271 -0.061 -0.285 -0.203 
  [0.130] [0.021]*** [0.100] [0.022]*** [0.113] [0.022]*** [0.116]* 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) - 0.042 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.016 -0.002 0.019 
  [0.053] [0.001]* [0.050] [0.001]* [0.051] [0.001]* [0.051] 
SucDec∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β5) + 0.144 0.132 0.164 0.139 0.158 0.137 0.174 
  [0.189] [0.021]*** [0.195] [0.021]*** [0.187] [0.021]*** [0.200] 
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β6) - 0.077 -0.036 0.102 -0.039 0.066 -0.036 0.058 
  [0.108] [0.020]* [0.106] [0.021]* [0.108] [0.021]* [0.117] 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙ΔlnSales 
(β7) 
? 0.390 0.016 0.300 0.013 0.427 0.011 0.298 
  [0.233]* [0.036] [0.248] [0.036] [0.286] [0.036] [0.245] 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) - 0.020 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.008 0.011 
  [0.016] [0.003]** [0.016] [0.003]** [0.016]* [0.003]** [0.016] 
StratInd∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β9) - -0.201 -0.166      
  [0.120]* [0.030]***      
ElecYear∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β10) -   -0.301 -0.019    
    [0.134]** [0.018]    
LeftWing∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β11) -     -0.349 0.024  
      [0.130]*** [0.018]  
PrePriv1∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β12) +       0.340 
        [0.199]* 
PrivYear∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β13) ?       0.219 
        [0.161] 
PostPriv∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β14) ?       -0.181 
        [0.127] 
AsInt  0.008 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.007 
  [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
SucDec  -0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.002 
  [0.018] [0.002]*** [0.018] [0.002]*** [0.018] [0.002]*** [0.019] 








Notes: The table presents the results of the regression analyses to investigate the effects of socio-political variables on labor cost stickiness of SOEs and 
private firms. The dependent variable is ΔlnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). The results for SOEs (private firms) are 
presented in column 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6). The variable of interests are StratInd (columns 1 and 2), ElecYear (columns 3 and 4) and LeftWing (columns 
5 and 6). Column 7 displays the results of the regression analysis to investigate the effect of privatization on labor cost stickiness. The  Chow Test row 
represents the difference between SOEs and private firms. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The effects of socio-political 
factors on cost stickiness (hypotheses 2a-2d) are in bold figures. See the appendix for variable definitions.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
  [0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]** [0.002] [0.007]* 
CommonLaw  0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.008 
  [0.026] [0.003]** [0.026] [0.003]** [0.027] [0.003]** [0.026] 
Growth   0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 
  [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
StratInd  -0.067 -0.000      
  [0.016]* [0.011]      
ElecYear    -0.015 -0.003    
    [0.007]** [0.001]*    
LeftWing      -0.004 0.002  
      [0.007] [0.002]  
PrePriv1        0.004 
        [0.010] 
PrivYear        0.002 
        [0.010] 
PostPriv        0.001 
        [0.007] 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
Chow Test  0.65 11.23*** 15.95***  
R2  0.29 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.29 
N  1,208 39,210 1,208 39,210 1,208 39,210 1,208 
 
 




Overall, these results largely support our predictions that socio-political variables 
affect the labor cost stickiness of SOEs. 
2.4.3. Cost Stickiness of SOEs and Political Connections 
Even as we show that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms, 
SOEs might not differ substantively from private firms with political connections to a 
country’s top officials, such as when (persons related to) politicians are board members 
or large shareholders of a private firm (Faccio, 2006). Private firms may obtain political 
benefits from such connections; it is also possible that states exert political influences on 
these firms through these connections. For example, politicians may require such firms 
to delay labor reductions during economic recessions to maintain their popular vote 
(Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2006). Consequently, states can pursue their 
socio-political interests through both their ownership of firms and their influences on 
politically connected firms. In terms of cost stickiness, firms’ political connections may 
provide an alternative explanation for the effects of states’ socio-political intervention on 
labor cost stickiness. 
To test the robustness of our H1 findings, we need to demonstrate first that SOEs 
have stickier labor costs than politically connected firms, and second that politically 
connected firms do not exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than non-politically connected 
firms. Therefore, we run two regressions, such that we compare politically connected 
private firms with non-politically connected private firms in the first equation and then 
compare SOEs with politically connected private firms in the second equation. To 
identify political connections, we turn to Faccio’s (2006) database. Although these data 
mostly refer to the year 2001, we assume, consistent with prior research (Faccio, 2006; 







changes occur.11 A dummy variable (PolCon) equals 1 if the private firm is politically 
connected and 0 otherwise. When we run the basic regression equation for only private 
firms, the politically connected firms exhibit less cost stickiness than non-politically 
connected ones (β16 = 0.106, t = 2.12; see column 1 in Table 2.5). Compared with non-
politically connected firms, politically connected firms reduce their labor costs more 
when sales decline. As a possible explanation for this finding, we posit that it may be 
easier for politically connected firms to reduce their labor costs because they can rely on 
their political connections to address or overcome resistance from labor unions and other 
stakeholders. Next, when we include SOEs and politically connected private firms in our 
sample, we find that SOEs still exhibit greater labor cost stickiness, as indicated by the 
negative value of β3 in column 2 of Table 2.5 (β3 = -0.237, t = 2.64). Therefore, SOEs 
appear to experience stronger socio-political pressure to make asymmetric labor cost 
adjustment decisions than do politically connected private firms, which leads to the 










                                                          








Table 2.5 Results of Regression Analyses – Controlling for Political Connections 
 
 










(SOEs vs. politically 
connected private 
firms) 
ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.671 0.640 
  [0.010]*** [0.037]*** 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.278 -0.154 
  [0.021]*** [0.104] 
SOE∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β3) -  -0.237 
   [0.090]*** 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) - -0.002 -0.013 
  [0.001]* [0.028] 
SucDec∙ΔlnSales (β5) + 0.138 0.095 
  [0.021]*** [0.098] 
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales(β6) - -0.040 0.063 
  [0.021]* [0.090] 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β7) ? 0.011 0.226 
  [0.036] [0.185] 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) - 0.007 0.022 
  [0.003]** [0.014] 
PolCon∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β16)  0.106  
  [0.050]**  
SOE   -0.024 
   [0.007]*** 
PolCon  0.004  
  [0.003]  
AsInt  -0.000 -0.001 
  [0.000]*** [0.002] 
SucDec  -0.018 -0.009 
  [0.002]*** [0.010] 
EPL  0.000 0.011 
  [0.002] [0.006]* 
CommonLaw  0.006 0.032 
  [0.003]** [0.014]** 
Growth  0.003 0.005 
  [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.44 0.44 
N  39,210 2,451 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses that compare politically connected firms 
with non-politically connected private firms and SOEs. The dependent variable is ΔlnLaborCost (change 
of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). Using private firm observations only, in column 1 we 
compare politically connected firms and non-politically connected firms. Column 2 shows the results of 
comparing SOEs and politically-connected private firms. Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered 
at the firm level. The effects of political connection and state ownership on cost stickiness are in bold 
figures. See the appendix for variable definitions. 








2.4.4. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, differences between SOEs and private 
firms may increase a possible bias in the estimates, due to the potentially misspecified 
relation between the dependent and independent variables (Shipman, Swanquist, & 
Whited, 2017). We therefore use propensity score matching (PSM) to match SOEs with 
comparable private firms by selecting the private firms that are most similar to SOEs, 
according to the distribution of observed covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). We 
modify Borisova et al. (2012) approach and use size, sales growth, return on assets, 
leverage, stock value traded as a percentage of GDP, and industry to match the SOEs with 
private firm observations. A nearest-neighbor matching approach with a caliper constraint 
(≤0.001) produces the matched pairs Erkens and Bonner (2013). we use one-to-one 
matching without replacement. The PSM produces 1,163 matched pairs, and a t-test 
indicates that this PSM is reasonably successful in matching SOE firms with private 
firms, because the pertinent covariates do not differ significantly across the two groups, 
except for size and industry. We rerun the regression Equation (1) on our PSM 
observations. The results in column 1, Table 2.6, are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 2.3, column 3.  
Second, SOEs are much larger than private firms on average, so firm size might 
explain the SOEs’ cost behavior. To control for this effect, we use the natural logarithm 
of the lagged number of employees and interact it with Dec∙ΔlnSales. Third, cost behavior 
tends to change during economic crises (Banker et al., 2012). Therefore, we rerun the 
regression up to the year 2007 (before the most recent economic crisis). Fourth, when 
managing SOEs, states tend to consider their budget conditions (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 
2013). For example, politicians may reduce their socio-political intervention and focus 
on monitoring SOEs more conscientiously if budget pressures are high, leading to less 
 
 




cost stickiness. To measure the effect of states’ budget conditions, we use BudDef 
(countries’ budget deficit) data from the World Bank. Fifth, instead of investigating labor 
cost behavior, we use the change in the natural logarithmic value of the number of 
employees as our dependent variable (Dierynck et al., 2012). Sixth, U.K. firms constitute 
31.82% of the total number of observations, but they provide only 14 firm-year 
observations regarding state ownership, which may affect the results disproportionally. 
Therefore, we rerun the regression without U.K. firms. Seventh, SOEs tend to operate in 
strategic industries that require more skilled labor, implying greater cost stickiness 
(Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013). To control for this factor, we use the lagged labor costs 
per employee as a proxy for employee skills and interact it with Dec∙ΔlnSales. Eighth, 
though we included industry dummies in our specification to control for industry effects, 
as a further control for the industry effects on labor cost stickiness, we interact the 
industry dummies with Dec∙ΔlnSales.12 Ninth,  Banker et al. (2014) suggest that cost 
behavior in the current period is conditional on the direction of prior-period sales changes 
because managers use these changes as references to predict future sales changes and 
make their resource adjustment decisions accordingly. We use a two-period formula from 
Banker et al. (2014) to disentangle the effect of prior-period sales changes on cost 
stickiness. As Table 2.6 shows, the results of these additional tests consistently indicate 
that SOEs exhibit more asymmetric cost behavior than do private firms.13  
 
                                                          
12 We use the Fama-French 5-industry classification for this robustness test to avoid multicollinearity 
concerns. 
13 As additional tests, we define a firm-year observation as an SOE if the state holds at least 5%, 10%, or 







Table 2.6 Robustness Checks 
 
 
  Dependent Variable: ΔlnLaborCost (except column 5: ΔlnLabor) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 









Industry Prior Period 
ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.599 0.676 0.705 0.669 0.611 0.644 0.672 0.669 0.752/ 0.419 
  [0.038]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010***/0.016***] 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.137 -0.262 -0.280 -0.284 -0.248 -0.230 -0.273 -0.225 -0.358 /0.113 
  [0.084] [0.020]*** [0.024]*** [0.021]*** [0.031]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.024]*** [0.023***/0.029***] 
SOE∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β3) - -0.207 -0.306 -0.152 -0.157 -0.305 -0.176 -0.181 -0.148 -0.148/-0.207 
  [0.077]*** [0.057]*** [0.071]** [0.057]*** [0.132]** [0.057]*** [0.058]*** [0.056]*** [0.73**/0.079**] 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) - -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001/-0.036 
  [0.016] [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.002] [0.001]* [0.002] [0.001]* [0.001*/0.008***] 
SucDec∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β5) + 0.046 0.163 0.159 0.137 0.187 0.163 0.144 0.134  
  [0.102] [0.020]*** [0.027]*** [0.021]*** [0.032]*** [0.024]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***  
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β6) - 0.068 -0.034 -0.066 -0.020 -0.033 -0.033 -0.040 -0.038 -0.027/-0.030 
  [0.077] [0.020]* [0.026]** [0.022] [0.031] [0.020] [0.021]* [0.020]* [0.026/ 0.024] 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β7) ? 0.351 0.023 -0.015 0.052 0.008 -0.006 0.011 0.014  0.007/ 0.037 
  [0.173]** [0.035] [0.046] [0.040] [0.050] [0.089] [0.037] [0.036] [0.046/ 0.043] 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) - 0.018 0.007 -0.017 0.004 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.003/ 0.012 
  [0.013] [0.003]** [0.008]** [0.003] [0.005]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004/ 0.004***] 
Size∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β17) -  0.050        
   [0.005]***        
BudDef∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β18) +    0.006      
     [0.003]**      
LagLaborCosts∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β19) -       -0.000   
        [0.000]   
SOE  -0.020 -0.024 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021 -0.016 -0.020 -0.022 -0.019 
  [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
AsInt  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.002] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]*** [0.000]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SucDec  -0.010 -0.014 -0.017 -0.018 -0.010 -0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
  [0.010] [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
EPL  0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  [0.006]** [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
CommonLaw  0.025 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 
 




  [0.012]** [0.003]** [0.003] [0.003]*** [0.004]** [0.007] [0.003]** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Growth  0.006 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.001] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Size   0.002        
   [0.000]***        
BudDef     0.001      
     [0.000]***      
LagLaborCost        -0.000   
        [0.000]   
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
Industry Dummy∙Dec∙ ΔlnSales  Included (only for column 8) 
R2  0.39 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.18 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.44 
N  2,326 39,716 27,951 40,143 39,500 27,559 39,716 40,418  40.418 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of various robustness tests. The dependent variable is ΔlnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs) except in 
column 5 where the dependent variable is ΔlnEmployee (change of the natural logarithmic value of number of employees). Column 1 presents the regression equation results 
after matching SOE observations with private firms using PSM. Columns 2, 4, and 7 show the results after taking the effects of firm size, country’s budget deficit, and firms’ 
lagged labor cost per employee, respectively. Column 3 displays the results of the regression using firm-year observations up to the year 2007. In column 6 the sample 
excludes U.K. observations. In column 8, we interact the industry dummies with Dec* ΔlnSales. In column 9, we follow Banker et al. (2014) and develop two dummy 
variables based on the prior-period sales changes: increase and decrease (PriorInc and PriorDec). We then develop four-way interactions between our variables and PriorInc 
or PriorDec. When there are two figures in the same cells, the first figure refers to the PriorInc result, and the latter figure refers to the PriorDec result. Figures in brackets 
are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See the appendix for definitions of all other variables. 








Strong governance helps minimize managerial opportunistic behavior (Chen et al., 
2012) or governments’ socio-political intervention (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012). Therefore, SOEs 
in countries with stronger governance might exhibit less labor cost stickiness than SOEs in 
countries with weaker corporate governance. To test these arguments empirically, we divide 
our sample into two groups, based on the median value of three governance-related variables: 
investor protection (InvProt), the percentage of institutional ownership (InstOwn), and 
government effectiveness (GoftEff) (e.g. Banker, Byzalov & Threinen, 2013; Chen et al., 
2012;  Bertay, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2015).14 As Table 2.7 shows, in all the below-
median subsamples (columns 1, 3, and 5), SOEs exhibit significantly greater cost stickiness 
than private firms. In the above-median subsamples (columns 2, 4, and 6), SOEs exhibit 
significantly greater cost stickiness than private firms only in column 6 (InstOwn variable). 
The Chow test indicates that the coefficient of the SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales term for the above-
median GovtEff subsample is significantly less negative than that for the below-median 
subsample, and there is no difference between the SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales of the above- and 
below-median InvProt and InstOwn subsamples. Thus, the results cannot unequivocally 
support the idea that strong corporate governance mechanisms are effective for mitigating 
managerial opportunistic behavior or governments’ tendency to intervene in SOEs to attain 
their socio-political interests.  
 
                                                          
14 Consistent with Banker, Byzalov, and Threinen (2013), we use the composite anti–self-dealing index 
developed by Djankov, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanez, & Shleifer (2008). We must exclude the firms from Estonia 
and Slovenia, because these countries are not represented in the anti–self-dealing index database. Meanwhile, 
we construct the variable InstOwn by deducting CloslyHealdshare% (percentage of shares held by all 
insidires; obtained from Datastream) from the percentage of government ownership for SOEs. In line with 
Bertay et al. (2015), we use a measure of government effectiveness from Worldwide Governance Indicators 
to represent GoftEff (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2014). Because InvProt and CommonLaw are almost perfectly 
correlated (0.970), we do not include CommonLaw.  
 
 




Table 2.7 Robustness check – Splitting Sample Based on the Median Values of Governance Variables 
 
   Dependent Variable: ΔlnLaborCost 
















ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.646 0.687 0.630 0.697 0.705 0.644 
  [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.263 -0.293 -0.314 -0.257 -0.276 -0.242 
  [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.031]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.025]*** 
SOE∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β3) - -0.170 -0.161 -0.185 -0.115 -0.293 -0.367 
  [0.064]*** [0.106] [0.071]*** [0.082] [0.082]*** [0.129]*** 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) - -0.019 -0.002 -0.023 -0.002 -0.059 -0.002 
  [0.010]* [0.001]* [0.009]*** [0.001]* [0.013]*** [0.001]** 
SucDec∙ΔlnSales (β5) + 0.156 0.118 0.151 0.128 0.126 0.135 
  [0.028]*** [0.030]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** 
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales(β6) - -0.001 -0.054 0.075 0.002 -0.027 -0.036 
  [0.022] [0.019]*** [0.027]*** [0.024] [0.018] [0.018]** 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) - 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.005 
  [0.004]** [0.005]* [0.004]** [0.004] [0.004]** [0.005] 
SOE  -0.014 -0.026 -0.012 -0.027 -0.020 -0.022 
  [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]** 
AsInt  -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  [0.001]* [0.000]*** [0.001]** [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]*** 
SucDec  -0.012 -0.024 -0.012 -0.022 -0.019 -0.018 
  [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
EPL  0.004 -0.006 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 
  [0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.001]*** [0.001] 
Growth  0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
  [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001]*** 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
Chow Test  0.69 4.74** 0.74 
R2  0.41 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.42 







Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses after splitting the sample into two subsamples based on the median value of the three governance variables 
(InvProt, GovtEff, and InstOwn). The dependent variable is ΔlnLaborCost (change of the natural logarithmic value of labor costs). The results for the below-median 
(above-median) subsamples are presented at columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6). Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost 
stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See the appendix for variable definitions.  








2.4.5.  Supplemental Analysis 
Although labor costs arguably are more subject to managerial discretion and socio-
political intervention than more aggregated cost categories (Dierynck et al., 2012; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994), selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and operating costs are more 
common in cost stickiness literature ( Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2012). Therefore, we investigate whether the significant effect of state ownership on cost 
stickiness also applies to SG&A and operating costs. In our overall sample, labor costs 
constitute a small portion of total operating costs (ratio = 0.277) but they are higher than 
SG&A costs (ratio = 1.763). In this sense, labor cost behavior may not be closely related to 
behaviors associated with operating or SG&A costs. We mimic the steps delineated for the 
final firm-year sample, except that we use alternative cost criteria for this analysis and do not 























ΔlnSales (β1) + 0.661 0.886 
  [0.016]*** [0.006]*** 
Dec∙ΔlnSales (β2) - -0.127 -0.080 
  [0.042]*** [0.013]*** 
SOE∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β3) - 0.080 0.034 
  [0.100] [0.037] 
AsInt∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β5) - -0.004 -0.006 
  [0.002]** [0.002]** 
SucDec∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β4) + 0.039 0.043 
  [0.040] [0.014]*** 
EPL∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β6) - -0.033 -0.042 
  [0.042] [0.014]*** 
CommonLaw∙Dec∙ΔlnSales 
(β7) 
? -0.064 -0.071 
  [0.066] [0.024]*** 
Growth∙Dec∙ΔlnSales (β8) - 0.005 0.010 
  [0.005] [0.002]*** 
SOE  0.002 0.002 
  [0.009] [0.002] 
AsInt  -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]* 
SucDec  -0.026 -0.008 
  [0.005]*** [0.001]*** 
EPL  0.002 0.000 
  [0.003] [0.001] 
CommonLaw  -0.009 -0.001 
  [0.005]* [0.001] 
Growth  0.002 0.002 
  [0.001]** [0.000]*** 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.25 0.80 
N  26,430 38,970 
 
Notes: This table presents the regression analyses using the logarithmic value of the change in different 
cost categories (SG&A and operating costs). The dependent variable is ΔlnSG&A and ΔlnOprCost (change 
of the natural logarithmic value of SG&A and operating costs, respectively). Figures in brackets are 
standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The degree of cost stickiness of SOEs is in bold figures. See 
the appendix for variable definitions. 








As Table 2.8 shows, the sample firms exhibit cost stickiness for either of the 
alternative cost categories (Dec∙∆lnSales is significantly negative). However, the results 
indicate that SOE does not have a significant effect on cost stickiness for the alternative cost 
categories as none of the SOE∙Dec∙∆lnSales coefficients is negative. These analyses thus 
reveal that state ownership does not cause cost stickiness in more aggregated cost categories. 
Rather, SOEs may exhibit cost stickiness only in categories that are directly susceptible to 
socio-political influence (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). Because only the labor 
costs of SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness, these results further suggest that omitted 
technological or economic factors are unlikely to explain differences between SOEs and 
private firms. 
2.5. Conclusions 
With a sample of firms from 22 European countries during 1993-2012, we investigate 
the role of state ownership in explaining asymmetric cost behavior. Consistent with our 
predictions, we find that SOEs exhibit greater cost stickiness than private firms, which is due 
to stronger socio-political influences over the SOEs. The results demonstrate that the effects 
of election years and left-wing governments on labor cost stickiness are stronger in SOEs 
than in private firms. Moreover, in the year prior to privatization, labor cost stickiness 
decreases, possibly due to pre-privatization labor restructuring. Our results are also robust to 
various sensitivity analyses.  
Different owners have different incentives with regard to managing costs (Grossman 
& Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998) and recent literature suggests that 
ownership type also affects firms’ cost behavior (Holzhacker et al., 2015; Hall, 2016).  We 
contribute to this stream of literature by showing that a particular ownership type (i.e., state 







also reveals the role of socio-political variables for explaining SOEs’ labor cost stickiness; 
these variables help detail the differences in labor cost stickiness between SOEs and private 
firms. Our findings thus contribute to an expanded understanding of the effects of state 
ownership on firm performance and other outcome variables. State ownership of profit-
seeking firms remains important (Christiansen, 2011) and understanding the impact on labor 
cost stickiness represents a means to advance the ongoing debate about whether state 
ownership is beneficial to SOE performance in general. Our research contributes to this 
debate by illuminating the role of state ownership and socio-political factors in resource 
























Variables Definitions and Sources – Main Analysis 
 
Variables Definition Sources 
ΔlnLaborCost The change of the natural logarithmic value 
of labor costs (ln LaborCostsi,t - ln 
LaborCosti,t-1) 
Datastream 
ΔlnSales The change of the natural logarithmic value 
of labor costs (ln Salesi,t - ln Salesi,t-1) 
Datastream 
Dec A dummy variable equal to 1 if 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 i,t < 
Sales i,t-1, and 0 otherwise (deflated figures) 
Datastream 
SOE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has 
a certain percentage of shares in the firm, 
and 0 otherwise  
Privatization Barometer, firms’ 
annual reports, financial 
statements, or websites 
AsInt Total assets divided by net sales Datastream 
SucDec A dummy variable equal to 1 if Salesi,t < 
Salesi,t-1 < Salesi,t-2 , and 0 otherwise 
(deflated figures) 
Datastream 
EPL Unweighted average of OECD measures of 
strictness of labor regulation regarding 
employee dismissal, categorized into three 
types: individual dismissal of regular 
workers, temporary workers, and collective 
dismissal. 
Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development 
(OECD) 
CommonLaw  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 
domicile country has common-law legal 
origin (UK and Ireland), and 0 otherwise 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Growth Annual percentage of GDP change at 
market prices based on current local 
currency 
The World Bank 
StratInd A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE’s 
main activities are in mining, oil, steel, 
transportation, utilities, defense and 
telecommunication and 0 otherwise.  
Fama and French (2016),  
according to (Boubakri et al., 
2009) 
ElecYear A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
reporting year is country’s election year, 0 
otherwise  
Europa World Year Book, 
Election Guide (post-2006) 
LeftWing A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ruling 
government in the year is a left-wing one, 
and 0 otherwise  
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions 
PrePriv1 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE 
observation is made one year before an SOE 
privatization and 0 otherwise  
Privatization Barometer, firms’ 
annual reports, financial 
statements, or websites 
PrivYear A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE is 
privatized, and 0 otherwise 
Privatization Barometer, firms’ 
annual reports, financial 
statements, or websites 
PostPriv  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SOE 
observation is made after an SOE 
privatization and 0 otherwise 
Privatization Barometer, firms’ 
annual reports, financial 
statements, or websites 





















Cost Stickiness Of Family Firms: A Socioemotional Weath Perspective 
Cost Stickiness Of Family Firms:  




Using the socioemotional wealth perspective, we predict that family firms exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms because family firms are less inclined to reduce costs during 
a sales decline to avoid a loss of the owners’ socioemotional wealth. We also argue that 
particularly family firms with a high degree of family ownership, family CEOs, and a high 
proportion of family directors exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Given 
that firms’ current cost stickiness is reflected in their cost ratio, we also argue that changes in 
family firms’ cost ratios are negatively associated with future earnings change. We find that 
family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Subsample analyses show 
that the effect of family ownership on cost stickiness is concentrated in family firms with a 
high degree of family ownership and family CEOs. Finally, we find that an increase in the 
cost ratio leads to a negative future earnings change for family firms but not for non-family 
firms, which highlights that non-economic considerations can explain cost stickiness in 
family firms. 
 




The management accounting literature suggests that costs behave asymmetrically. This 
implies that the magnitude of a cost increase is greater when sales increase than the magnitude 
of a cost decrease when sales decline with an equal extent (Anderson et al., 2003). The 
literature suggests that this asymmetric cost behavior or cost stickiness is the result of 







(Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013; Calleja et al., 2006), managerial opportunism  (Chen et al., 
2012; Dierynck et al., 2012), and managerial optimism about future sales (Banker et al., 
2014).  
While the accounting literature traditionally focuses on the economic explanations of 
cost stickiness, noneconomic considerations likely also play an important role in explaining 
resource adjustment decisions (Porter, 1980; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). However, in the 
management accounting literature, the role of noneconomic considerations in explaining cost 
behavior has largely been ignored. A better understanding of the role of noneconomic 
considerations in explaining cost stickiness is especially crucial in family firms as these firms 
are more emotion-laden than non-family firms due to the intertwined relationship between 
firms and families (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2010;  Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
A critical insight provided by the family firm literature is that, aside from economic interests, 
family firms are also motivated by noneconomic goals in protecting the families’ 
socioemotional resources (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Zellweger, Nason, 
Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013).  These noneconomic goals potentially explain these firms’ cost 
behavior.  
This study aims to investigate whether family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than 
non-family firms. Our theoretical framework draws on the socioemotional wealth perspective 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Cruz, Firfiray, & Gomez-Mejia, 2011; Berrone et al., 2012) that 
is commonly used to explain family firms’ behaviors. Basically, socioemotional wealth refers 
to the “non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as 
identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty” 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Families are generally considered to choose options that 
minimize the risk of a loss of socioemotional wealth, even if these choices imply that families 
 
 




have to incur higher financial risk  (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; 
Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Hence, according to this perspective, 
family firms are less likely to reduce costs when sales decline because they perceive cost 
reduction as a threat to the socioemotional wealth of the family owners. In contrast, compared 
to family firms, non-family firms are more willing to reduce costs because they are mainly 
focused on their economic interests.  
The literature also suggests that family control and influence over family firms are very 
instrumental in explaining family owners’ ability to make family firms prioritize their 
socioemotional wealth interests over other interests (Berrone et al., 2012). Specifically, the 
literature suggests that family owners’ ability to preserve their socioemotional wealth is 
affected by the percentage of family ownership  (Berrone et al., 2012; Astrachan, Klein, & 
Smyrnios, 2002) the presence of a family CEO (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-
Kintana, 2010) and the proportion of family directors on the firms’ boards (Astrachan et al., 
2002). Accordingly, we study to what extent these characteristics cause some family firms to 
exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms while other family firms show cost 
behavior that is similar to non-family firms.  
Apart from studying the determinants of cost stickiness, we also look at the effects of a 
change in the cost ratio (costs divided by sales) on future earnings change both for family and 
for non-family firms  (Anderson et al., 2007; Banker et al., 2018; Baumgarten et al., 2010). 
Cost stickiness increases this ratio, and it likely indicates a positive earnings change when 
this change is driven by managerial optimism as a reflection of positive sales expectations 
(Anderson et al., 2007). However, an increase in the cost ratio can also be driven by cost 
inefficiency and regarded as a predictor of a negative future earnings change. We argue that 







In this paper, we argue that the objective to protect socioemotional wealth likely leads 
family firms to reduce costs to a lesser extent when sales decline, which, consequently, brings 
about an increase in the cost ratio. More importantly, this increase is less likely to reflect 
managerial optimism about future sales and, hence, does not represent positive earnings 
expectations (Anderson et al., 2007). This implies that, in family firms, an increase in the cost 
ratio likely produces a mismatch between current unutilized resources and expected future 
sales which eventually affects future earnings change negatively. Considering the importance 
of socioemotional wealth as the reference point for decision-making (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) , we hypothesize that the association between a change in the cost 
ratio and a future earnings change is negative for family firms.  
To test our predictions, we use the database developed by Anderson et al. (2009) and 
Anderson et al. (2012), which focuses on the 2,000 largest US firms for the period 2001-
2010. This database classifies a firm-year observation as a family firm when families own at 
least 5% of the firm’s shares or votes in a particular year. Our study supports the argument 
that relative to non-family firms, family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness. Furthermore, 
we document that particularly family firms with high family ownership and a family CEO 
exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. However, we find no evidence regarding 
the effect of the proportion of family directors on the firms’ boards on cost stickiness. The 
findings underscore the importance of more direct family control and influence in enabling 
families to prioritize their socioemotional wealth in cost adjustment decisions and explain 
why family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Finally, we show that 
an increase of family firms’ cost ratio is associated with a negative future earnings change 
and the association is stronger during sales-decline periods. 
 
 




The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we show that noneconomic 
considerations play a significant role in family firms’ resource adjustment decisions (Porter, 
1985; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005) whereas prior cost stickiness studies are chiefly based on 
the notion that these decisions are mainly economically driven. This is a potentially important 
contribution to the cost stickiness literature because it shows that a purely economic view of 
this phenomenon likely yields an incomplete picture. The setting of family firms allows us to 
study these non-economic factors since these firms tend to involve socioemotional 
considerations into their decision-making heavily (Eddleston et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2011; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Also, we show not only that family firms exhibit different cost 
behavior than non-family firms, but also that this asymmetric cost behavior negatively affects 
future performance changes in family firms. Our study therefore extends the socioemotional 
wealth literature that usually focuses on either the importance of socioemotional wealth 
considerations in family firms’ behavior (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013), or on the 
performance effects of family firms’ behavior (e.g. Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 
2014; Schepers, Voordeckers, Steijvers, & Laveren, 2014). Secondly, we extend the literature 
on family firms in general and the socioemotional wealth literature in particular, by studying 
family firms’ asymmetric cost behavior relative to non-family firms. Whereas prior 
accounting studies have mainly applied the socioemotional wealth perspective to family 
firms’ decision-making in the financial accounting or reporting field such as earnings 
management (Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010), earnings quality (Pazzaglia et al., 
2013), or IPO underpricing (Leitterstorf & Rau, 2014), management accounting practices are 
still relatively understudied in the literature on family firms. Filling this gap is important 







various regulations and standards. Therefore, by focusing on management accounting 
practices, our study better reflects firm-level decision-making than studies that examine 
family firms in relation with the financial accounting domain (Songini, Gnan, & Malmi, 
2013). 
 
3.2 Literature Review  
3.2.1 Family Firms and the Preservation of Socioemotional Wealth 
The presence of family firms is pervasive worldwide. It is estimated that family firms 
make up around two-thirds of the total business entities and contribute to between 70-90% of 
global GDP (Family Firms Institute, 2015). Family ownership in publicly listed firms is also 
common, even in developed countries (La Porta et al., 1999). In the U.S. alone, about one-
third of the largest public firms (S&P 500) exhibit significant family ownership (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). 
The significant family influence in publicly listed firms enables families to preserve 
their interests in the firms. While it can be argued that families, like any other shareholder, 
aim to pursue economic interests from their firm ownership, the literature suggests a more 
nuanced perspective by pointing out that families pursue both economic and noneconomic 
interests (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2012; Zellweger et al., 2013).  In particular, scholars suggest 
that families are also focused on ensuring the fulfillment of their social and emotional needs 
(Kepner, 1983). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007)  label the social and emotional interests of family 
firms as socioemotional wealth. More specifically, they define socioemotional wealth as all 
“non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity, the 
ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). It includes elements such as corporate culture, reputation, prestige, 
 
 




harmony, intimacy, power, influence, and enjoyment from ownership (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014).  
It has been argued that families often consider their socioemotional wealth to be more 
important than their economic interests (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). On the one hand, 
this implies that family owners are inclined to minimize the risk of losing their socioemotional 
wealth, although this may increase their financial risks.  On the other hand, owning family 
likely avoid opportunities that potentially increase their economic interests if they believe 
that these initiatives will pose a threat to their socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Berrone et al., 2012). For example, a recent 
PricewaterhouseCoopers survey (2016) indicates that despite the importance of formal 
planning to anticipate future conditions, a high percentage of family firms worldwide fail to 
initiate formal succession and middle-range plans to avoid the possible emotional stress 
resulting from these decisions.  The importance attached to the preservation of family owners’ 
socioemotional wealth is often based on the multiple roles of the family members (e.g., as 
owners or managers and as family members)  (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). As a result, the 
relationship between the family and the family firm is generally closely intertwined 
(Eddleston et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) 
As regards a variety of corporate choices, the socioemotional wealth perspective can be 
used to explain different behavior between family firms and non-family firms. For example, 
despite their generally poor financial performance, Spanish family firms are more reluctant 
to participate in joint cooperatives because this implies that families have to give up a 
significant portion of their control over their firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Due to 
reputational concerns, family firms also invest more in pollution prevention activities, 







2010). Similarly, although diversification potentially reduces financial performance 
variability and increases firm survivability, family firms tend to diversify less than non-family 
firms possibly because diversification often requires new, non-family, stakeholders that 
potentially disrupt firm harmony (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). These results consistently 
indicate that to preserve the family owners’ socioemotional wealth, family firms make 
decisions that potentially harm their economic interests. 
 
3.2.2 Cost Stickiness and the Socioemotional Wealth Perspective 
It has been widely established that costs do not respond symmetrically to activity 
changes. Specifically, the rise in costs during a sales increase is often higher than the decrease 
in costs when sales diminish. This cost stickiness phenomenon challenges the conventional 
view of cost behavior which assumes that costs always respond proportionally to activity 
changes regardless of the direction of the change (Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012; 
Dierynck et al., 2012). 
It is further argued that cost stickiness is the result of deliberate managerial decisions 
(Anderson et al., 2003;  Banker & Byzalov, 2014). During a sales decrease, managers are less 
willing to reduce their unutilized resources when it is costly to do so (e.g., high legal firing 
costs, loss of employee morale, or high costs to reacquire the resources when sales increase 
again) ( Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018 ). In addition, optimistic managers tend 
to scale down resources to a lesser extent during a sales decrease because when sales increase 
again in the future, they will need less additional resources ( Anderson et al., 2003; Banker et 
al., 2014). 
Noneconomic considerations likely play a significant role in explaining resource 
adjustment decisions as well. If managers are emotionally attached to their firms or if they 
 
 




perceive resource reductions as a threat to their managerial reputation, they may be reluctant 
to scale down resources (Porter, 1985; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Stavrou et al., 2007; 
Block, 2010). Although noneconomic considerations may explain cost stickiness for both 
family firms and non-family firms, it can be argued that these factors play a more significant 
role in family firms because owning family members are likely to be more emotionally 
attached to their firms (Eddleston et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Consequently, 
when making resource adjustment decisions, family firms are likely to be more inclined to 
consider their family owners’ noneconomic interests (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005).  
Based on the socioemotional wealth perspective, it is proposed that family firms exhibit 
greater cost stickiness than non-family firms because family firms use their objective to 
protect the family owners’ socioemotional wealth as the basis in making resource adjustment 
decisions. In this sense, family firms are less likely to reduce their resources than non-family 
firms during a sales decrease because family firms follow the family owners’ preference for 
the protection of their socioemotional wealth to their economic interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011, 2007). Although resource reduction leads to better financial performance, it is likely to 
be perceived by family firms as a threat to the family owners’ socioemotional wealth.   
Family firms’ reluctance to reduce resources when sales decline is driven by various 
specific elements of the socioemotional wealth preservation motive. Reducing resources, for 
example, may disrupt the well-established family firms’ corporate culture on which family 
firms rely much when dealing with their strategic stakeholders (Stavrou et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, family firms rely more on the loyalty of their employees (Weber, Lavell, Lowry, 
& Zellner, 2003; Martinez, 2014) and firing employees will potentially deteriorate employee 
loyalty. Also, family firms may consider a resource reduction as a weakening of their 







costs also potentially creates conflicts among family members (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2004) because some are affected by the cost reduction while others are not. Meanwhile, 
owners’ of non-family firms are generally less emotionally attached to their firms, which is 
why here socioemotional considerations hardly play a role in their resource adjustment 
decisions.  
In sum, when sales decrease, firms are confronted with the choice of scaling down or 
retaining their unutilized resources. Although in many cases, resource reduction will improve 
their financial performance, family firms are less likely to scale down their costs than non- 
family firms because of the risk of a diminishing effect on the families’ socioemotional 
wealth. Since non-family firms tend to focus on economic considerations in making resource 
adjustment decisions, it is likely that the cost behavior of family firms is less sensitive to sales 
decline than the cost behavior of non-family firms. Based on the previous arguments, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. 
 
3.2.3 Cost Stickiness of Family Firms and Strength of Family Control and Influence  
3.2.3.1 The degree of Family Ownership and the Cost Stickiness of Family Firms 
Although in general it can be predicted that family firms exhibit greater cost 
stickiness, it is also likely that, depending on specific circumstances, family firms differ in 
their ability to prioritize families’ socioemotional wealth in cost adjustment decisions. More 
specifically, when families can exert more significant control and influence over their firms, 
they are better able to prioritize their socioemotional wealth over economic interests (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011). As a result, it is likely that such family firms reduce costs to a lesser extent 
than non-family firms when sales decline, leading to greater cost stickiness. On the other 
 
 




hand, when family firms are owned by families who are less able to control their firms, these 
family firms are not likely to exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms because 
they will be less encouraged to use the family owners’ socioemotional wealth as the reference 
point in the decision-making process.  
Families can increase their control by various means, but the most direct one is by 
owning a high percentage of firms’ shares. A high degree of family ownership enables 
families to pursue their interests (Astrachan et al., 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). It is 
therefore likely that family firms with a high degree of family ownership exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms since families have greater power to pursue their interests 
over other shareholders’. It is less likely that this will apply to family firms with low family 
ownership because in these circumstances families are less well positioned to pursue their 
interests given their less significant ownership.  
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2a: The influence of family ownership on the degree of cost stickiness is concentrated among 
family firms with a high degree of family ownership. 
 
3.2.3.2 Family CEO and the Cost Stickiness of Family Firms 
Families can also exercise a direct influence on their firms by having family members 
as CEOs in their firms (Berrone et al., 2012). CEOs exert a significant influence on firms’ 
decision-making processes (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). Family firms that hire family CEOs 
expect these CEOs to ensure the protection of the families’ socioemotional wealth (Berrone 
et al., 2012).  In return, family firms offer strong emotional ties and better protection from 
managerial job market disciplining mechanisms (Strike et al., 2015). 







performance (Detienne & Chirico, 2013). Also, as professional managers, they have less 
emotional involvement with  their firms or the owning families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Minichilli et al., 2014) and subject to more stringent managerial job market disciplining 
mechanisms (Strike et al., 2015). It is therefore likely that family firms’ costs led by non-
family CEOs behave in the same way as non-family firms’ costs because non-family CEOs 
are likely to focus more on financial performance than on preserving socioemotional wealth.  
In the cost stickiness context, family firms led by a family CEO are more likely to 
exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms because they consider the family owners’ 
socioemotional wealth to be their reference point in making resource adjustment decisions. 
However, family firms led by a non-family CEO are equally willing to reduce costs as non-
family firms because the CEOs of these firms do not have strong incentives to protect the 
socioemotional wealth.  
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2b: The influence of family ownership on the degree of cost stickiness is concentrated among 
family firms with a family CEO.  
 
3.2.3.3 The proportion of Family Directors and the Cost Stickiness of Family Firms 
 Families can also exert their control and influence on their firms more subtly through 
having family members sitting on the firm’s board of directors (Berrone et al., 2012). Boards 
play very strategic roles in selecting and appointing CEOs and controlling CEOs on behalf of 
shareholders (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Additionally, boards provide valuable 
resources to CEOs that are arguably helpful to CEOs in assuming their managerial roles 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The family firm literature suggests that family directors are 
associated with better boards’ firm-specific expertise that CEOs can rely on in making 
 
 




strategic decisions (Zattoni, Gnan, & Huse, 2015). Also, a higher proportion of family 
directors ensures CEOs that they have more discretion to prioritize families’ socioemotional 
wealth over the economic interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
 We then predict that family firms with a higher proportion of family directors exhibit 
greater cost stickiness than non-family firms for two reasons. Firstly, boards with a higher 
proportion of family directors are likely to advise CEOs of family firms not to reduce costs 
more when sales decline, either upon CEOs’ requests or their initiatives, to protect their 
families’ socioemotional wealth. These CEOs are likely to take this advice into consideration 
because they consider family directors to represent powerful shareholders (Berrone et al., 
2012) or family directors’ advice to be accurate due to family directors’ firm-specific 
expertise (Zattoni et al., 2015). Secondly, CEOs of family firms are less likely to take 
initiatives to reduce costs when family directors constitute a higher proportion of their boards 
because these CEOs perceive a higher percentage of family directors to be a strong indication 
that families demand that their socioemotional wealth will be protected  (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). 
 However, it is likely that family firms with a lower proportion of family directors do 
not exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms because family directors have much 
less power in influencing boards to provide advice to CEOs that would protect families’ 
socioemotional wealth. Also, CEOs will interpret the lower proportion of family directors as 
an indication that these family firms are willing to have their economic interests as the 
reference point in firms’ decision making (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
 Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2c: The influence of family ownership on the degree of cost stickiness is concentrated among 








3.2.4 Family Firms’ Cost Stickiness and Future Earnings Change 
 So far we have hypothesized that family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-
family firms due to socioemotional wealth preservation concerns. We have also predicted that 
family firms’ greater cost stickiness relative to that of non-family firms depends on the ability 
of families to exert control and influence on their firms. Knowing that asymmetric cost 
behavior affects firms’ cost ratio (costs divided by sales) (Anderson et al., 2007),  we now 
ask whether these changes in cost ratio have a different performance effect for family firms 
as compared to non-family firms.  
While the traditional approach argues that an increase of the cost ratio implies 
managerial inefficiency and poorer future performance, the more recent literature offers a 
more nuanced perspective based on the cost stickiness argument (Anderson et al., 2007; 
Baumgarten et al., 2010). According to the more recent literature, an increase of this ratio can 
also be driven by a manager’s decision to retain unutilized resources when sales decrease, 
based on a positive expectation regarding future sales (Anderson et al., 2007). Therefore, such 
an increase would then provide information about managers’ positive sales expectations. 
Indeed, an increase in the cost ratio during sales-decline periods is associated with a positive 
one-year-ahead earnings change when future sales are more likely to increase than to decrease 
(Anderson et al., 2007). Furthermore, Baumgarten et al. (2010) indicate that changes in the 
cost ratio exhibit positive effect on future earnings change during sales-decrease periods only 
for cost-efficient firms, i.e., firms with previous SG&A ratios below the industry mean. 
These results suggest that cost inefficiency and managerial optimism about future sales 
are competing forces that explain the effect of cost ratio changes on one-year-ahead earnings 
change. If the increase is mainly driven by managerial inefficiency, it is likely to be associated 
 
 




with a negative future earnings change because managerial inefficiency tends to persist. 
However, if managerial optimism regarding future sales explains much of the change in the 
cost ratio, it will positively affect one-year-ahead earnings change (Anderson et al., 2007). 
The relative magnitudes of managerial optimism and cost inefficiency likely explain the 
ultimate effect of the increase in the cost ratio on future earnings change. 
We add to this by arguing that the socioemotional wealth preservation motive also 
likely explains the incremental information value of the change of the cost ratio. Our first 
hypothesis predicts that family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. 
This will likely increase the cost ratio. However, this increase does not necessarily represent 
managerial optimism about future sales and therefore does not reflect positive earnings 
expectations (Anderson et al., 2007). Consequently, this implies that family firms are less 
likely to retain unutilized productive resources to meet increasing future sales, which creates 
a mismatch between the currently unused resources and the expected future sales. Eventually, 
this will negatively affect future earnings change.  
When sales decline, the direction of the effect of the current change of the cost ratio of 
future earnings change depends on the relative magnitudes of the optimism force and the 
inefficiency force in explaining the change (Anderson et al., 2007). However, family firms 
have an additional factor (the socioemotional wealth motive) that increases the magnitude of 
the inefficiency force and thus leads to a greater likelihood of a negative association between 
cost ratio changes and future earnings change. Because the socioemotional wealth 
preservation motive is fundamental in family firms’ decision-making (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), we predict that this factor largely explains the association between 
cost ratio changes and future sales changes. 







H3: Family firms exhibit a negative association between cost ratio changes and future 




The starting point of our sampling procedure is the database developed by Anderson et 
al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2012)15. The database contains information on the 2,000 
largest US firms (based on the total assets value for of 2001) for 2001-2010 (16,230 firm-
year observations). To classify a firm as a family firm, Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson 
et al. (2012) employ a single criterion. More specifically, they (and we) classify a particular 
firm-year observation as a family firm when families own at least 5% of the firm’s shares or 
votes in a particular year.  
Next, we retrieve our CEO, director, and other governance data from the MSCI GMI 
Ratings database. This step limits our sample to 10,016 observations because many firm-year 
observations included in the database developed by Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson et 
al. (2012)  are not covered by the MSCI GMI Ratings database. From the family firm 
observations, we then manually gather data on the percentage of family ownership,  CEOs’ 
family status, and family directors. We collect all relevant financial data for year t, t-1, and t-
2 from the Compustat database. For hypothesis 3, we also collect EPS data for t+1.  
For Sales, we delete observations that contain missing, zero or negative values for the 
periods t, t-1, and t-2, which we repeat for SG&A costs for the periods t and t-1, and for Assets 
and Labor for period t.  Furthermore, consistent with  Anderson et al. (2003), Banker, Byzalov 
                                                          
15 The database is freely available at http://www.ronandersonprofessionalpage.net/data-sets.html 
 
 




& Chen (2013), and Banker et al. (2014) we exclude observations with SG&At > Salest and 
data in which sales experience large changes (an increase of more than 50% or a decrease of 
more than 33%). Excluding observations with large changes is specifically important for 
family firm research because family firms tend to engage less in acquisitions than non-family 
firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Finally, we delete the 1% outliers for each tail of the change 
in SG&A costs and the change in sales (Chen et al., 2012). Consequently, our final sample 
involves 7,902 firm-year observations (for 1,257 firms) with 2,417 (397 unique firms) family 
firm observations. Table 3.1 explains our sample selection procedure.  
Table 3.1 Sample Selection Procedures 
 
Sample Selection Criteria Total Observations 
Firm-year observations provided by (Anderson et al., 2009; 
Anderson et al., 2012) 
16,230 
Deleting observations with missing director, CEO, and company-
related data  
10,005 
Deleting observations with missing and negative financial data 
(sales, SG&A costs, employees, and total assets) 
9,352 
Deleting observations with SG&At > Salest, and data in which 
sales experience large change (increase by more than 50% or 
decrease by more than 33%). 
8,249 
Trimming top and bottom 1% of observations with extreme values 
in the change in SG&A costs and sales 
7,902 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Model 
3.3.2.1 Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1 
Based on the socioemotional wealth perspective, we predict that family firms exhibit 
greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Consistent with previous cost stickiness 
literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012, Banker et al., 2014), we focus on the 
behavior of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs in our analysis because these 
costs largely reflect the office and managerial activities. These costs include various 







and management of overall firm activities (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, 2013). These costs 
arguably also include the consumption of pay and perquisites (Chen et al., 2012)  that also 
capture the provision of pay and perquisites to family employees of the family firms that are 
often used to protect the family owners’ socioemotional wealth (Schepers et al., 2014).  
Lastly, SG&A costs are often used in the literature about the performance effects of cost 
behavior (Anderson et al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). 
To test our first hypothesis, we refer to Calleja et al. (2006), Banker, Byzalov, and 
Chen (2013), and Banker et al. (2014) and propose the following basic formula: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   𝛽1  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3  ∙  𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4  ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽6  ∙  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7  ∙  𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡  ∙   𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8  ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +    𝛽9  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10  ∙  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +     𝜁 ∙
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   .....................................................................................................  (1) 
 
 
where ΔlnSG&Ai,t  (ΔlnSalesi,t ) refers to the natural log-change of SG&A costs (sales) for firm 
i in year t. Deci,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one if sales for firm i year t decrease and 
0 otherwise. Consequently, β1 measures the increase in SG&A costs when sales increase, 
while β1 + β2 indicates the effect of a sales change on the change of SG&A costs when sales 
decrease. Conditional on β1 > 0, cost stickiness occurs when β2 < 0 because it specifies that 
the magnitude of the SG&A costs decrease during a sales decrease is less than the magnitude 
of the SG&A costs during a sales increase (Anderson et al., 2003). Our variable of interest is 
FamFirm (family firm), which represents whether a particular firm-year observation is a 
family firm. Based on the database of Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2012), this 
variable takes the value of 1 if the family owns at least 5% of the firm’s shares or votes of 
that firm-year observation and 0 otherwise. Family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than 
 
 




non-family firms when β3 < 0. 
We employ three control variables that are commonly used in the cost stickiness 
literature ( Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012). Asint refers to the asset intensity of firms. 
It is measured by dividing the firm’s total assets by sales. Similarly, we measure employee 
intensity (Emplint) by dividing the firm’s total employees by sales. Both measures reflect the 
resources needed for a certain level of sales. Firms that need more resources to attain a certain 
level of sales experience greater difficulties to reduce costs. Therefore, firms with a higher 
degree of Asint and Emplint tend to have stickier costs. Lastly, when firms experience a sales 
decrease in the previous period (PrevDec), they are more cautious about their costs and are 
more sensitive to sales change. Therefore, firms that experience a previous sales decrease 
tend to have a lesser degree of cost stickiness. PrevDec is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if Salesi,t-1 <  Salesi,t-2, and zero if otherwise16. All financial data are inflation-
adjusted. Standalone Variables is written in the vector form and refers to the main variables.   
3.3.2.2 Empirical Models for Hypotheses 2a-2c 
To test hypothesis 2a, we split our family firm observations into two subgroups based 
on the median value of family ownership (FamOwn): family firms with a high percentage of 
family ownership (HighFamOwn) and those with a low percentage of family ownership 
(LowFamOwn). We then replace FamFirm with HighFamOwn and LowFamOwn to 
investigate whether the effect of family ownership on cost stickiness is concentrated in family 
firms with a high degree of family ownership.  We follow similar steps for hypotheses 2b-2c 
by splitting the family firm observations into two subsamples based on the family status of 
                                                          
16  We do not follow Dierynck et al. (2012) who define  PrevDec  as a dummy variable that represents sales 
decline in two concecutive periods  (Salesi,t <Salesi,t-1 <  Salesi,t-2). Using their definition of PrevDec will 








CEOs: family CEOs (FamCEO) and non-family CEOs (NonFamCEO) and on the median 
values of the proportion of family directors to total directors (FamDir): family firms with a 
high proportion of family directors (HighFamDir) and those with a low proportion of family 
directors (LowFamDir). Similar to hypothesis 2a, for hypothesis 2b we replace FamFirm with 
FamCEO and NonFamCEO and for hypothesis 2c we replace FamFirm with LowFamDir 
and HighFamDir to investigate whether the effect of family ownership on cost stickiness is 
concentrated in family firms with family CEOs and a high proportion of family directors, 
respectively.  
Hypotheses 2a-2c predict that the coefficients of HighFamOwn∙Dec∙∆lnSales, 
FamCEO∙Dec∙∆lnSales, and HighFamDir∙Dec∙∆lnSales are negative, indicating that family 
firms with a high percentage of family ownership, family CEOs or a high proportion of family 
directors exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Using non-family firms as the 
reference group, we employ the following regression equation to test hypotheses 2a: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   𝛽1  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +   𝛾1  ∙  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾2 ∙  𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4  ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6  ∙  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝜆1  ∙  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡  ∙   𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆2  ∙  𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡  ∙   𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∙  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡  ∙
  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +    𝛽9  ∙  𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10 ∙  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ∙  𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜁 ∙
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   .....................................................................................................  (2) 
   
We replace HighFamOwn (LowFamOwn) with FamCEO (NonFamCEO) or 
HighFamDir (LowFamDir) to investigate hypotheses 2b and 2c, respectively. We hand-
collect the data on family ownership, CEO family status and proportion of family directors. 
Standalone Variables is written in the vector form and refers to the main variables.   
3.3.2.3 Empirical Model for Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the change in the cost ratio of family firms is negatively 
 
 




associated with future earnings change. Following Anderson et al. (2007) and consistent with 








.........................................................................................................................  (3) 
 
 A higher SG&AChg indicates that the degree of SG&A change is greater than the 
degree of sales change. 
 We regress SG&AChg on CEPSt+1 or one-year-ahead earnings change. We also 
include fundamental signals of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993); Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) 
as control variables in our specification (Anderson et al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). 
Appendix A explains these fundamental signals and their operationalization. CEPSi,t + 1  is 





  ................................................................................................................................ (4) 
 
 
where P denotes the end-of-fiscal-year price per share, and i and t denote the firm and the 
year, respectively. We define CEPSi,t  similarly to CEPSi,t + 1, except that we replace t +1 with 
t  and t with  t-1.  
 We modify the model of Anderson et al. (2007) and  Baumgarten et al. (2010) into 
the following equation: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝜁1 ∙  𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁2 ∙  𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁3 ∙  𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
∑  10𝑗=1 𝛿𝑗 ∙  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + εi,t .....................................................................................................  (5) 
 







earnings change. FamFirmSG&AChgi,t is SG&AChgi,t when FamFirmi,t =1, and 0 if 
otherwise. Accordingly, NonFamFirmSG&AChgi,t  is SG&AChgi,t  when FamFirmi,t =0, and 
0 if otherwise. We use the sample used to test hypotheses 1 and 2a-2c as the initial sample to 
test hypothesis 3.   
 
3.4 Empirical Results  
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As indicated in Table 3.2, our descriptive analysis reveals that family firms and non-
family firms only exhibit significant differences in terms of EmplInt. These findings suggest 
that it is less likely that these variables explain the different cost behavior between family 
firms and non-family firms. Table 3.3 displays the Spearman and Pearson correlation between 
our stand-alone variables. None of the Spearman or Pearson correlation coefficients indicates 
strong correlations between these variables. To ensure that our analyses are not affected by 
severe multicollinearity problems, we also conduct a multicollinearity test based on the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) with the cutoff value of 10. We find no multicollinearity 
problems among our independent variables.  
 
Table 3.2   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables 
Total Sample  (n=7,902) 
Mean for FF 
(non-FF) 
observations Mean Median Std Dev 
SGA/Salesi,t 0.244 0.216 0.159 0.247 (0.242) 
Asinti,t 1.206 0.997 0.848 1.206 (1.206) 
EmplInti,t 5.932 4.522 7.876 6.787 (5.555)*** 
DecDumi,t 0.344 0.000 0.475 0.356 (0.338) 
PrevDeci,t 0.335 0.000 0.472 0.345 (0.330) 
SGAChgi,t 0.00007 0.0003 0.02 0.0004 (-0.0003) 
CEPSi,t 0.009 0.005 0.111 0.008 ( 0.01) 









Table 3.3  Correlation Matrix 
 
 FF SG&A/ Sales DecDum PrevDec Asint Emplint 
 
FF 
         0.034**   0.017    0.015 -0.060*  0.104* 
SG&A/ Sales   0.015*    0.016*   -0.011 0.242*    0.090* 
DecDum      0.017     0.015   0.208* 0.019*   0.049* 
PrevDec  0.015    -0.007        0.208*       0.027*     0.042 
Asint -0.000        0.200*   0.028*  0.029*  -0.098* 
Emplint    0.073*        -0.044**  0.021 0.013* -0.104*  
 
3.4.2 Family Firms and Cost Stickiness 
Following the recommendations of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we mean-
center all continuous predictor variables to obtain a more meaningful interpretation and to 
minimize the possibility of collinearity. To control for the possibility of an interfirm 
correlation of standard errors, we use firm-level, clustered standard errors in our specification 
(Petersen, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). Finally, we include the year and industry fixed effects. 
 In Table 3.4, we first show the existence of cost stickiness among all of our sample 
firms and hence we exclude the FamFirm and all control variables and their interaction terms. 
Column 1 Table 3.4 confirms that our sample firms exhibit cost stickiness as indicated by the 
positive value of β1 (0.671, t = 32.83) and a negative value of β2 (-0.134, t=-4.63). Our data 
indicate that for each 1% of net sales increase, SG&A costs increase by 0.671%. Furthermore, 
for each 1% of net sales decrease, SG&A costs decrease by only 0.537% (0.671%-0.134%), 
which implies cost stickiness among our sample firms because the degree of cost decrease is 
less than the degree of cost increase for the same degree of sales change. Our findings are 
consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck 
et al., 2012). 







results. Column 2 Table 3.4 indicates the positive value of β1 (0.712, t = 30.86) and negative 
value of β2 (-0.205, t=-5.86). Our results also show that firms experiencing a sales decrease 
in the previous period (PrevDec) tend to exhibit a lesser degree of cost stickiness, as indicated 
by the positive value of PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t∙ΔlnSalesi,t  (β4= 0.189, t= 3.32). The results point out 
that firms experiencing a sales decrease in the current and previous periods decrease their 
SG&A costs more than firms that only experience a sales decrease in the current period.  
Next, we include our variable of interest, FamFirm, in the analysis. Including FamFirm 
does not alter our overall results in the sense that β1 remains significantly positive and β2 is 
negative. More importantly, these findings support our first hypothesis that family firms 
exhibit cost greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. As column 3 Table 3.4 shows, the 
coefficient of FamFirmi,t∙ Deci,t∙ΔlnSalesi,t  is significantly negative (β3 = -0.115, t= -1.97). 
The figure suggests that when sales decrease, family firms reduce SG&A costs less than non-
family firms indicating that family firms exhibit greater SG&A cost stickiness than non-
family firms.  Specifically, when sales decrease, family firms reduce their SG&A costs by 
2.36%  (-0.115 x -0.205) less than non-family firms. Overall these findings support our first 
hypothesis that family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. 
 
 




Table 3.4  SG&A Cost Stickiness of Family Firms - Results of Regression Analysis 
 




(1) (2) (3) 
ΔlnSalesi,t   (β1 ) + 0.671 0.712 0.677 
  [0.020]*** [0.023]*** [0.028]*** 
Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   (β2) - -0.134 -0.205 -0.169 
  [0.029]*** [0.035]*** [0.041]*** 
FamFirmi,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β3) -   -0.115 
    [0.058]** 
PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β4) +  0.189 0.184 
   [0.057]*** [0.056]*** 
Asintit ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β5) -  0.024 0.021 
   [0.046] [0.046] 
Emplinti,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β6) -  -0.003 -0.004 
   [0.004] [0.004] 
FamFirmi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β7) +   0.113 
    [0.039]*** 
PrevDeci,t  ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β8) -  -0.153 -0.149 
   [0.040]*** [0.040]*** 
Asinti,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β9) +  -0.056 -0.054 
   [0.030]* [0.030]* 
Emplinti,t ∙   ΔlnSalesi,t  (β10) +  0.005 0.005 
   [0.004] [0.004] 
Stand-alone variables  Included 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.49 0.50 0.50 
N  7,902 7,902 7,902 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression equations to investigate the degree of cost stickiness 
of family firms. The dependent variable is ΔlnSG&Ai,t (log-change of SG&A costs). Numbers in brackets 
are standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. The degree of cost stickiness of family firms is in a bold figure. 
 
3.4.3 Cost Stickiness of Family Firms and Strength of Family Control and Influence  
To test hypothesis 2a, we delete observations with a dual-share structure because this 
share structure enables controlling shareholders such as families to have voting rights higher 
than their cash flow rights. Therefore, the classification of family firms into those with high 
family ownership and low family ownership could be distorted. Column 1, Table 3.5 shows 
that family firms with a high percentage of family ownership exhibit greater cost stickiness 
than non-family firms as indicated by the negative coefficient of HighFamOwn∙ 







family ownership do not exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms, as indicated by 
the insignificance of γ2. These findings support hypothesis H2a and suggest that a high 
percentage of family ownership enables families to prioritize their socioemotional wealth 
over other shareholders’ interests.17 
Our second family firm variable is family CEO. As can be seen at column 2 Table 
3.5, the coefficient of FamilyCEOi,t∙ Deci,t∙ΔlnSalesi,t  is negative (γ3 = -0.123, t= -1.75). This 
implies that family firms led by family CEOs exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family 
firms. Meanwhile, family firms led by non-family CEOs do not exhibit greater cost stickiness 
than non-family firms, as indicated by the insignificance of γ2.  These results support 
hypothesis H2b and show that family firms with family CEOs can prioritize their 
socioemotional wealth in making resource adjustment decisions, thus leading to greater cost 
stickiness. 
In column 3 of Table 3.5, family firms with a high proportion of family directors do 
not exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms as indicated by the insignificant γ3. 
The results do not support hypothesis H2c. Overall, the findings related to hypotheses H2a 
and H2b suggest that family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness particularly when families 
exert their control and influence explicitly (e.g., by having family members as CEOs). When 
families try to control their firms in a more indirect way (by having family members as 




                                                          
17  Including observations with a dual-shares structure produces qualitatively similar results. 
 
 




Table 3.5  SG&A Cost Stickiness of Family Firms – The Role of Family Firms-Related 
Variables 
 




(1) (2) (3) 
ΔlnSalesi,t   (β1 ) + 0.678 0.678 0.677 
  [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** 
Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   (β2) - -0.169 -0.170 -0.170 
  [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.041]*** 
HighFamOwni,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t  (γ1) - -0.248   
  [0.093]***   
LowFamOwni,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t  (γ2) ? -0.015   
  [0.081]   
FamCEOi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t  (γ3) -  -0.123  
   [0.070]*  
NonFamCEOi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t (γ4) ?  -0.115  
   [0.080]  
HighFamDiri,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t (γ5) -   -0.118 
    [0.077] 
LowFamDiri,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t (γ6) ?   -0.109 
    [0.073] 
PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β4) + 0.174 0.185 0.183 
  [0.059]*** [0.057]*** [0.056]*** 
Asintit ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β5) - 0.006 0.022 0.020 
  [0.053] [0.046] [0.046] 
Emplinti,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β6) - -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] 
HighFamOwni,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (λ1)  0.182   
  [0.055]***   
LowFamOwni,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (λ2)  0.001   
  [0.055]   
FamCEOi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (λ3)   0.091  
   [0.047]*  
NonFamCEOi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t (λ4)   0.144  
   [0.054]***  
HighFamDiri,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t (λ5)    0.107 
    [0.052]** 
LowFamDiri,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (λ6)    0.116 
    [0.046]** 
PrevDeci,t  ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β8)  -0.143 -0.150 -0.148 
  [0.042]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** 
Asinti,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β9)  -0.059 -0.054 -0.053 
  [0.032]* [0.030]* [0.030]* 
Emplinti,t ∙   ΔlnSalesi,t  (β10)  0.006 0.005 0.005 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] 
Stand-alone variables  Included 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.50 0.50 0.50 
N  7,231 7,902 7,902 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses after replacing FamFirm variable and its 
interaction terms with three family firms-related variables: percentage of family ownership (HighFamOwn 
and LowFamOwn), family status of CEOs (FamCEO and NonFamCEO), and proportion of family directors 
(HighFamDir and LowFamDir), respectively. The dependent variable is ΔlnSG&Ai,t (log-change of SG&A 
costs). Numbers in brackets are standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at 









3.4.4 Family Firms and Future Earnings Change 
Column 1 Table 3.6 shows the results of the regression specification for the whole set 
of observations (sales-increase and sales-decrease firms). The findings indicate that a current 
change in the SG&A ratio of family firms is negatively associated with a future earnings 
change (𝜁1= -0.372, t =-2.07) while for non-family firms a ratio change is not associated with 
a future earnings change (𝜁2 is insignificant). These findings support hypothesis 3 which 
predicts that only family firms exhibit a more negative association between a cost ratio change 
and a future earnings change.  
When we divide our observations into sales-decrease periods and sales-increase 
periods, we find that in the case of family firms the association between a current change of 
the SG&A ratio and a future earnings change was negative for sales-decrease periods (𝜁1= -
0.536, t =-1.94) (column 2 Table 3.6) but not for sales-increase periods (column 3 Table 3.6). 
The coefficient of NonFamFirmSG&AChg is insignificant for both sales-increase and sales-
decrease periods. Furthermore, the absolute value of 𝜁1 for the sales-decrease subsample is 
higher than for the full sample, which indicates that the negative association of a current 
change in the SG&A ratio of family firms and a future earnings change is stronger for sales-














Table 3.6  The Effect of Change in the SG&A Cost Ratio of Family Firms on Future 
Earnings Change 
 









FamFirmSG&AChgi,t - -0.372 -0.536 -0.400 
  [0.180]** [0.276]* [0.260] 
NonFamFirmSG&AChgi,t ? 0.022 -0.027 -0.091 
  [0.114] [0.219] [0.117] 
CEPSt - -0.154 -0.142 -0.208 
  [0.038]*** [0.047]*** [0.052]*** 
Individual Signals  Included 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.10 0.16 0.08 
N  4,204 1,418 2,786 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression equations to investigate the effect of a current change 
in the SG&A cost ratio of family firms on future earnings change. Numbers in brackets are standard errors, 
clustered at firm levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 




3.4.5 Sensitivity Tests 
We conduct several sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our finding that family 
firms exhibit greater SG&A cost stickiness than non-family firms. First, a significant 
proportion of family firms (25.61%) exhibits a dual share structure that allows families to 
have voting rights higher than cash flow rights. As a result, it becomes easier for families to 
exert control over firms’ decision-making process (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009). To mitigate 
this problem, we exclude observations with a dual share structure and repeat the process. As 
column 1 Table 3.7 shows, we find that the results are qualitatively similar to our main 
analysis. More specifically, family firms still exhibit greater SG&A cost stickiness than non-
family firms. 
Secondly, we exclude family firms with multiple family owners, assuming that in these 
firms the protection of the socioemotional wealth of all of the family owners will be a central 







businesses. The results in column 2 Table 3.7 show that after dropping family firms with 
multiple family owners family firms still exhibit greater SG&A cost stickiness, as indicated 
by the significantly negative value of β3  (-0.144, t= -2.41). Thirdly, we define a firm as a 
family firm if the families own at least 10% and 20% of the voting rights, respectively. As 
columns 3 and 4 Table 3.7 indicate, using stricter definitions of a family firm does not alter 
our results. More specifically, family firms still exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family 
firms even when we use higher percentages of family ownership as the defining thresholds 
of a family firm.  
We then control for free cash flow (FCF) level. Jensen (1986) argues that firms with 
excess cash flows are likely to invest in value decreasing projects. Consequently, a higher 
FCF is associated with greater cost stickiness (Chen et al., 2012). We measure FCF by (cash 
flow from operating activities - common dividend – preferred dividend) scaled by total assets 
(Chen et al., 2012). Column 5 Table 3.7 indicates that even after incorporating FCF, family 
firms still exhibit greater cost stickiness. 
Finally, we control for the ability of independent board members in disciplining 
families in preserving their socioemotional wealth over economic interests. We measure 
board independence (BoardInd) as the ratio between the number of fully independent 
directors and the number of total directors. We then split the sample into two groups based 
on the median value of the proportion of fully independent directors. The variable (BoardInd) 
is equal to one if the firm’s proportion of fully independent directors is above the median 
value and zero otherwise. Further, we interact BoardInd with Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  and with 
ΔlnSalesi, t, and then rerun the regression that includes the BoardInd ∙Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t, and 
BoardInd  ∙ΔlnSalesi,t.  As column 6 Table 3.7 indicates, family firms still exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms. 
 
 





Table 3.7  SG&A Cost Stickiness of Family Firms – Robustness Tests 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔlnSalesi,t   (β1 ) + 0.679 0.675 0.676 0.689 0.672 0.672 
  [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.027]*** [0.026]*** [0.028]*** [0.035]*** 
Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   (β2) - -0.169 -0.167 -0.170 -0.184 -0.171 -0.161 
  [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.040]*** [0.055]*** 
FamFirmi,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β3) 
- -0.118 -0.144 -0.150 -0.118 -0.111 -0.116 
  [0.065]* [0.060]** [0.062]** [0.070]* [0.058]* [0.061]* 
PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β4) 
+ 0.176 0.191 0.183 0.184 0.187 0.190 
  [0.059]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** 
Asintit ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β5) - 0.010 -0.004 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.019 
  [0.052] [0.047] [0.046] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] 
Emplinti,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β6) 
- -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
FCFi,t* Deci,t * ΔlnSalesi,t   -     0.236  
      [0.363]  
IndBoardi,t* Deci,t * ΔlnSalesi,t   +      -0.015 
       [0.057] 
FamFirmi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β7) + 0.094 0.129 0.155 0.135 0.113 0.113 
  [0.043]** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.044]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** 
PrevDeci,t  ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β8) - -0.144 -0.156 -0.148 -0.150 -0.143 -0.153 
  [0.042]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** 
Asinti,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β9) + -0.061 -0.033 -0.055 -0.057 -0.054 -0.053 
  [0.032]* [0.028] [0.030]* [0.030]* [0.030]* [0.030]* 
Emplinti,t ∙   ΔlnSalesi,t  (β10) + 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
FCFi,t*  ΔlnSalesi,t   +     0.132  







IndBoardi,t* ΔlnSalesi,t   -      0.009 
       [0.038] 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 
N  7,231 7,669 7,902 7,902 7,889 7,832 
Notes: The table presents the results of the robustness tests. Column 1 presents the results of regression analysis after leaving 
out observations with the dual-share structure. We delete firm-year observations with joint ownership between two or more 
families/ founders (column 2). In column 3 (4) we define FamFirm = 1 if families have at least 10% (20%) of firms’ shares 
and 0 otherwise. In column 5, we include FCF and its interactions with Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t   and  ΔlnSalesi,t . In the last column, 
we include board independence (IndBoard) in our specification. The dependent variable is ΔlnSG&Ai,t (log-change of SG&A 
costs). Numbers in brackets are standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.1 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The degree of cost stickiness of family firms is in bold figures. 
 
 




We also identify whether families’ greater abilities to control and influence their firms 
affect the association between family firms’ change in cost ratio and future earnings change. 
More specifically, we investigate whether family firms with a high degree of family 
ownership, family CEOs, and a high proportion of family directors exhibit a more negative 
association between current cost ratio change and future earnings change than family firms 
with a low degree of family ownership, nonfamily CEOs, and a low proportion of family 
directors. Our predictions are based on the notion that it is easier for families to secure their 
socioemotional wealth in situations with a high degree of family ownership, family CEOs 
and a high proportion of family directors. Consequently, it is more likely that their current 
cost ratio change is negatively associated with future earnings change.  
Similar to previous analyses, we delete observations with a dual share structure to 
mitigate the possible impact of dual shares in inflating voting rights. As can be seen in column 
1 Table 3.8, neither family firms with high nor low family ownership exhibit a significantly 
negative association between current cost change and future performance change. These 
results suggest that the degree of family ownership does not influence the negative association 
between current cost change and future performance change. 
Meanwhile, columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.8 show that family firms with family CEOs 
and a high proportion of family directors exhibit a significantly negative association between 
current cost changes and future earnings change (-0.771, t = -2.29, and -0.479, t = -2.08, 
respectively). These findings support the idea that family firms with more significant family 
control and influence exhibit a more negative association between current cost changes and 
future performance changes. By and large, Table 3.8 suggests that in family firms with a 








Table 3.8  Family Firm Characteristics and the Effect of the Change in the SG&A 
Cost Ratio of Family Firms on Future Earnings Change 
 
 Dependent Variable: CEPSi,t+1 






High vs. Low 
Proportion of 
Family Directors 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
FamHOwnSG&AChgi,t -0.388   
 [0.259]   
FamLOwnSG&AChgi,t -0.348   
 [0.306]   
FamCEOSG&AChgi,t  -0.771  
  [0.337]**  
nonFamCEOSG&ACh
gi,t 
 -0.010  
  [0.245]  
FamHDirSG&AChgi,t   -0.479 
   [0.231]** 
FamLDirSG&AChgi,t   -0.311 
   [0.251] 
NonFamFirmSG&ACh
gi,t 
0.045 0.024 0.021 
 [0.113] [0.114] [0.114] 
CEPSt -0.152 -0.154 -0.154 
 [0.040]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** 
    
Individual Signals Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Year Dummies Included 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 
N 3,857 4,204 4,204 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression equations to investigate the effect of a current change 
in the SG&A cost ratio of family firms with different governance characteristics on future earnings change. 
Numbers in brackets are standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The effect of a change in the cost ratio of family firms 
on future earnings change is in bold figures. 
 
 
3.4.6  Supplemental Analyses 
Overall, our results indicate that our main finding that family firms exhibit a greater 
degree of SG&A cost stickiness than non-family firms is robust to various sensitivity tests. 
However, other cost categories also likely reflect owning families’ intention to prioritize their 
socioemotional wealth. For example, family firms’ intention to maintain their well-
established corporate culture and employee loyalty will cause family firms not to lay off 
 
 




employees easily when sales decline (Block, 2010; Martinez, 2014; Stavrou et al., 2007; 
Weber et al., 2003). The decision is arguably related to the behavior of labor costs. 
Furthermore, SG&A costs only constitute about 30% of total operating costs while the 
proportion of costs of goods sold to total operating costs is much higher (about 70%). It is 
then possible that owning families focus more heavily on costs of goods sold than on SG&A 
costs in making cost-related decisions. 
To address this issue, we rerun equation (1) and use the changes in other cost categories 
(labor cost, cost of goods sold, and total operating costs) as the dependent variables. We use 
previous steps in generating the final firm-year observations, except that the cost-related 
criteria refer to the corresponding costs being analyzed.  Table 3.9 below displays that family 
firms do not exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms when we use the changes 
in labor cost, costs of goods sold, and total operating costs as the dependent variables. As can 
be seen from this table, the number of firm-year observations is greatly reduced when we use 
labor cost as the change in labor cost as the dependent variable because only a small number 
of our observations have the labor costs data.  
The findings suggest that owning families’ intention to maintain their socioemotional 
wealth does not focus on labor-related issues such as labor costs. A plausible explanation for 
these results is that US family firms are less loyal towards a flexible workforce since that is 
common in the US setting. Further, because costs of goods sold constitute a much larger 
proportion of total costs relative to SG&A costs and because total operating costs directly 
affect firms’ profitability, family firms may well be more motivated to reduce costs of goods 
sold and total operating costs when sales decline because of the greater impacts of these costs 
to their profitability. Consequently, family firms do not exhibit greater stickiness of costs of 








Table 3.9  Supplemental Analyses Using Different Cost Categories 
 
  Dependent Variable 




(1) (2) (3) 
ΔlnSalesi,t  (β1 ) + 0.915 0.827 0.896 
  [0.019]*** [0.066]*** [0.013]*** 
Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t  (β2) - -0.027 -0.309 -0.059 
  [0.030] [0.109]*** [0.020]*** 
FamFirmi,t∙ Deci,t ∙ 
ΔlnSalesi,t  (β3) 
- -0.014 0.044 0.000 
  [0.040] [0.128] [0.028] 
PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t ∙ 
ΔlnSalesi,t  (β4) 
+ 0.081 0.304 0.120 
  [0.040]** [0.188] [0.030]*** 
Asintit ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β5) 
- -0.025 0.133 -0.020 
  [0.032] [0.091] [0.023] 
Emplinti,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ 
ΔlnSalesi,t  (β6) 
- -0.002 0.016 -0.004 
  [0.003] [0.009]* [0.002]** 
FamFirmi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β7) 
+ 0.011 0.108 0.011 
  [0.027] [0.083] [0.020] 
PrevDeci,t  ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β8) 
- -0.039 -0.167 -0.085 
  [0.028] [0.122] [0.022]*** 
Asinti,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β9) + -0.045 -0.092 -0.056 
  [0.018]** [0.070] [0.018]*** 
Emplinti,t ∙   ΔlnSalesi,t  
(β10) 
+ 0.002 0.005 0.004 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]** 
Stand-alone variables  Included 
Industry Dummies  Included 
Year Dummies  Included 
R2  0.79 0.70 0.88 
N  8,377 676 8,150 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression equations to investigate the degree of cost stickiness 
of family firms using different cost or input categories. In column (1), the dependent variable is ΔlnCOGSi,t 
(log-change of costs of goods sold). Column (2) uses ΔlnLaborCosti,t (log-change of labor cost). In column 
(3), the dependent variable is ΔlnOprCosti,t  (log-change of total operating costs). Numbers in brackets are 
standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. The degree of cost stickiness of family firms is in bold figure 
 
Further, the family firm literature argues that family firms that are controlled by later-
generation owning families are more likely to prioritize their economic interests over their 
socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). The argument 
 
 




implies that these family firms do not exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. 
Meanwhile, several finance studies demonstrate that family CEOs from later generation lead 
to worse firm performance (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008), especially when later-generation 
CEOs exhibit lower managerial skills (Perez-Gonzales, 2006; Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
Consequently, family firms led by later-generation CEOs potentially exhibit greater cost 
stickiness because their CEOs fail to reduce costs significantly when sales decline.  
We empirically investigate this issue by splitting further the FamilyCEO variable into 
two variables: FounderCEO (equal to one if the family CEO is the founder of the firm and 
zero otherwise) and HeirCEO (equal to one if the family CEO is not the founder of the firm 
and zero otherwise). Further, these new variables are multiplied with Dec∙∆lnSales and 
∆lnSales, respectively. We then rerun equation (2) by replacing Family CEO with 
FounderCEO and HeirCEO.  
Table 3.10 below suggests that firms led by heir CEOs exhibit greater cost stickiness 
than non-family firms while founder CEOs does not affect SG&A cost stickiness. At first,  
the results imply that heir CEOs are more likely to prioritize socioemotional wealth in making 
cost-adjustment decisions than founder CEOs. However, further analysis reveals that 
founders are still greatly involved in family firms that are led by heir CEOs. For example, 
from 998 family firm-year observations with heir CEOs, 612 of them (61.32%) still have 
founders as directors or blockholders. Further, about 80% of heir CEOs belong to the first 
(siblings/ spouses) or second generation. We then split the FamilyCEO variable into two new 
variables (FounderInvl and NoFounderInvl)  based on whether for a family firm led by a 
family CEO, the founder still acts as the CEO/ director/ blockholder or not. As can be seen 
from column 2 of Table 3.10,  we find that family firms led by family CEOs and active 







firms led by family CEOs without active founders’ involvement. 
 
Table 3.10 SG&A Cost Stickiness of Family Firms – The Role of Founder/ Heir CEOs 
and the Presence/ Absence  of Founder’s Involvement 
 
 (1) (2) 
ΔlnSalesi,t   (β1 ) 0.692 0.677 
 [0.028]*** [0.028]*** 
Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   (β2) -0.182 -0.170 
 [0.041]*** [0.041]*** 
FounderCEOi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   0.046  
 [0.095]  
HeirCEOi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t    -0.148  
 [0.081]*  
FounderInvi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t    -0.138 
  [0.080]* 
NoFounderInvi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t    -0.044 
  [0.122] 
NonFamCEOi,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t (γ4) -0.108 -0.116 
 [0.080] [0.080] 
PrevDeci,t∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β4) 0.194 0.186 
 [0.057]*** [0.056]*** 
Asintit ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β5) 0.008 0.023 
 [0.046] [0.046] 
Emplinti,t ∙ Deci,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β6) -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
FounderCEOi,t ∙ΔlnSalesi,t   -0.065  
 [0.054]  
HeirCEOi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t    0.082  
 [0.057]  
FounderInvi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t    0.114 
  [0.051]** 
NoFounderInvi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t    -0.009 
  [0.078] 
NonFamCEOi,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t (λ4) 0.130 0.145 
 [0.054]** [0.054]*** 
PrevDeci,t  ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β8) -0.151 -0.150 
 [0.040]*** [0.040]*** 
Asinti,t ∙ ΔlnSalesi,t  (β9) -0.050 -0.055 
 [0.030] [0.030]* 
Emplinti,t ∙   ΔlnSalesi,t  (β10) 0.005 0.004 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
Individual Signals Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Year Dummies Included 
R2 0.50 0.50 
N 7,231 7,902 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression analyses after replacing the FamFirm variable 
and its interaction terms with the family status of CEOs (FounderCEO and HeirCEO or FounderInvl 
and NoFounderInvl and NonFamCEO). The dependent variable is ΔlnSG&Ai,t (log-change of SG&A 
costs). Numbers in brackets are standard errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The degree of cost stickiness of 








Lastly, the findings indicate that a current change in the SG&A ratio of family firms is 
negatively associated with one-year-ahead earnings change (𝜁1= -0.372, t =-2.07) while for 
non-family firms a ratio change is not associated with a future earnings change (𝜁2 is 
insignificant). These findings support hypothesis 3 which predicts that only family firms 
exhibit a more negative association between a cost ratio change and a future earnings change. 
However, family firms tend to exhibit longer investment horizons than non-family firms  
(Gentry, Dibrell, & Kim, 2016) and the long-term orientation of family firms may explain the 
negative association between the change in SG&A cost ratio and one-year-ahead earnings 
change. To address this issue, we rerun equation (5) with two-year-ahead and three-year-
ahead earnings change as the dependent variable. Table 3.11 below demonstrates the results 
of our analysis. Columns 1 and 3 demonstrate that the change in the SG&A cost ratio of 
family firms is not significantly associated with two-year-ahead earnings change but 
positively associated with three-year-ahead earnings change. At first, the findings indicate 
that family firms’ asymmetric cost behavior pays off in the long run and family firms’ longer 
investment horizon explains their SG&A cost stickiness. 
However, our further analyses reveal that only family firms with non-family CEO 
exhibit a positive effect of the change in SG&A cost ratio on long-term earnings change. As 
columns 2 and 4 display, family firms led by family CEOs exhibit a change in SG&A cost 
ratio that is not associated with two-year-ahead and three-year-ahead earnings change while 
the change in SG&A cost ratio of family firms led by non-family CEOs is positively 
associated with three-year-ahead earnings change. These results suggest that for family firms 
led by family CEOs, their asymmetric cost adjustment decisions (as manifested by the change 
in SG&A cost ratio) are negatively associated with future short-term earnings change and do 







protect their socioemotional wealth. 
 
Table 3.11 The Effect of Change in the SG&A Cost Ratio of Family Firms on Two-
Year-Ahead and Three-Year-Ahead Earnings Change 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 CEPSi,t+2 CEPSi,t+2 CEPSi,t+3 CEPSi,t+3 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamFirmSG&AChgi,t 0.115  0.365  
 [0.168]  [0.195]*  
FamCEOSG&AChgi,t  0.071  0.114 
  [0.264]  [0.279] 
nonFamCEOSG&AChgi,t  -0.068  0.891 
  [0.294]  [0.350]** 
NonFamFirmSG&AChgi,t 0.261 0.255 0.044 0.043 
 [0.142]* [0.142]* [0.129] [0.129] 
CEPSi,t -0.007 -0.008 0.016 0.016 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.033] [0.033] 
Individual Signals Included 
Industry Dummies Included 
Year Dummies Included 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
N 4,068 4,068 3,965 3,965 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the regression equations to investigate the effect of a current change 
in SG&A cost ratio of family firms on two-year-ahead and three-year-ahead future earnings change. 
Columns 1 and 2  (3 and 4) display the results of the effect of the change in SG&A cost ratio on two-year-
ahead (three-year-ahead) earnings change. In columns 2 and 4, we split further family firm observations 
based on the family status of the CEO (family vs. non-family CEO). Numbers in brackets are standard 
errors, clustered at firm levels. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-





The socioemotional wealth perspective suggests that family firms prioritize the family 
owners’ socioemotional endowment over economic interests. In fact, their socioemotional 
wealth serves as a reference point in the firms’ decision-making processes. Therefore, in line 
with the socioemotional wealth preservation motive, family firms are willing to sacrifice their 
economic interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012).  
 Based on the socioemotional wealth perspective, we argue that family firms are likely 
to perceive resource reductions as a threat to the families’ socioemotional endowment. They 
 
 




put relatively more weight on the loss of these resources than on the increase of their 
economic wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). Consequently, family 
firms are likely to make more asymmetrical resource adjustment decisions than non-family 
firms. Our empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that family firms exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms. The conclusion is robust to various sensitivity analyses.  
We also hypothesize and find that family firms’ exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-
family firms when families are better able to exert their control and influence on their firms 
through a high percentage of family ownership and family CEOs. Meanwhile, the presence 
of a high proportion of family directors does not cause family firms to exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms, possibly because family directors are a more indirect control 
device than family ownership or family CEOs.   
Cost stickiness affects the way we interpret a change in the cost ratio. The current 
change in the cost ratio predicts a negative or a positive future earnings change, depending 
on whether the change is mainly driven by inefficiency or by managerial optimism (Anderson 
et al., 2007). Since the socioemotional wealth preservation motive is a likely explanation for 
family firms’ decisions to reduce costs less when sales decline, an increase in their cost ratio 
will mainly be driven by inefficiency. This increase does not reflect better future earnings 
expectations and neither does it include much unused productive resources that are necessary 
to meet future demands. Therefore, we hypothesize that family firms exhibit a negative 
association between changes in the current SG&A costs and future earnings change and that 
non-family firms do not exhibit a negative association. Our empirical evidence confirms our 
hypothesis and shows that the negative association is stronger when sales decline. 
Overall, our study extends the cost stickiness literature by investigating the cost 







factors to investigate cost stickiness, we extend this literature by examining how also 
noneconomic factors can explain cost stickiness. We argue that the desire to preserve 
socioemotional wealth among family members can explain the cost stickiness of family firms. 
A unique strength of our study is that we not only find that family firms exhibit greater cost 
stickiness than non-family firms but also that changes in the current cost ratio (reflecting cost 
stickiness) are negatively associated with future earnings change for family firms (and not for 
non-family firms), which provides further support for the conclusion that non-economic 
factors explain cost stickiness. Moreover, by showing that not all family firms exhibit greater 
cost stickiness than non-family firms, we suggest the importance of contingent factors in 
explaining family firms’ behavior. More specifically, our results suggest that family firms are 
more likely to exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms when family owners have 
greater ability to influence their firms’ decision-making process directly, such as by having a 
higher degree of family ownership or having their family members as CEOs.  
In addition, we contribute to the socioemotional wealth literature by showing the effect 
of a change in the cost ratio (as a consequence of family firms’ asymmetric cost behavior) on 
future performance (a future earnings change). More specifically, the socioemotional wealth 
literature usually focuses on either the role of socioemotional wealth considerations in 
explaining family firms’ different decision-making behavior relative to non-family firms (e.g. 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012; Pazzaglia et al., 2013), or on the performance 
effect of family firms’ behavior (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2014; Schepers et al., 2014). An 
important contribution of our research is that by investigating both asymmetric cost behavior 
and the different performance effects of current asymmetric cost behavior for family firms 
and non-family firms, it can bridge these two research approaches.  
Finally, we extend the family firms literature into the management accounting domain 
 
 




while previous studies mainly focus on financial accounting issues (Stockmans et al., 2010; 
Pazzaglia et al., 2013; Leitterstorf & Rau, 2014). The interesting feature of the management 
accounting domain for the family firms literature as compared to the financial accounting 
domain is that changes observed in management accounting practices are usually a more 
direct consequence of managerial decision-making than changes in financial accounting. 
Therefore, it is easier to attribute these changes to the characteristics of family firms. Our 
socioemotional wealth approach enables us to contribute to both the literature on family firms 
in general and to that on socioemotional wealth in particular.  
The present study has several limitations that future research will hopefully be able to 
overcome. First, our sample firms are restricted to the largest US publicly listed firms (based 
on the total assets value of 2001). Future research can use other research contexts, such as 
private family firms or publicly listed family firms in other countries to gain a better 
understanding of the effects of different institutional incentives on the cost stickiness of 
family firms.   
Second, our study draws on a definition of family firms that relies on a percentage of 
family ownership (Anderson et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2012). Although this indicator 
enables us to identify family firms more easily, it cannot fully reflect the multifaceted, 
heterogeneous nature of the importance of socioemotional wealth in family firms (Astrachan 
et al., 2002; Cruz et al., 2011). We have strived to overcome this issue by investigating the 
effects of different levels of family control and influence (such as CEO family status and 
proportion of family directors). However, it is still likely that our empirical operationalization 
of family firms does not capture the whole spectrum of socioemotional dimensions, which 
contains more elements than just family ownership and control (Berrone et al., 2012). 







control their firms, they may not reflect owning families’ intention and willingness to do so 
(Berrone et al., 2012;  Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta, &Gomez-Mejia., 
2013). Thus, our study focuses on using the socioemotional perspective to analyze family 
firms’ asymmetric cost behavior rather than directly measuring owning families’ actual 
intentions and actions to preserve their socioemotional wealth which is a common limitation 
of using publicly listed family firms as the sample (Martin, Campbell, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2016). We leave to future research to investigate the cost behavior of family firms using more 










Fundamental Signals of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and  Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) as 
used by Anderson et al.  (2007) and Baumgarten et al. (2010) 
 
Variables Measurement 
Inventory Change (Inv) Inventory (#3)i.t / Salesi,t -  Inventoryi.t-1 / Salesi,t-1 
Account Receivable (AR) Accounts Receivablei,t (#2)/ Salesi,t   - Accounts Receivablei,t -1/ Salesi,t-1 
Capital Expenditure 
(CAPX) 
Firm Capital Expenditurei,t(#30)/ Industry Capital Expenditurei,t  - Firm 
Capital Expenditurei,t-1(#30)/ Industry Capital Expenditurei,t-1 
Gross Margin (GM) Gross Margini,t -1 (#12-#41)/ Salesi,t-1  - Gross Margini,t  (#12-#41)/ Salesi,t 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) [(1/3 ∑ Tax Rate3𝛾=1 i,t-γ) – Tax Ratei,t ] * CEPSt,i 
where Tax Ratei,t = Tax Expense (#16) / EBT (#170+#65) 
Earnings Quality (EQ) 0 for LIFO, 1 for FIFO or other 
Audit Qualification (AQ) 0  for unqualified, 1 for Qualified or other 
Labor Force (LF) (Salesi,t-1/#Employeesi,t-1(#29) - Salesi,t/#Employeesi,t)/ (Salesi,t-1/#Employeesi,t-
1) 
Leverage (LEV) Long-term Debti,t (#9)/ Equityi,t (#60) - Long-term Debti,t-1 (#9)/ Equityi,t -
1(#60) 
Sales Growth (Growth) Salesi,t/ Salesi,t-1 – Salesi,t-1/ Salesi,t-2 
 
 
















 Managerial Ability, Cost Efficiency, and Future Firm Performance 
 
Managerial Ability, Cost Efficiency, 
and Future Firm Performance 
 
Abstract: 
Using the upper echelon theory, this study investigates the role of cost efficiency in 
moderating the performance effect of managerial ability on future firm performance. Better 
able managers are more likely to increase future firm performance because of their superior 
ability in exploiting market opportunities. However, the ability to increase future sales is 
insufficient in enhancing firm performance because it is still probable that firms have to 
increase considerable resources to meet increased sales. Firms can translate sales growth into 
higher profitability only when they increase their costs at a pace lower than their sales 
increase. In this respect, better able managers who manage cost-efficient firms are more likely 
to increase future performance because cost-efficient firms arguably acquire resources at 
lower adjustment costs. Thus, we predict that cost efficiency enhances the performance effect 
of managerial ability. Our empirical results support the hypothesis. Overall, this study 
highlights the importance of firm-level characteristics in explaining the performance effects 
of CEO characteristics to evaluate CEO performance better.  




The upper echelon theory suggests that the characteristics of top managers matter in 
explaining firm behavior because they make important firm decisions and their personal 
characteristics significantly affect their decision-making processes (Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This perspective has been used in the accounting and finance 
literatures to explain the effect of CEO characteristics on various types of firm behavior or 
outcomes, such as risk-taking behavior (Bernile et al., 2017), real earnings management 
(Olsen et al., 2017),  and tax avoidance (Christensen et al., 2015). 
Based on insights from the upper echelon theory we propose that managerial ability 







ability itself can be defined as managers’ superior skills in managing firms’ resources more 
efficiently relative to their counterparts in the same industries (Demerjian et al., 2012). The 
managerial ability literature finds that firms led by better able managers exhibit better current 
performance (Chen et al., 2015; Cheung, Naidu, Navissi, & Ranjeeni, 2017; Koester et al., 
2017). In this study, we predict that managerial ability positively affects future profitability 
because the capabilities of better able managers to understand industry characteristics and to 
exploit market opportunities (Demerjian et al., 2012) enable them to increase future sales.  
However, increases in future sales do not necessarily imply better future profitability 
because it is likely that firms still need to add resources to meet the increased demands. Thus, 
firms will increase their future profitability only when the increase in sales is greater than the 
costs of additional resources (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; Davidsson et al., 2009). We then 
argue that cost efficiency is important for firms with increasing future sales, considering that 
sales growth does not necessarily translate into higher future profitability. For example, future 
sales growth can be unprofitable if this growth requires greater additional resources 
(Davidsson et al., 2009). 
According to the cost stickiness literature, cost-efficient firms will translate sales 
growth into increased profitability if they possess and can acquire resources with lower 
adjustment costs (costs to reduce the resources when sales decline and to reacquire these 
resources when future sales increase) (Anderson et al., 2003). It is likely that cost-efficient 
firms have relatively more resources with lower adjustment costs available than their less 
efficient counterparts (Anderson et al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). When better able 
managers manage cost-efficient firms, it is less challenging for them to increase resources at 
a pace lower than the sales growth than when they manage less efficient firms (Anderson et 
al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). It follows that cost-efficient firms strengthen the effect 
 
 




of managerial ability on future profitability. Thus, we expect that firms’ cost efficiency 
moderates the relationship between managerial ability and future performance. 
We rely on the managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012) that has been used 
extensively in the accounting and finance literature (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012; Krishnan & 
Wang, 2015; Bonsall IV et al., 2017). We use the latest version of this database that ranges 
from 1980 to 2016 (http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html). This updated database 
covers more than two hundred thousand US firm-year observations. We generate our 
financial data from Compustat. Our final sample covers more than 130,000 firm-year 
observations.  
Our findings support the prediction that firms led by better able managers increase 
their future profitability more than firms led by less able managers. Furthermore, consistent 
with our expectations, we document that the effect of better able managers on future 
profitability is strengthened in cost-efficient firms. The results underscore the importance of 
firm contexts in explaining the effect of managerial ability on firm performance. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, previous studies that investigate the 
effects of managerial ability on firm performance do not illuminate the effects of firm context 
on this association (e.g., Bonsall IV et al., 2017; Koester et al., 2017). Thus, our study 
highlights the importance of firm contexts in explaining the effect of managerial ability on 
firm performance. More specifically, we show that the positive effect of managerial ability 
on future profitability likely depends on the cost efficiency of the firm. 
Secondly, our study  adds to the debate whether better able managers persistently 
enhance firm performance (Demerjian et al., 2012; Cheung et al., 2017) or only improve 
current firm performance at the expense of future earnings (Malmendier & Tate, 2009; 







persistently increase firm performance, although the performance effect diminishes with 
increases in time lag. Specifically, the results show that the association between managerial 
ability and future firm performance is less strong for future performance in t+2 than it is for 
future performance in t+1.  
 
4.1 Hypothesis Development 
The accounting and finance literature for long have argued that managerial 
characteristics are irrelevant in explaining various firm outcomes because managers, like 
other production factors, are easily substitutable (Bonsall IV et al., 2017). However, since 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) demonstrated the presence of manager fixed effects in explaining 
firm behavior, the accounting and finance literature have begun to study the effects of 
individual managerial characteristics on various corporate outcomes. 
As suggested by the upper echelon theory, the characteristics of top managers matter 
in explaining firm behavior because they make important firm decisions and their personal 
characteristics significantly affect their decision-making processes (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Hambrick, 2007). Specifically, the key notion of the upper echelon view is that top 
managers’ views of problems, search for alternative solutions to these problems, the way they 
process information and, hence, ultimately arrive at decisions largely depend on personal 
characteristics they possess (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Indeed, a vast amount of studies 
have shown that firm behaviors are associated with CEOs’ narcissism (Olsen et al., 2017), 
political orientation (Christensen et al., 2015), and even early-life experience with disasters 
(Bernile et al., 2017). 
More recently, the upper echelon perspective has been used in the accounting and 
finance literatures to explain the effect of CEO characteristics on various types of firm 
 
 




behavior or outcomes, such as accounting irregularities (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 
2010), earnings management (Hillary, Huang, & Xu, 2017), and tax avoidance (Christensen 
et al., 2015). 
One important managerial characteristic is managerial ability. Broadly defined, 
managerial ability refers to managers’ experience and knowledge about their firms’ activities 
and business environments that enable managers to utilize their resources more efficiently 
(Demerjian et al., 2012). A couple of recent studies demonstrate that managerial ability 
affects firm outcomes, including earnings quality (Demerjian et al., 2012), tax avoidance 
(Koester et al., 2017), and credit ratings (Bonsall IV et al., 2017). For example, Demerjian et 
al. (2012) show that managerial ability is associated with a higher degree of earnings quality 
which they ascribe to better able managers’ superior knowledge about their firms’ operating 
activities enabling them to make more accurate accrual estimates. Moreover, firms led by 
better able managers exhibit better performance than those led by less able managers. 
Specifically, managerial ability is positively associated with higher firms’ innovative outputs 
(Chen et al., 2015), lower variability in future performance (Bonsall IV et al., 2017; 
Demerjian et al., 2012), and with higher tax avoidance (Koester et al., 2017). 
Following the previous literature, we predict that managerial ability affects future firm 
performance. Our prediction is based on the argument that better able managers exhibit 
superior ability in both exploiting product market opportunities (Demerjian et al., 2012) and 
predicting future trends and conditions (Bonsall IV et al., 2017). Consequently, the superior 
knowledge of better able managers makes their firms more likely to experience sales 
increases in subsequent years and, more in particular, to identify attractive market 
opportunities (Bonsall IV et al., 2017). These arguments imply that better able managers are 







profitable sales in future periods. It is thus likely that firms led by better able managers exhibit 
increasing future sales because they more fully exploit the market potential of the firm. Based 
on these arguments, we arrive at the following baseline hypothesis: 
H1: Managerial ability increases future profitability. 
While the managerial ability literature suggests that better able managers increase firm 
performance (e.g. Demerjian et al., 2012; Bonsall IV et al., 2017; Koester et al., 2017), we 
offer a more nuanced explanation of the relationship between managerial ability and firm 
performance by arguing that firm characteristics are likely to enhance the relationship. 
Specifically, we propose that cost efficiency moderates the effect of managerial ability on 
one-year-ahead firm performance for the following reasons.   
Increases in future sales require additional resources because of the probable 
insufficiency of current resources to meet increasing sales. Firms can translate the growth in 
future sales into higher profitability only if they manage to increase costs at a pace lower than 
future sales growth (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; Davidsson et al., 2009). Therefore, cost 
efficiency is likely to be as important as the ability to increase sales because sales growth 
does not necessarily imply increased profitability (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; Hoitash et al., 
2016; Krause et al., 2013). For example, when firms increase their sales by focusing on less 
profitable segments, the increasing sales will likely cause costs to increase at a greater level 
(Davidsson et al., 2009).  
Drawing from the cost stickiness literature, as outlined below, we predict that firms’ 
cost efficiency increases the effects of managerial ability on firms’ future profitability for the 
following reason. The cost stickiness literature suggests that increased future sales lead to 
better profitability for cost-efficient firms because these firms can acquire resources with low 
adjustment costs (costs to reduce the resources when sales decline and to reacquire these 
 
 




resources when future sales increase) (Anderson et al., 2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010). Firms 
that can acquire and utilize resources with low adjustment cost will find it easier and less 
costly to increase resources to anticipate increased future sales ( Anderson et al., 2003;  
Banker et al., 2018; Banker & Byzalov, 2014). Therefore these firms will enjoy higher 
profitability when future sales increase.  
Against this background, it is important to note that the effect of managerial ability 
on future firm profitability is more pronounced when better able managers manage cost 
efficient firms. Given that better able managers exhibit superior experience and knowledge 
about their firms’ activities and business environments (Demerjian et al., 2012), it is likely 
that their firms will show increased future sales. When these better able managers are in 
charge of cost-efficient firms, they have more resources with lower adjustment costs 
available. Consequently, their firms manage to meet increased future sales with a lower level 
of additional resources and, as a result, to achieve better future profitability (Anderson et al., 
2007; Baumgarten et al., 2010)18. 
To summarize, better able managers are more likely to increase future profitability 
when they manage cost-efficient firms than when they manage less efficient firms because 
their ability to increase sales is more valuable in case their firms can add the required 
resources against low costs. Based on these arguments, we propose our second hypothesis:  
H2: Current cost efficiency enhances the effects of managerial ability on one-year-ahead 
profitability. 
                                                          
18 We argue that cost efficiency is exogenous for the two following reasons. First, the correlation between cost 
efficiency and managerial ability is very small (about -0.056), thus suggesting the very weak relationship 
between cost efficiency and managerial ability. Second, as suggested by Anderson et al. (2007), various factors 
may explain a change in the ratio between an input and an output, including managerial expectations of future 
sales. Managers may deliberately increase the ratio of input to output if they are certain that future sales will 
increase. Meanwhile, the measurement of managerial ability by (Demerjian et al., 2012) largely focus on the 
relation between current inputs and current outputs and does not capture the future performance effects of 








4.2 Research Method  
4.2.1 Data 
We use the managerial ability database of Demerjian et al. (2012) that has been used 
extensively in the accounting literature (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012; Krishnan and Wang, 
2015). The managerial ability measure uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the 
firm efficiency in generating revenues from seven inputs. Subsequently, they disentangle the 
total firms’ efficiency measure into a manager-level component and a firm-level component. 
Our sampling frame starts from the latest managerial ability data of Demerjian et al. (2012) 
that comprises 213,186 firm-year observations ranging from 1980-2016. The financial data 
comes from Compustat.  We leave out observations with missing values for all variables and 
zero and negative values for sales, operating costs, and assets. After trimming the extreme 
values in the top and bottom 1% of continuous independent variables, we have a final sample 
of around 133,000 firm-year observations. 
 
4.2.2 Variable Definitions  
Our first variable of interest is managerial ability (MA). Following Chen et al. (2015), 
Krishnan & Wang (2015), Bui, Chen, Hasan, & Lin (2018) we use lagged managerial ability 
score as the proxy of MA. Our second variable of interest is cost efficiency (COSTEFF). 
Following Hoitash et al. (2016), we measure cost efficiency by subtracting the annual change 
in sales (scaled by lagged total assets) from the annual change in operating costs (also scaled 
by lagged total assets). Because a higher value of this subtraction implies that change of 
operating costs is greater than a change of sales (and therefore indicates cost inefficiency), 
we, similar to Hoitash et al. (2016), multiply the number by -1.  
 
 




We use ROA (return on assets) as the proxy for firm performance. We measure ROA 
by dividing current net income by lagged total assets. As an alternative proxy of firm 
performance, we also use the industry-adjusted ROA (ADJROA). We measure ADJROA by 
subtracting the median value of industry ROA from firms’ ROA in the same year (using the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification). 
We use several control variables in the analysis. First, we control for firm size (SIZE) 
because larger firms are likely to be better able to gain cost efficiency than smaller firms 
(Krause et al., 2013). Secondly, highly leveraged firms are likely to be under stricter debt 
covenant and eventually, they are more cautious in managing their costs. Therefore, we 
control for firms’ leverage (LEV) in our analysis (Brush & Bromiley, 2000). Third, it is likely 
that firms with high growth potential invest more than firms with low growth potential. 
Therefore, they may exhibit lower cost efficiency than firms with low growth potential. We 
then control firms’ market-to-book ratio (MTB) as the proxy of their growth potential in our 
analysis (Cheung et al., 2017). Fourth, we control whether firms exhibit a sales decline in 
previous periods (PREVDEC) because firms that experience a sales decline in previous 
periods are likely to be more cautious in managing costs (Anderson et al., 2003). Fifth, 
because firms’ cost adjustment decisions depend on the adjustment costs of their resources, 
we also include firms’ asset intensity (ASINT) and employee intensity (EMPLINT) as proxies 
of firms’ adjustment costs (Banker & Byzalov, 2014). Table 4.1 below displays the 












Table 4.1  The Operationalization of Research Variables 
 
Variable Operationalization 
Managerial Ability (MA) Lagged managerial ability score of (Demerjian et al., 
2012) 
Cost Efficiency (COSTEFF) Annual change of operating costs (scaled by lagged total 
assets) – annual change of sales (scaled by lagged total 
assets) – following (Hoitash et al., 2016) 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income/ Lagged Total Assets 
Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets (AdjROA) ROA – the median value of industry ROA (using the 
Fama-French’ 48 industry classification)  
Firm Size (SIZE) The natural logarithmic value of (the number of 
outstanding shares x closing share price)  
Market-to-Book Ratio or Growth Opportunity 
(MTB) 
Firm’s total market value/ total book value of equity 
Sales Decline in Previous Periods (PREVDEC) A dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm’s previous 
sales are lower than the sales of two years before, zero 
otherwise. 
Asset Intensity (ASINT) The logarithmic value of (total assets/ sales) 
Employee Intensity (EMPLINT) The logarithmic value of (total employees/ sales) 
 
4.2.3 Empirical Model 
Our first hypothesis predicts that managerial ability increases future performance. 
Therefore, we propose the following specification for our first hypothesis: 
 
ROAi,t+1 = β0  + β1 ∙ MAi,t-1 + β4  ∙ ROAi,t +β5 ∙ SIZEi,t + β6 ∙  LEVi,t +β7 ∙ MTBi,t + β8 ∙ PREVDECi,t +β9  ∙  
ASINTi,t + β10 ∙ EMPLINTi,t  + ε .........................................................................................................  (1) 
 
Our first hypothesis is supported when β1 > 0.  We then replace ROAi,t+1 and ROAi,t 
with AdjROAi,t+1  and AdjROAi,t .  
 For our second hypothesis, we predict that the effect of managerial ability on future 
firm profitability is higher when firms exhibit greater cost efficiency. To test the second 
hypothesis, we propose the following specification:  
 
ROAi,t+1 = β0  + β1 ∙ MAi,t-1 +   β2 ∙ COSTEFFi,t    +  β3 ∙ MAi,t-1  ∙  COSTEFFi,t    +  β4  ∙ ROAi,t +β5 ∙ SIZEi,t + β6 ∙  








Our second hypothesis is supported when β3 > 0, implying that cost efficiency 
increases the positive effect of managerial ability on future performance.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of our variables. The mean value of MAi,t-
1  is -0.005, and is qualitatively similar to Demerjian et al. (2012) who find that the average 
MA is  -0.004. The mean and median values of COSTEFFi,t  are positive, indicating that most 
firms exhibit positive efficiency (the change in operating costs is less than the change in 
sales). Further, although the mean value of ROAi,t, and ROAi,t+1  is negative, the median values 
of these two variables are positive, suggesting that most firms exhibit positive current and 
future performance. Table 4.3 displays the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the 
independent variables. This table demonstrates that there is no strong correlation between 
these variables because none of the  correlations is above 0.4. Further, we also run a 
multicollinearity test to ensure that a severe multicollinearity problem does not confound our 
analyses. With the cutoff value of the variance inflation factors (VIF) is 10, we find no 














Table 4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median St. Dev Min Max 
ROAi,t+1 -0,0232 0,0309 0,2283 -3,022 0,4799 
MAi,t-1  -0,0047 -0,0153 0,0999 -0,2153 0,4833 
ROAi,t  -0,0184 0,034 0,242 -3,5255 0,51 
COSTEFFi,t     0,0059 0,0086 0,1221 -0,7888 1,0723 
SIZEi,t  -0,073 -0,1177 2,2562 -5,7131 5,4805 
LEVi,t  0,5141 0,4939 0,3022 0,04672 4,643 
MTBi,t  2,4963 1,7137 3,4343 -17,5806 34,1287 
PREVDECi,t  0,356 0 0,4788 0 1 
ASINTi,t  0,0592 -0,0558 0,7602 -1,6175 4,0045 








Table 4.3 Pearson and Spearman Correlation between Independent Variables 
 
 MAi,t-1 ROAi,t COSTEFFi,t SIZEi,t LEVi,t MTBi,t PREVDECi,t ASINTi,t EMPLINTi,t 
MAi,t-1   0,2004 -0,0212 -0,0239 -0,1462 0,1475 -0,113 -0,2114 -0,0554 
ROAi,t  0,1248  0,3454 0,3629 -0,2192 0,2534 -0,1807 -0,2083 -0,0938 
COSTEFFi,t     -0,0558 0,2033  0,0708 -0,0182 0,1971 -0,0152 -0,0725 -0,0617 
SIZEi,t  0,0894 0,2634 0,0248  -0,0013 0,3762 -0,152 0,1748 -0,2752 
LEVi,t  -0,0977 -0,2103 0,0301 -0,0768  -0,0836 0,063 -0,1496 -0,303 
MTBi,t  0,1016 -0,0668 0,0606 0,1866 -0,106  -0,1952 0,0636 -0,056 
PREVDECi,t  -0,1094 -0,0801 0,0419 -0,15 0,075 -0,0987  -0,0112 0,0511 
ASINTi,t  -0,1688 -0,2522 -0,0816 0,121 -0,133 0,0577 0,0001  -0,0566 
EMPLINTi,t   -0,1074 -0,1384 -0,0521 -0,2627 -0,0179 0,0031 0,0489 0,0008  
 










4.3.2 The Effects of Managerial Ability on Future Profitability 
 Table 4.4 displays the results of the test of the first hypothesis. Column 1 of this 
table suggests that MAi,t-1  has a positive effect on ROAi,t  (β1 = 0.024, t = 3.71), thus supporting 
our first hypothesis that predicts that managerial ability increases future performance.  Next, 
column 2 of Table 4.4 displays the results of the test of the first hypothesis by replacing ROAi,t 
and ROAi,t+1  with AdjROAi,t  and  AdjROAi,t+1, respectively. The results are qualitatively 
similar to the findings using ROAi,t and ROAi, t+1  (β1 = 0.028, t = 4.45). Overall, these findings 
empirically support our first hypothesis that predicts that better able managers have superior 
skills in enhancing future profitability. Further, our results are also in line with Demerjian et 
al. (2012) and Koester et al. (2017) who argue that better able managers have superior skills 
in optimizing the utilization of their firms’ resources, which leads to higher sales and lower 
costs.   
 
Table 4.4 Results of the Test of First Hypothesis 
 
 ROAi.t+1 AdjROAi.t+1 
 (1) (2) 
MAi.t-1 0.024 0.028 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
ROAi.t 0.491  
 [0.008]***  
AdjROAi.t  0.489 
  [0.008]*** 
LEVi.t -0.038 -0.038 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
MTBi.t -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SIZEi.t 0.015 0.015 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PREVDECi.t -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
ASINTi.t -0.033 -0.031 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
EMPLINTi.t   -0.009 -0.010 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Industry F.E. Included 
Year F.E. Included 
R2 0.43 0.39 
N 133.336 133.266 
 
 




Note; The table shows the results of the regression analyses to investigate the effect of managerial ability 
(MA) on one-year-ahead profitability (in bold figures). The dependent variable in columns 1 (2) is one-
year-ahead ROA (industry-adjusted ROA). Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered in firms. 
The effect of managerial ability on future firm performance is in bold figures. 
*. **. *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. respectively (two-tailed) 
 
 
4.3.3 The Role of Cost Efficiency in Moderating the Effect of Managerial Ability on 
Future Profitability 
 Our second hypothesis predicts that cost efficiency increases the positive effect of 
better able managers on future profitability. Before interacting COSTEFFi,t  and  MAi,t-1, we 
mean-center the variables to obtain a more meaningful interpretation of the results (Cohen et 
al., 2003). As indicated by Table 4.5, our empirical results support hypothesis 2. Column 2 
of this table shows that the interaction term between MAi,t-1 and COSTEFFi,t  is significantly 
positive (β3 = 0.395, t= 4.47) while the coefficient of MAi,t-1 is still significantly positive (β1 
= 0.044, t= 5.55) and the coefficient of COSTEFFi,t  is insignificant (β2 = - 0.005,  t= -0.48).  
Using industry-adjusted ROA as the performance variables also produce qualitatively similar 
results. Specifically, the interaction term between MAi,t-1 and COSTEFFi,t  is significantly 
positive (β3 = 0.396, t= 4.49), the coefficient of MAi,t-1 is positive (β1 = 0.048, t= 6.11) and 
COSTEFFi,t  is insignificant (β2 = - 0.009,  t= -0.89).   
These results suggest that although cost efficiency itself does not affect future 
performance, cost efficiency combined with higher managerial ability increases future 
performance. Thus, these findings support the argument that due to a better understanding of 
their firms’ business activities, better able managers are more likely to increase future 











Table 4.5 Results of the Test of Second Hypothesis 
 
 ROAi.t+1 AdjROAi.t+1 
 (1) (2) 
MAi.t-1 0.044 0.048 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
COSTEFFi.t     -0.005 -0.009 
 [0.010] [0.010] 
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFi.t     
0.395 0.396 
 [0.088]*** [0.088]*** 
ROAi.t 0.491  
 [0.008]***  
AdjROAi.t  0.489 
  [0.008]*** 
LEVi.t -0.037 -0.038 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
MTBi.t -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SIZEi.t 0.015 0.015 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PREVDECi.t -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
ASINTi.t -0.033 -0.031 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
EMPLINTi.t   -0.009 -0.010 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
_CONSTANT -0.061 -0.039 
 [0.009]*** [0.009]*** 
Industry F.E. Included 
Year F.E. Included 
R2 0.43 0.39 
N 133.336 133.266 
 
Note; The table shows the results of the regression analyses to investigate the role of cost efficiency 
(COSTEFF) in moderating the effect of managerial ability (MA) on one-year-ahead profitability (in bold 
figures). The dependent variable in column 1 (2) is one-year-ahead ROA (industry-adjusted ROA). 
Figures in brackets are standard errors, clustered in firms. The effects of managerial ability and the 
interaction between managerial ability and cost efficiency on future performance are in bold figures.  
*. **. *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. respectively (two-tailed) 
 
4.3.4 Sensitivity Tests 
We run several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, instead 
of using the lagged managerial ability score, we use the average managerial ability score of 
the two most recent years (Huang & Sun, 2017)  as the proxy of MA. Second, we follow 
Krause et al. (2013) by measuring COSTEFF   as the difference between growth in operating 
costs and sales growth (COSTEFFK). Because greater difference indicates greater cost 
 
 




inefficiency, similar to our initial proxy of COSTEFF, we multiply the difference by -1. Third, 
instead of using one-year-ahead performance as the proxy of future performance, we use 
current-year and two-years-ahead  ROA and AdjROA.  As can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.6, using alternative proxies of cost efficiency and managerial ability shows 
qualitatively similar results as our main analysis. Also, columns 3 and 4 suggest that cost 
efficiency moderates the effect of managerial ability on current and the two-year-ahead ROA. 
The results in these columns show that the effects of MAi,t-1  and the interaction between MAi, 
t-1, and COSTEFFi,t on current ROA  are stronger than the effects of these variables on one-
year-ahead ROA.  Further, the effects of  MAi,t-1   and the interaction between MAi,t-1  and 
COSTEFFi,t  on one-year-ahead ROA   are greater than their effects on two-year-ahead ROA. 
Thus, these results suggest that the effects of managerial ability, either individually or as 
moderated by cost efficiency, on firm performance decline as the time lag between 
managerial ability and firm performance increases. A longer time lag is more likely to involve 
greater environmental changes, such as unforeseen general economic circumstances and 
changes in industry trend, which will potentially reduce managerial ability to develop 
business forecast in general (Duncan, 1972). These changes will thus eventually mitigate the 
effect of managerial ability on future firm performance. Table 4.7 also displays that using 
AdjROA as the proxy of firm performance generates similar results, except that the individual 









Table 4.6 Sensitivity Analysis – ROA as the Proxy of Firm Performance 
 
 ROAi.t+1 ROAi.t+1 ROAi.t ROAi.t+2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MAi.t-1  0.143 0.075 0.027 
  [0.037]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** 
COSTEFFi.t     -0.003  0.508 -0.055 
 [0.010]  [0.008]*** [0.010]*** 
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFi.t     
  0.935 0.344 
   [0.085]*** [0.085]*** 
AVGMAi.t 0.032    
 [0.008]***    
AVGMAi.t* 
COSTEFFi.t     
0.291    
 [0.099]***    
COSTEFFKi.t      -0.001   
  [0.005]   
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFKi.t     
 0.118   
  [0.034]***   
ROAi.t 0.492 0.509  0.412 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]***  [0.009]*** 
ROAi.t-1   0.461  
   [0.007]***  
LEVi.t -0.038 -0.045 -0.132 -0.024 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
MTBi.t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SIZEi.t 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.017 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PREVDECi.t -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]*** [0.001] 
ASINTi.t -0.032 -0.032 -0.041 -0.042 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
EMPLINTi.t   -0.009 -0.010 -0.018 -0.007 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
_CONSTANT -0.057 -0.059 -0.016 0.041 
 [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.008]** [0.009]*** 
Industry F.E. Included 
Year F.E. Included 
R2 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.33 
N 132.733 133.214 145.746 120.528 
 
This table displays the sensitivity test of the second hypothesis. The dependent variable is ROA. In the 
first column, the proxy of MA is the average of managerial ability score of the two most recent years. In 
column 2, we measure COSTEFF by following Krause et al. (2013) who measure cost efficiency by 
subtracting sales growth from the growth in operating costs. We multiply this figure by -1 because the 
greater value of this figure indicates cost inefficiency. Column 3 and 4 show the effects of MAi.t-1 and its 
interaction with COSTEFFi.t-1  on ROAi.t  and ROAi.t+2,  respectively. The effects of managerial ability and 
the interaction between managerial ability and cost efficiency on future performance are in bold figures.  









Table 4.7 Sensitivity Analysis – AdjROA as the Proxy of Firm Performance 
 
 AdjROAi.t+1 AdjROAi.t+1 AdjROAi.t AdjROAi.t+2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MAi.t-1  0.140 0.019 0.031 
  [0.037]*** [0.007]** [0.008]*** 
COSTEFFi.t     -0.006   -0.056 
 [0.010]   [0.010]*** 
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFi.t     
  0.710 0.360 
   [0.086]*** [0.084]*** 
AVGMAi.t 0.037    
 [0.008]***    
AVGMAi.t* 
COSTEFFi.t     
0.298    
 [0.098]***    
COSTEFFKi.t      -0.001   
  [0.005]   
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFKi.t     
 0.111   
  [0.033]***   
AdjROAi.t 0.490 0.505  0.411 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]***  [0.009]*** 
AdjROAi.t-1   0.417  
   [0.007]***  
LEVi.t -0.038 -0.046 -0.135 -0.024 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
MTBi.t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SIZEi.t 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.016 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PREVDECi.t -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]*** [0.001] 
ASINTi.t -0.030 -0.031 -0.051 -0.040 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
EMPLINTi.t   -0.009 -0.010 -0.025 -0.007 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
_CONSTANT -0.036 -0.038 -0.053 -0.055 
 [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** 
Industry F.E. Included 
Year F.E. Included 
R2 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.29 
N 132.662 133.140 145.717 120.465 
 
This table displays the sensitivity test of the second hypothesis. The dependent variable is AdjROA. In 
the first column. The proxy of MA is the average of managerial ability score of the two most recent years. 
In column 2, we measure COSTEFF by following Krause et al. (2013) who measure cost efficiency by 
subtracting sales growth from the growth in operating costs. We multiply this figure by -1 because the 
greater value of this figure indicates cost inefficiency. Column 3 and 4 show the effects of MAi.t-1 and its 
interaction with COSTEFFi.t-1  on AdjROAi.t  and AdjROAi.t+2, respectively. The effects of managerial 
ability and the interaction between managerial ability and cost efficiency on future performance are in 
bold figures.  










4.3.5 Additional Analysis 
To investigate further when managerial ability and cost efficiency exhibit greater 
effects on future performance, we partition the sample into two subsamples based on the 
median value of ROAi,t.. (AdjROAi,t) and find that the positive effect of managerial ability on 
future performance is only significant when firms currently underperform. Specifically, in 
the low ROAi,t   (AdjROAi,t)  subsample, the interaction between managerial ability and cost 
efficiency is significantly positive (β3  = 0.416, t = 3.80 for ROAi,t and β3  = 0.419, t = 3.84 
for AdjROAi,t). Meanwhile, when firms exhibit better current performance, managerial ability 
does not (further) improve future performance (column 2 of Table 4.8). These results indicate 









Table 4.8 Additional Analysis – Partitioning Sample Firms into 
Low and High ROAt (AdjROAt)  Subsamples 
 
 ROAi.t+1 AdjROAi.t+1 
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MAi.t-1 0.072 0.001 0.075 0.001 
 [0.014]*** [0.008] [0.014]*** [0.009] 
COSTEFFi.t     -0.014 -0.005 -0.013 -0.037 
 [0.012] [0.017] [0.012] [0.017]** 
MAi.t-1* 
COSTEFFi.t     
0.416 0.120 0.419 0.154 
 [0.109]*** [0.137] [0.109]*** [0.150] 
ROAi.t 0.450 0.366   
 [0.010]*** [0.015]***   
AdjROAi.t   0.433 0.461 
   [0.011]*** [0.014]*** 
LEVi.t -0.031 -0.053 -0.034 -0.042 
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** 
MTBi.t -0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
SIZEi.t 0.017 0.010 0.016 0.010 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
PREVDECi.t 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
ASINTi.t -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 -0.027 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
EMPLINTi.t   -0.020 0.002 -0.022 0.002 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
_CONSTANT -0.139 0.034 -0.143 0.045 
 [0.014]*** [0.009]*** [0.016]*** [0.009]*** 
Industry F.E. Included 
Year F.E. Included 
R2 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.18 
N 66.668 66.668 66.816 66.450 
This table displays the additional tests by partitioning sample firms into two subsamples: firms with low 
and high ROAt or AdjROAt based on the median value of ROAt or AdjROAt. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) is one-year-ahead ROA (industry-adjusted ROA).  The effects of managerial 
ability and the interaction between managerial ability and cost efficiency on future performance are in 
bold figures.  
*. **. *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. respectively (two-tailed) 
 
4.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
 Better able managers exhibit better knowledge and skills in managing and utilizing 
their firms’ resources (Demerjian et al., 2012). These superior skills enable managers to 
enhance their firms’ performance. Accordingly, the managerial ability literature largely 







2015; Cheung et al., 2017; Koester et al., 2016). 
In this study, we find that managerial ability positively affects one-year-ahead 
profitability. Firms led by better able managers are more likely to increase future sales 
because of the managers’ better ability to identify market opportunities and to exploit these 
market opportunities (Demerjian et al., 2012).  Thus, this study complements previous 
literature that demonstrates the positive effect of managerial ability on current firm 
performance (Chen et al., 2015; Cheung et al., 2017; Koester et al., 2017). More specifically, 
these results highlight that better able managers persistently increase firm performance and 
not opportunistically manage their current performance at the expense of future performance.   
 We also demonstrate that cost efficiency moderates the relationship between 
managerial ability and one-year-ahead profitability. Thus, this study emphasizes the 
importance of firm contexts in explaining the effect of managerial ability on firm 
performance. This emphasis is important because previous studies are relatively silent about 
the moderating effects of firm characteristics on the relationship between managerial ability 
and firm performance (e.g. Bonsall IV et al., 2017;  Koester et al., 2017). Specifically, our 
study implies that in the case of increasing future sales, current cost efficiency will pay off 
because firm resources exhibit lower adjustment costs (costs to adjust the level of resources 
to the desired levels).  
 This study is subject to several caveats. Firstly, we use the managerial ability proxy 
of Demerjian et al. (2012) that formally measures the relationship between several production 
inputs and sales as the sole output measure. Even though this measure is accepted in previous 
literature, it is still possible that this measure does not account for omitted unobservable 
factors in measuring managerial ability. Secondly, our proxy for cost efficiency assumes that 
an increase in costs that is greater than the increase in sales always indicates cost inefficiency 
 
 




(Krause et al., 2013; Hoitash et al., 2016). However, Anderson et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
this is not always the case. Firms may deliberately increase operating costs to a larger extent 
than the increase in sales for reasons other than cost inefficiency, such as managerial 
optimism about future sales. Accordingly, we advise future studies to investigate further the 
motives for changes in operating costs relative to sales changes. For example, as suggested 
by Anderson et al. (2007), future studies can analyze whether managerial optimism for future 
sales or managerial inefficiency motivates firms to increase their costs to a larger extent than 
the amount that is proportional to the increase in their sales. In addition, further studies could 

























































Numerous studies have shown that costs do not change proportionally to activity 
changes in the sense that the cost increase when the activity increases is greater than the cost 
decrease when the activity decreases for the same levels of activity change (e.g., Anderson et 
al., 2003; Calleja, Steliaros, & Thomas, 2006;  Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012;  Dierynck, 
Landsman, & Renders, 2012) . This asymmetric cost behavior or “cost stickiness” is the 
consequence of managers’ asymmetric resource adjustment decisions.  Specifically, 
managers are willing to add resources when activity increases but are less willing to reduce 
resources when activity decreases (Anderson et al., 2003). 
A likely factor that explains cost stickiness is managerial incentives  . Managers 
consider their self-interests when making various decisions, including those regarding 
resource adjustment (Anderson et al., 2003; Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018). 
In this respect, because governance factors motivate or constrain managers to pursue their 
self-interests, cost stickiness is eventually affected by firms’ governance (Chen et al., 2012; 
Dierynck et al., 2012).  
Two important components of corporate governance are ownership type and CEO 
characteristics. Ownership type determines whether and how owners receive the benefits of 







1998). Thus, firms with different ownership types are likely to exhibit different cost behavior 
because their owners have different incentives in adjusting resources as a response to 
changing activity levels (Banker et al., 2018). Meanwhile, CEOs make important and 
strategic decisions for their firms. It is then likely that their personal characteristics affect 
their decision-making process because these characteristics shape the way they perceive and 
interpret their firms’ environment and make decisions based on their interpretation 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
The arguments lead us to analyze whether state and family ownership – two most 
common ownership types worldwide - affect the magnitude of cost stickiness. Family firms 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) arguably pursue both financial and non-financial 
objectives (Bai et al., 2000; Megginson, 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007;  Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2011). When sales decline, these firms are likely to retain unutilized resources because 
they consider that such reduction will threaten their non-financial objectives. Consequently, 
these firms will exhibit greater cost stickiness because of their decisions to retain idle 
resources when sales fall. 
Further, managerial ability is a CEO characteristic that increasingly receives attention 
from scholars. Better able managers are likely to increase future sales because of their 
superior ability to exploit market opportunities (Demerjian et al., 2012). However, increasing 
sales is not sufficient for enhancing profitability. Firms will increase their profitability when 
they add resources at a lower pace than future sales increase (Brush & Bromiley, 2000; 
Davidsson et al., 2009). Thus, it is important that firms manage to acquire resources at lower 
adjustment costs (costs to reduce resources when sales decline and to reacquire these 
resources when sales return to increase) because firms are more likely to add resources at a 







et al., 2003). When better able managers manage cost-efficient firms, the effect of managerial 
ability on firm performance is likely to be more pronounced because cost-efficient firms tend 
to have resources with lower adjustment costs. 
Thus, this dissertation aims at providing answers to the following research questions: 
(1) to what extent and under which circumstances does ownership type (state and family 
ownership) affect the degree of cost stickiness, and (2) what are the performance 
consequences of managerial ability and does firms’ cost efficiency influence these 
consequences?  
5.1. Main Findings of Each Study 
The first study (chapter 2) investigates the effect of state ownership on labor cost 
stickiness and whether the effects of several socio-political variables on labor cost stickiness 
are greater in SOEs than in private firms. The study focuses on labor cost issue because 
previous literature points out that labor-related issues such as wage levels and employment 
are the main concerns of policymakers in SOEs (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994). The results show that SOEs exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private 
firms. We also find that election years and left-wing governments exhibit effects on labor 
cost stickiness of SOEs, which are not present for private firms. Lastly, we demonstrate that 
in the year before the privatization, privatized firms exhibit anti-sticky cost behavior, 
suggesting that governments are likely to engage in aggressive cost-cutting activities before 
privatizing SOEs to maximize the proceeds from the privatization. 
The second study (chapter 3) analyzes the effect of family ownership on SG&A costs 
and the association between the changes in cost ratio (as a consequence of cost stickiness) of 
family firms and one-year-ahead earnings change. The study shows that family firms exhibit 







the degree of cost stickiness is concentrated in family firms in which owning families have 
the possibility to exert greater control over their firms, via a high degree of family ownership 
and family CEOs. Further, cost stickiness also affects the way we interpret financial ratios, 
including the cost ratio (a ratio between cost and sales). The cost stickiness literature suggests 
that firms may decide to retain unutilized resources when sales decrease because they are 
optimistic about future sales (Banker et al., 2014). This decision will arguably increase the 
cost ratio. Thus, an increase in this ratio that is motivated by managerial optimism about 
future sales will be associated with better performance (Anderson et al., 2007). In this study, 
we find that the changes in the cost ratio of family firms are negatively associated with one-
year-ahead earnings change, while there is no association for non-family firms. This result 
suggests that cost stickiness of family firms is indeed not caused by positive expectations 
about future sales but by other considerations such as the potential loss of socioemotional 
wealth. 
 The third study (chapter 4) focuses on the role of cost efficiency in moderating the 
effect of managerial ability on future performance. Similar to previous studies (e.g., 
Demerjian et al., 2012, Cheung et al., 2017),  this study finds that because of their superior 
ability to exploit market opportunities, better able managers are more likely to improve future 
performance by increasing future sales. Further, the study also demonstrates that cost 
efficiency enhances the effect of managerial ability on future performance. Thus, the findings 
suggest that when better able managers manage cost efficient firms, they manage to add 
resources needed to meet increased future sales at lower costs because their firms tend to have 








5.2. General Contributions  
The three studies in this dissertation offer two overarching contributions to the 
literature. Firstly, this thesis demonstrates that ownership type explains firms’ cost stickiness. 
Ownership type affects the distribution of the benefits of cost-related adjustment to owners 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998). Shareholders representing 
specific ownership types pursue both financial and non-financial objectives from their firm 
ownership. When these owners exhibit a greater preference for non-financial objectives (such 
as socio-political or socioemotional ones) over the financial ones, these objectives arguably 
motivate their managers to reduce fewer resources when sales fall, thus causing greater cost 
stickiness. Moreover, reducing costs when sales decline often involves difficult decisions 
(Anderson et al., 2003) and managers are motivated to avoid making such decisions by using 
owners’ greater preference for non-financial objective as their excuses.  Thus, we offer a more 
nuanced perspective on the effect of ownership type on cost stickiness by highlighting that 
various factors likely affect these firms’ cost stickiness by influencing the importance of 
nonfinancial objectives for the firms (such as election years or political orientation of the 
ruling parties for SOEs) or owners’ ability to exert greater control over their firms (e.g., 
family CEOs for family firms).  
 Secondly, this dissertation highlights the role of cost behavior in moderating the 
relationship between managerial ability and future performance. This issue is important 
because previous studies suggest that managerial ability always has a positive effect on firm 
performance. However, the study described in chapter 4 shows that the performance effect of 
managerial ability increases when these managers manage cost-efficient firms. This 







firm-level characteristic in explaining the relationship between managerial ability and one-
year ahead ROA.  
 
5.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
 The dissertation offers the following avenues for future studies.  Firstly, the first two 
studies (chapters 2 and 3) use (the percentage of) state or family share ownership as the basis 
of classifying sample firms into SOEs/ family firms and private/ non-family firms. In general, 
the percentage of ownership represents owners’ ability to control their firms and to secure 
their own interests possibly at the expense of others’ interests.  However,  owners can 
arguably pursue their interests from their firms using various devices other than through their 
share ownership. For example, governments can regulate firms in certain industries that they 
consider important or strategic. These regulations enable governments to exert significant 
control over firms’ operation and eventually to pursue their socio-political interests over these 
firms (Bertrand et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2009). In a similar vein, owning families’ 
socioemotional wealth is more complex than just family ownership (Astrachan et al., 2002; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore, future research may benefit from supplementing the 
ownership variable with other indicators that offer more nuanced views of the ability of 
owners to control firms or to pursue their own interests.   
Secondly, all chapters only use publicly listed firms as the samples and chapter 3 even 
only uses the 2000 largest publicly listed US firms (per 2001) as sample firms.  Consequently, 
these sample firms are larger than other (non-publicly listed) firms. Further, these studies rely 
on more developed countries as the research settings (22 European countries for chapter 2 
and the US for chapters 3 and 4) that potentially limit the generalizability of the results. Thus, 







stringent governance mechanisms than publicly listed firms. Also, future studies could use 
other research contexts such as developing countries that arguably exhibit weaker governance 
mechanisms.  
Thirdly, chapter 4 relies on the cost efficiency concept that assumes that an increase in 
costs that is greater than the increase in sales always indicates cost inefficiency (Krause et al., 
2013; Hoitash et al., 2016). However, the cost stickiness literature suggests this is not always 
the case because firms may add greater resources when sales increase or retain unused 
resources when sales decline (Anderson et al., 2007). Future research could investigate in 
which circumstances and why the cost efficiency or cost stickiness argument holds when the 
increase in costs is greater than the increase in sales.  
5.4. Practical Implications 
The studies in this dissertation discuss the role of ownership type on cost stickiness and 
the role of cost efficiency in moderating the performance effect of managerial ability. This 
dissertation offers two practical implications that will be described below. 
Firstly, our studies inform both academics and practitioners that ownership type affects 
the degree of cost stickiness. Certain owners prioritize non-financial objectives over financial 
ones, and these priorities likely affect their firms’ resource adjustment decisions and 
eventually cost behavior. Specifically, the emphasis on non-financial objectives likely 
increases the degree of cost stickiness because firms are less willing to reduce resources when 
sales decline. Thus, this dissertation advises practitioners such as financial analysts to 
incorporate firm characteristics in analyzing cost behavior. Certain firm characteristics likely 
increase or decrease the degree of cost stickiness that will eventually affect firm performance. 
Secondly, chapter 4 shows that although higher managerial ability is associated with 







capitalize on their superior ability to increase sales into higher profits.  This study then implies 
that certain firm-level characteristics likely moderate the performance effects of CEOs’ 
personal characteristics. Thus, this study suggests that firms have to incorporate their firm-
level characteristics in evaluating the performance of their managers. Specifically, it seems 
important to identify firm-level characteristics that potentially amplify or mitigate the 
performance effects of CEO characteristics to evaluate CEO performance better. 
We hope that this dissertation contributes to enhancing our understanding of cost 
stickiness. Furthermore, we hope that the dissertation motivates other scholars and students 
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Traditional management accounting literature argues that costs change proportionally 
to the changes in activity levels. However, a study by Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 
(2003) and various more recent studies demonstrate that the increase in costs when the level 
of firm activity increases is often greater than the decrease in costs in response to an activity 
decrease. This cost stickiness or sticky cost behavior is the consequence of managerial 
decisions to adjust resources asymmetrically. Firms add resources when sales increase. 
However, when sales decline, it is likely that they do not reduce unutilized resources (Banker 
& Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018). 
Several factors motivate managers to make asymmetrical resource adjustment 
decisions, including managerial incentives. Managers will arguably take their self-interests 
into consideration when making this type of resource adjustment decisions. In this respect, 
corporate governance will eventually affect cost stickiness because it motivates or constrains 
managers to make certain decisions (Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012). 
An important governance factor that likely affects cost stickiness is ownership type. 
Ownership type determines whether and how owners receive the benefits of cost-controlling 
activities (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998). Thus, firms with 
different owners arguably have different incentive levels in managing their costs. 
Family and state ownership are the two most common ownership types worldwide (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer, 1998;  Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Owners representing these two 
ownership types arguably pursue both financial and non-financial objectives. For example, 
ruling politicians may instruct SOEs (state-owned enterprises) to pursue greater socio-







2005) that are often in conflict with firms’ financial objectives (Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 1994). 
In a similar vein, owning families generate socioemotional wealth from their ownership of 
family firms. Thus, it is likely that owning families instruct the managers of their firms to 
serve and protect their sosioemotional needs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). 
Using agency theory and socioemotional wealth theory, the first two studies in this 
dissertation predict and test whether and under which circumstances SOEs and family firms 
exhibit greater cost stickiness than private or non-family firms. SOEs and family firms are 
arguably less willing to reduce costs when sales decline because of their emphasis on pursuing 
non-financial objectives (such as socio-political and socioemotional wealth goals). 
Consequently, it is likely that these firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than private or non-
family firms. Further, the second study also investigates whether family firms’ cost stickiness 
negatively affects future performance.  
The upper echelon theory argues that the personal characteristics of organizations’ top 
managers significantly affect organizations’ outcomes and behaviors (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Hambrick, 2007). An important CEO characteristic that likely affects firms’ outcomes 
is managerial ability. Briefly stated, managerial ability refers to managers’ superior skills to 
utilize their resources more efficiently and effectively to optimize firm profitability 
(Demerjian et al., 2012). Thus, firms led by better able managers are likely to generate better 
future performance. 
However, increased sales do not necessarily imply better profitability because firms 
often have to add more resources to meet increased demands. Firms can translate increased 
sales into higher profits only if the costs of adding resources is lower than the level of sales 







adjustment costs are more likely to translate sales increases into higher profits because they 
can add resources at lower costs. In this respect, the performance effect of managerial ability 
on future performance will be arguably more pronounced when better able managers lead 
cost-efficient firms because these firms manage to have resources with lower adjustment 
costs. Thus, the third study of this dissertation tests the role of cost efficiency in moderating 
the performance effect of managerial ability on future firm performance. The following 
paragraphs explain the three studies in more details. 
Chapter 2 examines the effect of state ownership on the labor cost stickiness of firms in 
22 European countries. States are more likely to interfere in the decision-making processes 
of state-owned enterprises and demand firm activities that are desirable from a socio-political 
perspective. For example, to win political support, politicians may instruct state-owned 
enterprises to avoid layoffs to minimize unemployment rates (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). The varied objectives of state-owned enterprises also make 
it more difficult to control managers’ behavior, leaving more room for managerial discretion 
and the pursuit of self-interests through empire-building behavior (Bai et al., 2000; Sapienza, 
2004; Tirole, 1994). Both state intervention and managerial self-interest restrain managers 
from laying off employees or reducing employee wages when sales decrease, which may lead 
to greater labor cost stickiness. Data from 1993–2012 reveal that state-owned enterprises 
exhibit greater labor cost stickiness than private firms, and their labor cost stickiness also 
varies predictably with socio-political variables such as election years and left-wing 
governments.  
In chapter 3,  the socioemotional wealth perspective (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011) is used to predict that family firms exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family 







loss of the owners’ socioemotional wealth. Particularly family firms with a high degree of 
family ownership, family CEOs, and a high proportion of family directors are expected to 
exhibit greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Given that firms’ current cost stickiness 
is reflected in their cost ratio changes, family firms’ cost ratios are likely to be negatively 
associated with future earnings change. The findings demonstrate that family firms exhibit 
greater cost stickiness than non-family firms. Subsample analyses show that the effect of 
family ownership on cost stickiness is concentrated in family firms with a high degree of 
family ownership and family CEOs. Finally, the results show that an increase in the cost ratio 
leads to a negative future earnings change for family firms but not for non-family firms, which 
highlights that cost stickiness in family firms can be explained by non-economic 
considerations. 
Using the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), chapter 
4 investigates the role of cost efficiency in moderating the performance effect of managerial 
ability on future firm performance. Better able managers are more likely to increase future 
firm performance because of their superior ability in exploiting market opportunities. 
However, the ability to increase future sales is insufficient in enhancing firm performance 
because it is still probable that firms have to increase considerable resources to meet increased 
sales. Firms can translate sales growth into higher profitability only when they increase their 
costs at a pace lower than their sales increase (Davidsson et al., 2009). In this respect, better 
able managers who manage cost-efficient firms are more likely to increase future 
performance because cost-efficient firms arguably acquire resources at lower adjustment 
costs. Thus, it can be predicted that cost efficiency enhances the performance effect of 







the importance of firm-level characteristics in explaining the performance effects of CEO 
characteristics to better evaluate CEO performance.  
The first two studies underscore the importance of ownership types in explaining cost 
stickiness. Firms with different ownership types arguably have different incentives in 
managing costs because their owners have different preferences for the benefits of cost-
related decisions. When owners emphasize non-financial objectives over financial ones (such 
as socio-political or socioemotional interests), it is likely that their firms are less willing to 
reduce costs when sales decline because these firms consider that such decisions will threaten 
their owners’ non-financial interests. Further, reducing resources often involves difficult and 
complex decisions and managers prefer avoiding such decisions and use the pursuit of these 
non-financial objectives as an excuse. Further, these two studies also offer a more nuanced 
perspective on the effect of ownership type on cost stickiness by highlighting that various 
factors likely affect these firms’ cost stickiness by influencing the importance of nonfinancial 
objectives for the firms (such as election years or political orientation of the ruling parties for 
SOEs) or owners’ ability to exert greater control over their firms (e.g. family CEOs for family 
firms).  
This dissertation also demonstrates that the positive effect of managerial ability on 
future performance is stronger when better able managers manage cost-efficient firms. 
Specifically, the third study of this dissertation empirically suggests that cost efficiency 
moderates the effect of managerial ability on firm performance. Thus, our study is important 
because it underscores the importance of firm-specific context, while previous studies suggest 


















De literatuur op het gebied van management accounting ging er in het verleden vanuit 
dat kosten proportioneel veranderen met veranderingen in activiteiten van de onderneming. 
In een studie van Anderson, Banker en Jankiraman (2003), en daarna in diverse andere 
studies, is echter aangetoond dat de stijging in kosten als gevolg van een stijging in de 
activiteiten van de onderneming vaak groter is dan de daling in kosten op moment dat de 
activiteiten van de onderneming afnemen. Dit fenomeen wordt aangeduid als  cost stickiness 
(“kostenkleverigheid”) en is het resultaat van beslissingen van managers om middelen 
asymmetrisch aan te passen aan de activiteiten van de onderneming. Meer in het bijzonder 
zullen ondernemingen middelen toevoegen op moment dat de omzet stijgt. Echter, op 
moment dat de omzet daalt, zullen managers minder snel geneigd zijn om de middelen die 
onbenut blijven te reduceren (Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2018). 
Diverse factoren dragen bij aan de neiging van managers om middelen asymmetrisch 
aan te passen aan de activiteiten van de onderneming. Zo is het aannemelijk dat managers 
hun eigenbelang in aanmerking nemen bij het nemen van beslissingen met betrekking tot het 
bijstellen van de inzet van middelen. Gezien de rol die corporate-governance-mechanismen 
hebben bij het reduceren van de mate waarin managers hun eigenbelang kunnen nastreven, 
kunnen corporate-governance-mechanismen ook van invloed zijn op de mate van cost 
stickiness (Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012). 
Een belangrijke corporate governance gerelateerde factor die hoogstwaarschijnlijk de 
mate van cost stickiness beïnvloedt is eigendomstype oftewel de identiteit van de (groot) 
aandeelhouders. De identiteit van de (groot) aandeelhouders bepaalt of en op welke manier 







1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Shleifer, 1998). Het is dan ook aannemelijk dat verschillende 
(groot) aandeelhouders in verschillende mate geneigd zijn om kosten te beheersen. 
Wereldwijd behoren familie- en staatsbezit tot veel voorkomende vormen van 
eigendom van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer, 1998;  
Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Aandeelhouders die families of de staat vertegenwoordigen zullen 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk zowel financiële als niet-financiële doelstellingen nastreven. 
Bijvoorbeeld politici die een regeringspartij vertegenwoordigen kunnen bedrijven die in het 
bezit van de staat zijn instrueren om meer sociaal-politieke doelen—doelen die op gespannen 
voet kunnen staan met de financiële doelen van de onderneming  (Sapienza, 2004; Tirole, 
1994)—na te streven in een poging om herkozen te worden (Bai et al., 2000; Megginson, 
2005). Evenzo halen families sociaal-emotionele waarde uit de bedrijven die zij bezitten. Het 
is derhalve aannemelijk dat familie-eigenaren de managers van hun bedrijven zullen 
instrueren om de sociaal-emotionele behoeften van de familie te dienen en te beschermen 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
Op basis van de agency-theorie en de socioemotional-wealth-theorie, worden in de 
eerste twee studies in deze dissertatie onderzocht of en onder welke omstandigheden de 
kosten in SOE’s (state-owned enterprises), bedrijven die (gedeeltelijk) in handen zijn van de 
staat, en familiebedrijven meer sticky zijn dan geprivatiseerde ondernemingen of niet-
familie-ondernemingen. Zo zullen SOE’s en familiebedrijven door hun focus op het 
verwezenlijken van niet-financiële doelstellingen (zoals sociaal-politieke en sociaal-
emotionele ambities) wellicht minder bereid zijn om bij dalingen van de omzet hun kosten te 
reduceren. Als gevolg hiervan is de verwachting dat deze bedrijven in hogere mate met cost 







onderzocht of cost stickiness van familiebedrijven een negatieve invloed kan hebben op 
toekomstige bedrijfsresultaten.  
Volgens de upper-echelon-theorie hebben de persoonlijke eigenschappen van 
topmanagers een significant effect op de bedrijfsresultaten van organisaties en de wijze 
waarop zij opereren (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Een belangrijk CEO-
kenmerk dat mogelijk invloed heeft op de resultaten van een bedrijf is de competentie van de 
manager (in de literatuur ook wel aangeduid met managerial ability). Kort samengevat heeft 
competentie van de manager betrekking op de vaardigheid om beleid te formuleren waarmee 
de bedrijfsmiddelen op een efficiënte en effectieve manier worden benut zodanig dat de 
winstcapaciteit wordt geoptimaliseerd. Derhalve is het aannemelijk dat meer competente 
managers betere toekomstige prestaties realiseren.                
Een hogere omzet betekent echter niet automatisch meer winst, aangezien bedrijven dan 
doorgaans meer middelen moeten inzetten de toegenomen vraag te kunnen beantwoorden. 
Bedrijven kunnen hun verkooptoename alleen omzetten in meer winst wanneer de kosten van 
de extra middelen lager zijn dan de stijging van de omzet (Anderson et al., 2007). Derhalve 
zullen bedrijven die extra middelen kunnen verkrijgen met lagere aanpassingskosten naar 
verwachting uiteindelijk meer winst overhouden aan de verkoopstijging doordat de aanschaf 
van de extra productiemiddelen gepaard gaat met minder kosten. Hoe beter de manager dus 
in staat is om een kostenbesparend beleid te voeren, hoe lager de aanpassingskosten, en hoe 
hoger de winst. De derde studie richt zich dan ook op het modererende effect van 
kostenefficiëntie op het effect van competentie van de manager op de toekomstige 
bedrijfsresultaten. In de volgende alinea’s worden de drie studies nader toegelicht.  
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt het effect van staatsbezit op de stickiness van de arbeidskosten 







mengen in besluitvormingsprocessen van bedrijven die (gedeeltelijk) eigendom zijn van de 
staat en van managers van deze bedrijven verlangen dat de bedrijven zich bezig houden met 
activiteiten die vanuit een sociaal-politiek perspectief gewenst zijn. Om politieke steun te 
verwerven, kunnen politici deze bedrijven bijvoorbeeld instrueren om geen mensen te 
ontslaan om zo de werkloosheidscijfers te minimaliseren. De aard van de doelstellingen van 
bedrijven die (gedeeltelijk) eigendom zijn van de staat maakt het ook moeilijker om het 
gedrag van managers te controleren, wat betekent dat zij een grotere keuzevrijheid hebben. 
Hierdoor kunnen zij gemakkelijker hun eigen gang gaan in het nastreven van hun 
eigenbelang. Zowel staatsinterventie als eigenbelang weerhouden managers ervan om 
werknemers te ontslaan wanneer de verkoop daalt, hetgeen kan leiden tot een hogere mate 
van cost stickiness. Gegevens uit de periode 1993 – 2012 laten zien dat de cost stickiness van 
de arbeidskosten van deze bedrijven hoger is dan die van andere bedrijven (i.c. bedrijven die 
niet (deels) in handen zijn van de staat), en dat de mate van cost stickiness samenhangt met 
sociaal-politieke variabelen, zoals verkiezingsjaren en politiek links georiënteerde 
regeringen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt er op basis van het socio-emotional-wealth-perspectief vanuit 
gegaan dat familiebedrijven meer onderhevig zijn aan cost stickiness dan niet-familie-
ondernemingen. Om een afname in de sociaal-emotionele welvaart van de eigenaren te 
voorkomen, zullen familiebedrijven minder geneigd zijn om gedurende een periode van 
daling van de omzet de kosten te reduceren. Voorts wordt er gesteld dat in het bijzonder bij 
familiebedrijven waarin een groot aantal familieleden een functie hebben, en ook bij 
familiebedrijven waarvan een familielid CEO of directeur is, een hogere mate van cost 
stickiness zal voorkomen dan bij niet-familie-ondernemingen. Aangezien cost stickiness tot 







kostenratio van familiebedrijven negatief gerelateerd zijn aan veranderingen in toekomstige 
bedrijfsresultaten. De resultaten laten zien dat familiebedrijven een hogere mate van cost 
stickiness hebben dan niet-familie-ondernemingen. Analyses van specifieke groepen van 
ondernemingen tonen aan dat het effect van familiebezit op cost stickiness zich vooral 
voordoet in familiebedrijven waar families een groot deel van de aandelen in het bezit hebben 
en bedrijven waarvan de CEO een lid van de familie is. Tenslotte is gebleken dat voor 
familiebedrijven een toename van de kostenratio tot een afname van de toekomstige winst 
leidt, hetgeen niet het geval is voor niet-familie-ondernemingen. De cost stickiness van 
familiebedrijven kan derhalve worden verklaard door niet-economische overwegingen. 
Met behulp van de upper-echelon-theorie onderzoekt hoofdstuk 4 de rol van 
kostenefficiëntie als modererende factor in de mate waarin managementcapaciteit de 
bedrijfsprestaties beïnvloedt. Door hun beter ontwikkelde vermogen om kansen in de markt 
op een goede manier te benutten, zijn de meer competente topmanagers naar verwachting 
beter in staat om verbeteringen in toekomstige resultaten te realiseren. De capaciteit om de 
toekomstige verkopen nog meer te laten stijgen is echter geen garantie voor een verbetering 
van de bedrijfsresultaten, aangezien er in deze situatie meer productiemiddelen nodig zijn. 
Verkoopgroei kan alleen worden vertaald naar een werkelijke toename van het resultaat 
wanneer de kostenverhoging de winst niet geheel tenietdoet. Het is dan ook aannemelijk dat 
meer competente managers die leidinggeven aan kostenefficiënte bedrijven beter in staat om 
de winst te laten stijgen doordat dergelijke bedrijven productiemiddelen tegen lagere kosten 
kunnen verwerven. Derhalve is de stelling dat kostenefficiëntie het effect van management-
competentie op toekomstige prestaties versterkt. De empirische bevindingen in deze studie 







kenmerken aan bij het duiden en evalueren van effecten van CEO-kenmerken op de prestaties 
van bedrijven. 
De eerste twee studies onderschrijven het belang van eigendomstypen in het verklaren 
van de cost stickiness van ondernemingen. Bedrijven die in dit opzicht verschillen hebben 
klaarblijkelijk verschillende drijfveren met betrekking tot het beheersen van hun kosten, 
aangezien hun beleid op dit punt gebaseerd is op andere voorkeuren. Wanneer eigenaren de 
voorrang geven aan niet-financiële boven financiële doelstellingen (zoals sociaal-politieke of 
sociaal-emotionele belangen), zullen zij in geval van dalingen in de omzet waarschijnlijk 
minder bereid zijn om meer kosten te besparen omdat hiermee hun niet-financiële belangen 
in het geding komen. Daarbij brengt het beperken van middelen vaak het nemen van moeilijke 
en complexe beslissingen met zich mee, die managers liever vermijden. In plaats daarvan 
kiezen ze er dan voor om zich op niet-financiële doelstellingen te richten. Voorts geven de 
twee studies een meer genuanceerd beeld van het effect van eigendomstype op cost stickiness 
door te wijzen op de invloed van factoren die het belang van een focus op niet-financiële 
overwegingen vergroten (zoals verkiezingsjaren of de politieke oriëntatie van partijen die 
SOE’s goed gezind zijn). Verder kunnen ook familiebedrijven waarvan de CEO een 
familielid is in hogere mate onderhevig zijn aan cost stickiness. Familie-CEO’s nemen vaak 
alleen de beslissingen en zijn doorgaans meer gericht op bovengenoemde factoren dan het 
management van niet-familie-ondernemingen.  
Deze dissertatie toont tevens aan dat het positieve effect op de toekomstige 
bedrijfsresultaten groter is wanneer bekwame managers leidinggeven aan een kostenefficiënt 
bedrijf. Zo stelt de derde studie op basis van empirisch onderzoek dat kostenefficiëntie een 
modererend effect heeft op de relatie tussen competentie van de manager en de prestaties van 







een positief effect heeft op de bedrijfsresultaten, wordt in deze dissertatie het belang van de 
bedrijfsspecifieke context onderschreven. 
